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THE LAW BETWEEN THE BAR
AND THE STATE
SUSAN P. KONIAK*
The traditional understanding of the relation between law
and professional legal ethics is that legal ethics covers matters
not covered by law; that ethics sits passively above law, starting
where law leaves off. In this Article, Professor Susan Koniak ar-
gues that this understanding is wrong. She asserts that profes-
sional ethics are in competition and conflict with law as it is
embodied in the pronouncements of courts and legislatures.
Although "law" is usually considered to be the near exclusive
preserve of the state, the Article contends that private groups also
have "law," but it is usually called "ethics." The legal profes-
sion's ethos is the profession's law-a law maintained by the
legal profession, not by the state.
Professor Koniak examines the profession's nomos-its
law-and how it contrasts, competes and coexists with the state's
law governing lawyers. The Article concludes that the legal pro-
fession and the state are engaged in an ongoing struggle over
normative space. It contends that the profession is able to main-
tain its competing vision of the law, despite the tremendous power
the state has at its disposal to enforce its view, because the state is
weakly committed to its vision of the law governing conduct of
the legal profession.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The state and the profession have different understandings of the
law governing lawyers-they have in effect different "law."' The law of
lawyering is not inherently more amorphous, contradictory or obtuse
than other law.2 It is not radically uncertain; it is "essentially con-
1. This Article uses Robert Cover's rich and original vision of law, which he articulated
most fully in Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Nar-
rative, 97 HARV. L. Rav. 4 (1983) [hereinafter Cover, Nomos] and developed further in Rob-
ert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986) [hereinafter Cover, Violence],
and Robert M. Cover, Bringing the Messiah Through Law: A Case Study, in RELIGION, MO-
RALITY AND THE LAW: NoMos XXX 201 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds.,
1988), as a means of understanding the law governing lawyers. Professor Cover died in the
summer of 1986. I loved him much and miss him deeply. The magnificence of his vision is
still with us. However modest a tribute to my friend and teacher this Article is, it is my sincere
hope that it serves at least to bring those unfamiliar with his work to it.
2. My claim is that what others bemoan as uncertainty in the law of lawyering, see, e.g.,
Harry I. Subin, The Lawyer as Superego: Disclosure of Client Confidences to Prevent Harm, 70
IOWA L. REv. 1091, 1098 (1985) ("At present, the law of confidentiality is in a state of
chaos."), is not a function of too little law, but of too much law.
It is remarkable that in myth and history the origin of and justification for a
court is rarely understood to be the need for law. Rather, it is understood to be the
need.., to choose between two or more laws, to impose upon law a hierarchy....
Modern apologists for the... [role] courts [play in killing off alternative mean-
ings for law] usually state the problem not as one of too much law, but as one of
unclear law.... To state, as I have done, that the problem is one of too much law is
to acknowledge the nomic integrity of each of the communities that have generated
principles and precepts. It is to posit that each "community of interpretation" that
has achieved "law" has its own nomos-narratives, experiences, and visions to which
the norm articulated is the right response.
Cover, Nomos, supra note 1, at 40, 42.
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tested."' 3 There is a continuing struggle between the profession and the
state over whether the profession's vision of law or the state's will reign.
The state has violent means at its disposal to ensure the primacy of its
law.' To struggle with the state can be dangerous. The power of the
state provides a formidable incentive for individual members to defect
from a group that insists on asserting its own law against the state and
for the group to give in and change its position. Protracted struggles
with the state are thus generally waged only by groups whose members
are strongly committed not only to their shared normative understanding
but also to one another.' The modem legal profession is not such a
group. It is heterogeneous.' Moreover, it is a group uniquely dependent
on the state and the state's law, which define the group and provide it
with purpose.7 The legal profession thus seems an unlikely group to
maintain a normative vision at odds with the state. Nonetheless, this
Article contends that the legal profession does maintain a strong compet-
ing normative vision and that it struggles with the state to assert the
primacy of that vision.
Protracted struggle between the profession and the state is possible,
notwithstanding the weak communal bonds among lawyers and the
group's dependence on the state, because the state's commitment to its
vision of the law governing lawyers is weak. The state acts weak and
speaks weak. Official interpreters of state law, such as judges,8 usually
act and speak from the starting assumption that the state's vision of the
law, their vision, is primary: they assume that their interpretations are
3. See Cover, Nomos, supra note 1, at 17 n.46 (citing W.B. GALLIE, PHILOSOPHY AND
THE HISTORICAL UNDERSTANDING 157-91 (1964)).
4. "Legal interpretative acts signal and occasion the imposition of violence upon others:
A judge articulates her understanding of a text, and as a result somebody loses his freedom, his
property, his children, even his life." Cover, Violence, supra note 1, at 1601.
5. See Cover, Nomos, supra note 1, at 26-30 (discussing the insular normative communi-
ties of the Amish and the Mennonites).
6. See, e.g., JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD 0. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SO-
CIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR 56-73 (1982); Edward 0. Laumann & John P. Heinz, Washing-
ton Lawyers and Others: The Structure of Washington Representation, 37 STAN. L. REv. 465,
476-95 (1985).
7. See infra text accompanying notes 83-85.
8. Although from the state's perspective judges are the most authoritative interpreters of
law, see Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803), they are not the only official
interpreters of state law. Administrative agencies and officials, prosecutors and other members
of the executive branch, and legislatures and members of the legislative branch, also function
as official interpreters. while the interpretations of these other state actors are, in theory,
always subject to rejection by judges, their interpretations are also to be accorded, in theory,
more deference than nonofficial interpretations. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984) (holding that courts should defer to an
administrative agency's reasonable interpretation of a statutory term).
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uniquely authoritative and that other interpretations must yield to that of
the state.9 In cases involving the law governing lawyers, however, the
attitude is different. The state often speaks as if it were uncertain about
whether its law should reign, and it demonstrates that uncertainty by
refusing to use force against lawyers to vindicate the primacy of its law."0
The state is thus not so threatening either to group members or to the
group's normative vision.11 The weakness of the state's commitment in
combination with other factors, such as the profession's control over the
education of its members, 2 has made it possible for the profession to
maintain a strong normative vision, its own law, at odds with that of the
state.
This Article examines the profession's nomos-its law 3 -and how
it contrasts, competes and coexists with the state's law governing law-
yers. Before proceeding, however, it is important to make clear that
while for ease of reading I will speak of "the profession" and "the state,"
I do not mean that either the profession or the state is monolithic or that
there exists only one version of the profession's law and one version of
the state's law. 4 My claim is rather that the various normative worlds
9. The most extreme demonstration of this attitude is Walker v. Birmingham, 388 U.S.
307, 320-21 (1967), in which the Court held that one cannot challenge an unconstitutional
court order by disobeying it; unlike statutes, regulations and executive orders, a court order
must be obeyed until a court decides it is unconstitutional.
10. See infra notes 314-80 and accompanying text.
11. Put simply, it is easier to maintain commitment to the principles of one's own group
when the other side is unlikely to get too nasty.
12. Other commentators have discussed the normative messages maintained and commu-
nicated by legal education. See generally DUNCAN KENNEDY, LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE
REPRODUCTION OF HIERARCHY: A POLEMIC AGAINST THE SYSTEM (1983) (discussing how
standard methods of teaching law communicate values and ideology); Roger C. Cramton, The
Ordinary Religion of the Law School Classroom, 29 J. LEGAL EDUC. 247 (1978) (analyzing the
value system of legal education).
13. Throughout this Article I use the terms "nomos," "normative world," "normative
vision" and "law" interchangeably.
The Hebrew word Torah was translated into the Greek nomos in the Septuagint
and in the Greek scripture and postscriptural writings, and into the English phrase
"the Law." "Torah," like "nomos" and "the Law," is amenable to a range of mean-
ings that serve both to enrich the term and to obscure analysis of it .... The Hebrew
"Torah" refers both to law in the sense of a body of regulation and, by extension, to
the corpus of all related normative material and to the teaching and learning of those
primary and secondary sources. In this fully extended sense, the term embraces life
itself, or at least the normative dimension of it, and "Torah" is used with just such
figurative extension in later rabbinics.
Cover, Nomos, supra note 1, at 11 n.31.
My justification for (and insistence on) using the word "law" to describe what others call
the profession's "ethos" is explained infra notes 53-81 and accompanying text.
14. To avoid straining the reader and myself, I will use the term "bar's (or profession's)
nomos" (or "normative world" or "law") without reminding you that I mean the core set of
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created by communities of practicing lawyers diverge from the various
normative worlds created by the state at similar points and for similar
reasons, although the degree of divergence may vary considerably." Put
another way, my position is that the normative worlds created by seg-
ments of the practicing bar (with the possible exception of government
lawyers)16 are more like one another than they are like the various nor-
normative understandings that tend to be common to at least those segments of the profession
that are not also state actors. By "state actors" I mean judges, administrative agency officials,
prosecutors and members of the legislature.
I will similarly use the term "state law" to refer to the commonly expressed normative
understandings of state actors, but this is not intended to suggest that the state view is mono-
lithic, always consistent or not fraught with ambiguity. The "state" too is diverse. First, much
of the law governing lawyers is state-not federal-law, and thus is not uniform. Second,
entities within a state may articulate different normative understandings of the law governing
lawyers. For example, the Securities and Exchange Commission's understanding of the law-
yer's obligations under law may differ from that of the Internal Revenue Service or, for that
matter, from the understanding of the federal courts. Third, state officials responsible for ar-
ticulating and enforcing the state's version of law may vary in their individual commitment to
the norms expressed. Most notably, the fact that so many state actors are also lawyers may
contribute significantly to the weakness of the state's commitment to state law. See, e.g.,
Wayne D. Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil Discovery: A Critique and Proposals for
Change, 31 VAND. L. Rnv. 1295, 1343 (1978) (suggesting that judicial reluctance to impose
discovery sanctions may stem from the fact that judges are lawyers and thus have been accul-
turated to the adversarial model of judicial process). Finally, the weakness of the state's com-
mitment to its law results in some ambiguity about the state's position. See infra notes 328-33
and accompanying text.
15. Other scholars of the profession, who understand the importance of the substantial
heterogeneity in background, substance of work and work-setting of the modern bar, have also
described and accepted the existence of a core of shared normative understandings. See, e.g.,
Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REv. 1, 10 (1988) (describing
the core as the "Ideal of Liberal Advocacy," which corresponds to Professor Rhode's descrip-
tion, although he differs with Rhode by claiming that substantial agreement on this normative
approach dissolves when lawyers consider the civil lawyer's role); Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical
Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 589, 595-605 (1985) (describing the core as
dominated by an adversary ideology, albeit tempered with rhetoric suggesting more public-
spirited ideals).
16. Prosecutors and other government lawyers present a particularly interesting subom-
munity of the bar to study in light of the theory presented in this Article because this group
functions both as the state and as the bar. While consideration of the nomos of this group is
outside the scope of this Article, I do want to note that the present struggle between the United
States Attorney General and the bar over whether and to what extent the ethics rules apply to
government lawyers provides persuasive evidence that at least in some critical respects the
prosecutor's nomos diverges considerably from that of the private bar.
One center of dispute concerns rule 4.2 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
which forbids lawyers from communicating with represented parties without the consent of the
lawyers for those parties. The Attorney General contends that this does not prevent govern-
ment lawyers from communicating directly with those under investigation or accused of
crimes. See Memorandum from Attorney General Richard Thornburgh to Justice Depart-
ment Litigators (June 8, 1989) (on file with author) (interpreting rule 4.2 to allow government
lawyers to contact individuals without obtaining their lawyers' consent so long as the contact
is legitimate under the Constitution and federal law). The organized bar contends the rule
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mative worlds created by different state entities. I do not, however, mean
to dispute that the profession-even if, as in this Article, we use the term
to mean only the private bar-comprises many different communities or
that those communities may differ in their understanding of the norma-
tive standards that govern the behavior of their members. 17 That neither
the state nor the bar is monolithic introduces another element of uncer-
tainty into discussions of the law of lawyering, but not one that distin-
guishes this body of law from others. The state, after all, is no more
monolithic in its approach to antitrust law, for example," and the busi-
ness community is no more monolithic in its vision of anticompetitive
practices, 9 than the bar is toward the law that most affects it. By identi-
fying and discussing what I claim is the bar's dominant nomos, I do not
mean to circumvent the alternative normative visions maintained by sub-
communities of lawyers.20 Indeed, I mean to strengthen communities
forbids such contact. The courts have not been forthcoming with an answer to this question.
For example, on at least three occasions the United States Supreme Court has bypassed the
opportunity to address whether a prosecutor is bound by the ethics rules governing contact
with persons represented by counsel. See Minnick v. Mississippi, 111 S. Ct. 486 (1990); Michi-
gan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344 (1990); Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285 (1988); see also United
States v. Hammad, 858 F.2d 834, 839 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that prosecutors are bound by
the ethics rule but interpreting the rule as allowing prosecutors to use informants to gather
information from the those suspected of criminal activity without alerting their counsel);
United States v. Adonis, 744 F. Supp. 336, 346-47 (D.D.C. 1990) (referring to the Attorney
General's position with disapproval; holding that the United States Attorney is bound by rule
4.2, but refusing to comment on the widespread "violation" of the rule by Justice Department
lawyers); United States v. Western Elec. Co., 1990-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,939, at 63,050
(D.D.C. Feb. 28, 1990) (referring with apparent approval to the Attorney General's position
that prosecutors have wide latitude to talk to criminal suspects and defendants notwithstand-
ing the ethics rules).
By refusing to speak with commitment on this question, the courts have, in effect, ceded
their institutional role as official interpreters of state law to the private bar and the prosecutors
simultaneously. They have left legal meaning to be created in the arena of power politics. See
infra notes 329-32 and accompanying text.
17. For an interesting discussion of how communities of practitioners differed on the
breadth of the exceptions to the duty of confidentiality to be included in the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct during the debate in the ABA House of Delegates, see Ted Schneyer,
Professionalism as Bar Politics: The Making of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 14
LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 677 (1989).
18. See, eg., E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, POL-
ICY AND PROCEDURE 399 (2d ed. 1989) (discussing how the vertical restraint guidelines issued
by the United States Justice Department in 1985 departed from case law and explaining how
the Justice Department's vision of the law of vertical restraints differed not only from that of
the courts but also from that expressed by Congress).
19. See Michael H. Orbison, Note, Vertical Restraints in the Brewing Industry: Is the
Malt Beverage Interbrand Competition Act the Answer?, 50 BROoK. L. REV. 143, 161-63, 186-
88 (1983) (discussing how beer distributors and beer retailers disagree on a statute providing
an antitrust exemption for the beer industry).
20. See generally Gordon, supra note 15 (arguing persuasively for the need to realize in
action the professional ideal of independence from the client and exploring the conditions
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dedicated to re-forming the profession's nomos by providing a full de-
scription of the nomos which they challenge and by acknowledging that
their struggle is a struggle over the meaning of law.
II. THE INADEQUACY OF THE TRADITIONAL UNDERSTANDING OF
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LAW AND PROFESSIONAL
ETHIcs2 '
As traditionally conceived, the domain of professional ethics begins
where the law of the state leaves off.22 By this I mean that ethics is
generally understood to be about obligations above and beyond the re-
quirements of law. For example, a classic formulation of the legal profes-
sion's ethos-the formulation usually referred to as the "adversary
ethic"-is that short of violating the law,23 the lawyer should do all she
can to further the client's cause no matter how morally objectionable that
conducive to the flourishing of such an ideal). Professor Gordon demonstrates that the ideal of
independence from the client has coexisted with the ideal of independence from the state for
much of the profession's history in this country, and that the two norms are still expressed
today in the bar's rhetoric. His project, with which I am quite sympathetic, is, however, avow-
edly redemptionist: his purpose is to move the ideal of independence from the client out of the
world of rhetoric and into the world of action. In the terms used in this Article, Gordon is
seeking to make this norm "law" for the greater community of lawyers. That Gordon, who is
a lawyer, speaks this way is itself evidence that independence from the client is already "law"
for some subgroups of lawyers. For other evidence, see id. at 65-68.
On the other hand, his whole project is premised on the notion that for the vast majority
of lawyers this norm has lost the status of "law," assuming it ever had such status. For exam-
ple, he writes:
I know perfectly well that when lawyers start talking this way about their public
duties, being officers of the court and so on, most of us understand that we have left
ordinary life far behind for the hazy aspirational world of the Law Day sermon and
Bar Association after-dinner speech-inspirational, boozily solemn, anything but
real.
Id. at 13. For an examination of the potency of this alternate norm for lawyers in post-Civil
War America, see Robert W. Gordon, "The Ideal and the Actual in the Law": Fantasies and
Practices of New York City Lawyers, 1870-1910, in THE NEW HIGH PRIESTS: LAWYERS IN
POST-CIVIL WAR AMERICA at 51 (Gerard W. Gawalt ed., 1984).
21. I use the term "professional ethics" here instead of "legal ethics" for a reason. This
section of the discussion applies whether we are talking of the ethical (normative) systems of
lawyers, doctors or some other group.
22. See, e.g., William J. Goode, Community Within a Community: The Professions, 22
AM. Soc. REV. 194, 195 (1957) ("Although the occupational behavior of members is regulated
by law, the professional community exacts a higher standard of behavior than does the law.");
sources cited infra note 29.
23. Here, as is common in discussions of legal ethics, the word "law" refers to law other
than the profession's ethics rules. Note, however, that when adopted by a state court or legis-
lature, the ethics rules are a form of "law" as that term is commonly understood. The accept-
ance of ethics rules as law to some extent by both the state and the bar and the implications of
this acceptance are discussed infra texts accompanying notes 86-89, 159-72. For now it is
sufficient to note that even though the ethics rules are in one sense a part of state law, both the
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cause is and no matter what moral wrongs are perpetrated on others in
the process. 24
Thus, even this formulation, which might be characterized as mor-
ally unambitious, takes for granted that the domain of professional ethics
is separate from the domain of law except to the extent that ethics as-
sumes that law will be obeyed. 25 The same relationship between law and
professional ethics is found in discussions of medical ethics,26 accounting
ethics,2 7 business ethics28 and the sociological literature on the
state and the profession generally refer to these rules and questions arising under them as
matters of "ethics," not "law."
24. Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HuM. RTS. 1,
5-6 (1975). I call this formulation classic because those who support and those who criticize
the normative justification for the profession's ethos generally accept this statement (or some
nearly identical statement) as their point of departure. Compare MONROE H. FREEDMAN,
LAWYER'S ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM passim (1975) (defending the ethic described
by the classic formulation) and Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations
of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060, 1063-65 (1976) (similiar) and Stephen L.
Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, A Problem, and Some Possibilities, 1986
AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613, 614 (similar) with David Luban, The Adversary System Excuse, in
THE GOOD LAwYER: LAWYERS' ROLES AND LAWYERS' ETHics 83, 118 (David Luban ed.,
1983) (critiquing the ethic described by the classic formulation) and William H. Simon, Ethical
Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083, 1083-85 (1988) (similar).
For an article questioning whether the classic formulation is an accurate description of
the "ethical" obligations of lawyers, see Ted Schneyer, Moral Philosophy's Standard Miscon-
ception of Legal Ethics, 1984 Wis. L. REv. 1529, 1532-44 (1984). Note, however, that even
Professor Schneyer acknowledges that most commentators accept the classic formulation as an
accurate description of the profession's ethos. Id. at 1532.
25. The view that ethics should be about something other than and more than law is
exemplified in Stephen Gillers, What We Talked About When We Talked About Ethics: A
Critical View of the ModelRules, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 243, 247-48 (1985), an article criticizing the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct because, among other things, much of it merely repeats
the injunctions of civil and criminal law. "The more [the document traces the commands of
civil or criminal law] .... the less it can be considered a code of ethics." Id. at 246. "It is [the]
extralegal realm that defines ethics." Id. at 248.
26. See, e.g., COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, AMERICAN MEDICAL AS-
SOCIATION, CURRENT OPINIONS § 1.02, at 1-2 (1986); SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON BIOMEDICAL
ETHICS, AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, VALUES IN CONFLICT: RESOLVING ETHICAL
ISSUES IN HOSPITAL CARE 2-3 (1985); Marc D. Hiller, Medical Ethics and Public Policy, in
MEDICAL ETHICS AND THE LAW 3, 10, 12, 22 (Marc D. Hiller ed., 1981).
27. See, e.g., AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS (AICPA),
CONCEPTS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 3 (1985); WALTER G. KELL ET AL., MODERN AUDIT-
ING 721-22 (4th ed. 1989); JACK C. ROBERTSON, AUDITING 89-130 (6th ed. 1990); Stephen E.
Loeb, Introduction to ETHICS IN THE ACCOUNTING PROFESSION 3, 5 (Stephen E. Loeb ed.,
1978); Michael K. Schaub, Restructuring the Code of Professional Ethics: A Review of the
Anderson Committee Report and Its Implications, 2 AcCr. HORIZONS, Dec. 1988, at 89, 93.
28. See, e.g., Joel Kurtzman, Shifting the Focus at B-Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1989,
§ 3 (Business), at 4 (" 'It is an irony that it was the scandals on Wall Street that caused us to be
so concerned about the teaching [of] ethics on campus. But the scandals had nothing to do
with ethics. They were simply against the law and that's different.'" (quoting Donald P. Ja-
cobs, Dean of J.L. Kellogg Graduate School of Management at Northwestern University)).
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professions.29
Professional ethics thus conceived does not compete with state law,
nor could it possibly conflict with state law. Professional ethics merely
supplements state law, supplying norms to govern conduct that the soci-
ety at large lacks the necessary expertise to regulate30 or for which the
state's standards are insufficiently exacting.31 But the traditional under-
standing of the relationship between professional ethics and law-at least
among professionals themselves-goes further than the mere statement
that ethics begins where law leaves off. It also includes the notion that it
is appropriate for the state to leave substantial areas of conduct in which
the profession's own norms govern-i.e., that state law should "leave
off" sooner rather than later. The rhetoric of the professions is filled
with talk of the "right" of self-regulation, of the "encroachments" by the
state into areas of professional control, and of the need to ward off in-
creased state regulation by toughening internal controls.32
Insofar as the traditional understanding of the relationship between
law and ethics includes an ongoing debate over the extent and nature of
29. See, ag., A.M. CARR-SAUNDERS & P.A. WILSON, THE PROFESSIONS 301.03 (1933);
TALCOTr PARSONS, The Professions and Social Structure, in ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THE-
ORY 33, 35-37 (rev. ed. 1954); TALcOTr PARSONS, THE SOCIAL SYSTEM 463-64 (1951); Die-
trich Rueschemeyer, Professional Autonomy and the Social Control of Expertise, in THE
SOCIOLOGY OF THE PROFESSIONS: LAWYERS, DOCTORS AND OTHERS 38, 41 (Robert
Dingwald & Philip Lewis eds., 1983); Goode, supra note 22, at 195.
30. The classic sociological understanding of the professions is that society and individual
consumers are too lacking in expertise to control or monitor adequately the performance of
professionals. At the same time, the larger society and individual consumers are intensely
interested in controlling the conduct of professionals because of the high stakes involved in the
tasks committed to professionals-high stakes both for the individual client and for the larger
society because professional work implicates central social values like justice and the physical
well-being of societal members. The professions and society thus "strike a bargain": in ex-
change for high status, high remuneration, protection from lay competition and a significant
degree of autonomy from state control, the professions adopt norms designed to protect indi-
vidual consumers and the public at large, seek to educate members so they will internalize
these norms, and monitor compliance with and sanction deviations from such norms. See
DIETRICH RUESCHEMEYER, LAWYERS AND THEIR SOCIETY 13-14 (1973), for a statement of
this classic sociological explanation of professional ethics. For a similar explanation of profes-
sional ethics from an economist, see KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LiMrrs OF ORGANIZATION
36-37 (1974).
31. See, ag., Gillers, supra note 25, at 247-48.
32. The principle that the state should leave the professions substantial space in which the
professions' own norms are authoritative is central to the ideology of the professions. See, e.g.,
RUESCHEMEYER, supra note 30, at 13. It is reflected in the rhetoric of the professions. See,
e.g., Robert D. Raven, Disciplinary Enforcement: Time for Re-examination, A.B.A. J., May
1989, at 8. Raven, a former president of the ABA, discussed the connection between state law
and the profession's own rules as follows:
Certainly establishing and enforcing codes of conduct are two of the most im-
portant responsibilities of self-regulation. In fact, dissatisfaction with lawyer disci-
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the "right" of self-regulation, it exposes the competition between state
and group over normative space. But the nature and force of that com-
petition is masked because the traditional understanding asserts that the
domain of professional ethics does leave off where state law begins. The
traditional understanding thus suggests that a consensus exists on the
authoritative position of state law where state law exists. It suggests that
the professions and the state agree on when the state has spoken, what
the state has said, and that the effect of the state pronouncement is to
invalidate as a basis of action group norms that are in conflict with state
law. These assumptions are central to the traditional understanding of
the relationship between law and professional ethics. But they, and con-
sequently the traditional understanding of the relationship between law
and professional ethics, are naive and misleading. They are based on a
naive positivism about state law, they minimize the richness and power
of the group's normative vision, and they conceal the dynamic interplay
between state and group norms.
Consider the following example: By 1985 the number of criminal
defense lawyers being subpoenaed before grand juries had risen dramati-
cally,33 and opposition to this practice from individual lawyers and the
organized bar was increasing apace.34 The state was largely unresponsive
pline is often at the root of attempts by legislative and executive branches of state and
federal government to gain regulatory authority over the profession.
The ABA has steadfastly opposed such attempts, believing that lawyers, like
judges, must be protected from the political process.
Id. The view that the state should leave the professions substantial normative space is also
accepted in the classic sociological works on the professions, written by academic profession-
als. See sources cited supra note 29. For a general sampling of the sociological literature, see
PROFFSSIONALIZATION (H.M. Vollmer & Donald L. Mills eds., 1966).
33. This increase was in large part due to the broad forfeiture provisions of the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988 & Supp. I
1989) (particularly § 1963(e) (1988)), and to the Continuing Criminal Enterprise Statute
(CCE), 21 U.S.C. § 853(c) (1988), which prosecutors interpreted as applying to attorney's fees.
See William J. Genego, Risky Business: The Hazards of Being a Criminal Defense Lawyer,
CaiM. JuST., Spring 1986, at 1, 4 (survey showing that, of 21% of the lawyers responding, the
government had questioned the source of the lawyer's fee in one or more cases).
34. See, eg., Robert Merkle & George J. Moscarino, At Issue: Are Prosecutors Invading
the Attorney-Client Relationship?, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1985, at 38, 39; Ellen R. Peirce & Leonard
J. Colamarino, Defense Counsel as a Witness for the Prosecution: Curbing the Practice of Issu-
ing Grand Jury Subpoenas to Counsel for Targets of Investigations, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 821, 870
(1985); Matthew Zwerling, Federal Grand Juries v. Attorney Independence and the Attorney.
Client Privilege, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 1263, 1290 (1976). In In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served
upon Doe, 781 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1108 (1986), amicus briefs
opposing the government's use of such subpoenas and arguing for special procedures to limit
the practice were filed by the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, the New York
County Lawyers' Association, the New York Criminal Bar Association, the National Associa-
tion of Criminal Defense Lawyers and the New Jersey Association of Criminal Defense Law-
yers. Id. at 241.
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to the bar's opposition. The courts that had considered the question had
rejected the lawyers' claims that client and fee identity were generally
privileged from disclosure and that special procedures, such as prior judi-
cial approval, should be required before the government is allowed to
subpoena a criminal defense lawyer.35 While the Justice Department is-
sued guidelines on this subject in 1985, these guidelines provided that
such subpoenas could be issued upon a rather modest showing of need by
the U.S. Attorney's office involved; more important, they provided that
the showing of need be made to the Department of Justice itself, not to a
court.
3 6
The Massachusetts bar then proposed an ethics rule making it un-
ethical for a prosecutor to call a lawyer before a grand jury to testify
about a client without prior judicial approval. 37 The Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts adopted the rule38 and the United States District
Court for the District of Massachusetts refused to enjoin its operation.39
The federal government challenged the district court decision, arguing,
among other things, that ethics rules should not be used to change grand
jury procedures, an area governed by the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure.' In United States v. Klubock'" the United States Court of Ap-
35. See, e.g., Doe, 781 F.2d at 247-50; In re Klein, 776 F.2d 628, 632-33 (7th Cir. 1985);
In re Grand Jury Proceeding (Schofield), 721 F.2d 1221, 1222-23 (9th Cir. 1983); In re Grand
Jury Proceeding (Freeman), 708 F.2d 1571, 1575 (11th Cir. 1983). The only United States
court of appeals case to have adopted the bar's position requiring the government to make a
preliminary showing of need was In re Special Grand Jury No. 81-1 (Harvey), 676 F.2d 1005,
1012 (4th Cir.), vacated and withdrawn on other grounds, 697 F.2d 112 (1982).
36. In 1985 the Justice Department issued internal guidelines in the United States Attor-
ney's Manual, entitled "Policy with Regard to the Issuance of Grand Jury or Trial Subpoena
to Attorneys for Information Relating to the Representation of Clients." The text of these
guidelines is reprinted in In re Grand Jury Subpoena to Attorney (Under Seal), 679 F. Supp.
1403, 1408 n.15 (N.D. W. Va. 1988). They require the Assistant Attorney General of the
Criminal Division of the Justice Department to authorize any such subpoena. Id. at 1408.
Further, the prosecutor must make all reasonable attempts to obtain the information from
other sources before subpoenaing the lawyer "unless such efforts would compromise a criminal
investigation ... or would impair the ability to obtain such information from [the] attorney."
Id. at 1408 n.15. Compare the much stronger showing required under MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.8(0 (1991).
37. MASS. SuP. JUD. Cr. R. 3:08 (PF 15) (proposed by the Massachusetts bar in 1985).
38. The rule became effective in 1986. Id.
39. United States v. Klubock, 639 F. Supp. 117, 126 (D. Mass. 1986), aff'd, 832 F.2d 649
(1st Cir.), aff'd by an equally divided court on rehg, 832 F.2d 664 (Ist Cir. 1987) (en banc).
The district court initially declined to decide whether the rule had been incorporated into the
federal court rules for the district, id. at 121, but later specifically adopted the rule by amend-
ment. See United States v. Klubock, 832 F.2d 664, 666 (1st Cir. 1987) (en bane).
40. Klubock, 832 F.2d at 665. The government made three arguments: (1) that the rule
was invalid under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution because it was an attempt by state
authorities to control federal prosecutors; (2) that the district court lacked the power to pro-
mulgate the rule because it effected a substantial change in grand jury procedures, which
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peals for the First Circuit split four-four, leaving in place the district
court opinion upholding the rule.42 In the meantime, courts have contin-
ued to hold that special procedures are neither required nor advisable
under the Constitution or other law,43 while state bars, following Massa-
chusetts's lead, have proposed ethics rules that would require such
procedures."
In 1988 the American Bar Association passed its second resolution
on this issue, which called for even tighter limitations on the govern-
ment's power to subpoena lawyers to testify before grand juries than
those the ABA had originally proposed.45 The courts, prosecutors and
legislatures have remained largely unresponsive to the bar's position.46
should be made by amending the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure or by separate congres-
sional enactment; and (3) that the court of appeals should exercise its supervisory powers to
invalidate the law because the rule was so unwise. Id.
41. 832 F.2d 664 (1st Cir. 1987) (en banc).
42. Id at 665.
43. See, eg., United States v. Perry, 857 F.2d 1346, 1348 (9th Cir. 1988); In re Nackson,
114 N.J. 527, 537, 555 A.2d 1101, 1107 (1989); cf In re Grand Jury Subpoena of Stewart, 144
Misc. 2d 1012, 1019-22, 545 N.Y.S.2d 974, 979-82, aff'd as modified, 156 A.D.2d 294, 548
N.Y.S.2d 679 (1989) (finding no exception to the general principle that fee arrangements are
not privileged communications).
44. Among the state bars that have proposed such rules are Tennessee, Virginia, Penn-
sylvania and Florida. Tennessee and Virginia adopted the bar-proposed rules, Pennsylvania's
state court accepted the proposed rule after a federal court rejected it, and Florida's state court
rejected the proposed rule. See Baylson v. Disciplinary Bd. of the Supreme Court, 764 F.
Supp. 328, 349 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (federal district court rejecting bar-proposed and state-adopted
rule); Florida Bar re Amendments to the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar, 519 So. 2d 971, 972
(Fla. 1987) (state court rejecting bar-proposed rule); TENN. Sup. CT. R. DR 7-103 (1987); VA.
R. Sup. Cr. DR 8-102(A)(5) (1989).
45. The ABA House of Delegates passed the first resolution in February 1986. It called
on state and federal authorities to require prior judicial approval of all subpoenas to lawyers
relating to client information, and proposed specific substantive standards to govern when such
approval should be granted. In February 1988 the second resolution was passed. It is stronger
than the 1986 resolution in two ways. It calls for an adversarial hearing as a prerequisite to
judicial approval, whereas the 1986 resolution called for an ex parte proceeding. It also would
require the prosecutor to show that the information sought is "essential" to an ongoing investi-
gation, whereas the 1986 resolution required only a showing of "relevance." See A.B.A. Crim-
inal Justice Report 122B, reprinted in AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, SUMMARY OF ACTION
TAKEN BY THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 17-18 (Feb.
1988); A.B.A. Criminal Justice Report I IID, reprinted in AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
SUMMARY OF ACTION TAKEN BY THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSO-
CIATION 14 (Feb. 1986).
46. For example, despite strong lobbying efforts on the part of the ABA and the National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL), among other bar groups, Congress has
not enacted any legislative restrictions on the use of attorney subpoenas, although bills to
accomplish this have been introduced. See S. 2713, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988); 134 CONG.
REC. S11,438-39 (daily ed. Aug. 11, 1988) (statement of Sen. Simon). Courts have similarly
rejected pleas for special procedures and pleas to expand the protection for client identity or
fee information under the attorney-client privilege. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoenas ex
rel. United States v. Anderson, 906 F.2d 1485, 1498-99 (10th Cir. 1990); In re Grand Jury
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In 1990 the ABA amended the Model Rules of Professional Conduct to
require prosecutors to obtain judicial approval before seeldng to sub-
poena a lawyer about her client's affairs and making it unethical for a
prosecutor to seek judicial approval unless the information sought is not
privileged, it is essential to the investigation, and there is no feasible al-
ternative means to obtain it.47
'This example suggests a far more active competition between state
and group norms than the traditional understanding suggests. It belies
the notion that there is a general agreement between state and bar on the
content or authoritative nature of state pronouncements. "It suggests a
far more complex and dynamic understanding of law and ethics than the
static, peaceful understanding of traditional theory, and, as we shall see,
it is far from an isolated example of this struggle over law.
I will discuss further examples later, but I want here to dispel two
suspicions that the reader might have after reading the example
presented. The struggle over law between bar and state is not limited to
issues separating criminal defense lawyers and prosecutors, although
some of the rhetoric of the bar suggests it is,4" and it is not a struggle of
recent origin. First, the organized bar and the state have long been en-
gaged in a similar struggle over the obligations of securities lawyers (civil
lawyers who function primarily as facilitators of transactions, not liti-
gators).4 9 This struggle, which reached its peak in the 1970s, involved
Proceedings (Rabin), 896 F.2d 1267, 1279 (11th Cir. 1990); cases cited supra note 35. More-
over, while at least three state supreme courts, those of Pennsylvania, Virginia and Tennessee,
have adopted bar-proposed ethics rules requiring special procedures, see supra note 44, other
state courts have rejected such proposals, see, eg., Florida Bar re Amendments, 519 So. 2d at
972, and no federal court, other than the Massachusetts district court, has officially adopted
the rule. See Baylson, 764 F. Supp. at 349 (holding that the Pennsylvania rule may not be
applied to federal prosecutors); United States v. Klubock, 639 F. Supp. 117, 121 (D. Mass.
1986) (refusing to decide whether the state court rule had been incorporated into the rules of
the district), aff'd, 832 F.2d 649 (1st Cir.), aff'd on reh'g, 832 F.2d 664 (1st Cir. 1987) (en
bane).
47. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.8(0 (1991).
48. See, eg., Exercise of Federal Prosecutorial Authority in a Changing Legal Environ-
ment: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Government Information, Justice and Agriculture of
the House Comm. on Government Operations, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 204-05, 231 (1990) [herein-
after Hearings] (statement of Alan Ellis, President-Elect of the National Association of Crimi-
nal Defense Lawyers). See generally William 3. Genego, The New Adversaiy, 54 BROOK. L.
REv. 781 (1988) (exploring the relation between criminal defense lawyers and federal prosecu-
tors); Albert 3. Krieger & Susan W. Van Dusen, The Lawyer, The Client and the New Law, 22
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 737 (1984) (same); Timothy S. Robinson, Targeting Lawyers, NAT'L L.J.,
Jan. 21, 1985, at I (finding increased pressure on the criminal defense bar to reveal information
regarding clients and fees).
49. See, e.g., Milton W. Freeman, Recent Government Attacks on the Private Lawyer as an
Infringement of the Constitutional Right to the Assistance of Counsel, 36 Bus. LAW. 1791, 1795
(1981); Marvin G. Pickholz, The Proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct-And Other
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similar themes, similar moves and counter-moves by the bar and state,
and was conducted with the same intensity as the current struggle be-
tween the state and criminal defense lawyers.50 Second, the competition
between legal ethics and law is not of recent origin. For example, in 1935
the ABA ethics committee held that the Canons of Ethics prohibited a
lawyer from practicing law before a court in which the lawyer presided
as a judge pro tempore, despite a state statute that specifically provided
that judges pro tempore were not debarred from practicing in the courts
in which they sat."1 Other early examples are as stark as this one.52
A central part of my project is to change the understanding of the
relationship between law and professional ethics. Instead of nested con-
sistency-the group's normative system (ethics) fitting neatly within and
filling out the state's normative system (law)-I will describe two com-
peting and sometimes conflicting normative systems, each claiming to
legitimate action in accordance with its norms and thus each worthy of
the name of "law." By using the word "law" to describe both the state's
nomos and the bar's nomos, I am making a claim about the nature of law
and a claim about the nature of the bar's normative understanding. Both
claims are grounded in Professor Robert Cover's jurisprudential vision,
to which we now must turn.
III. THE PROFESSION'S ETHOS AS LAW
Law is more than a collection of rules. Rules require explanation to
have meaning. Stories must be told to create even the semblance of a
shared understanding of what the rules require. Stories, in turn, demand
explanation in the form of a rule-the "point" of the story. It is as if rule
is prelude to story and story is prelude to rule: "Every prescription is
insistent in its demand to be located in discourse-to be supplied with
history and destiny, beginning and end, explanation and purpose. And
every narrative is insistent in its demand for its prescriptive point, its
Assaults upon the Attorney-Client Relationship: Does "Serving the Public Interest" Disserve the
Public Interest?, 36 Bus. LAW. 1841, 1851 (1981).
50. See infra note 307 and accompanying text; infra note 319.
51. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 142 (1935).
52. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 203 (1940) (assert.
ing that Canons override federal statute that allows some advertising by patent lawyers); ABA
Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 152 (1936) (same); ABA Comm.
on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 42 (1931) (Canons override court approval
of conduct); ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 6 (1925) (use of
dead partner's name in firm name may violate Canons even if such use is allowed by law);
ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 4 (1924) (distribution of
letters soliciting business is unethical whether or not relevant departments of the federal gov-
emnment acquiesce in the conduct).
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moral.""3 But law is not just rules and stories. Rules and stories alone
(literature, history), while essential to normative discourse, are to be dis-
tinguished from law because they do not license transformations of real-
ity through the use of force. 4 Law does. Law is rules and stories and a
commitment of human will to change the world that is into the world
that our rules and stories tell us ought to be. This commitment to realize
the "ought" distinguishes law from utopian vision, literature, and his-
tory.5 It also accounts for the connection between law and violence.
Both metaphorically and literally, law entails violence: to insist on one
normative vision is to be willing to kill off alternative visions and, if nec-
essary, those who adhere to those visions or who idiosyncratically fail to
conform.
56
Law understood as rules, the stories told about the rules, and the
commitment to act in accordance with those rules and stories requires no
53. Cover, Nomos, supra note 1, at 5.
54. Id. at 9-10. "The creation of legal meaning cannot take place in silence. But neither
can it take place without the committed action that distinguishes law from literature." Id. at
49.
55. As Professor Cover explains:
[Tihe concept of a nomos is not exhausted by its "alternity"; it is neither utopia nor
pure vision. A nomos, as a world of law, entails the application of human will to an
extant state of affairs as well as toward our visions of alternative futures....
Our visions hold our reality up to us as unredeemed. By themselves the alterna-
tive worlds of our visions-the lion lying down with the lamb, the creditor forgiving
debts each seventh year, the state all shriveled and withered away-dictate no partic-
ular set of transformations .... But law gives a vision depth of field, by placing one
part of it in the highlight of insistent and immediate demand while casting another
part in the shadow of the millennium. Law is that which licenses in blood certain
transformations while authorizing others only by unanimous consent.
Id. at 9.
56. Id at 53. On the distinction between collective outrages that we sometimes call mad-
ness and individual insanity, see id. at 10 n.28. "[T]he fact that we can locate [the part we
play] in a common 'script' renders it 'sane'-a warrant that we share a nomos." Id. at 10.
"Sanity," which is seen as an outrage from the perspective of a second normative system and
thus labeled "mad" from the perspective of that second normative system, may be distin-
guished from truly idiosyncratic normative behavior for which we may reserve the term "in-
sane." To understand the last sentence it is important not to confuse the term "normative
system" with the state or the dominant normative system in a society. A state or dominant
normative system may well label certain acts of resistance to its nomos, which are based on
alternate normative systems, as "madness." In fact, the definition of "madness" in all cultures
may inextricably be tied to the breadth of the culture's acceptance of alternative normative
visions. See generally THOMAS S. SzAsz, THE MANUFACTURE OF MADNESS (2d ed. 1977)
(arguing that madness is no more than adherence to a normative vision labeled "mad" by the
dominant culture). One, however, may plausibly argue that acts based on a shared, albeit
radical, normative vision can be distinguished from idiosyncratic acts whose normative mean-
ing is understood only by the actor and which that actor can locate only in a personal script to
which at best only she has access. See generally Cover, Violence, supra note 1 (exploring the
relationship between legal meaning and violence).
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state.5 7 A community and the state may share an understanding of what
constitutes the operative rule, but if they have radically different under-
standings of what that rule means (different stories) and each is commit-
ted to action based on its understanding, we have two distinct laws.
Why insist on calling each "law"? Normally, we reserve the label
"law" for official state pronouncements, relegating the normative visions
of communities to the status of "nonlaw" or, at best, advocacy about law.
But what we miss by doing so is the force and effect that committed
communities with their own vision of law have on state law. State law
inevitably changes in the face of action taken in the name of alternative
normative visions, even if the change is only to hold that a certain
amount of increased state force is justified and will be used to maintain
the state's legal vision. The state cannot merely reaffirm its prior law; it
must decide what its former understanding means in light of the commu-
nity's resistance. It must ask itself whether its law means that people
who disobey based on their own narrative will go to jail or whether the
group's narrative should in some way be incorporated into state law. In
other words the state must decide whether and to what extent the state
and the group will be reshaped in the struggle. Prior to the committed
"disobedience," state law had not confronted these questions and thus
did not include the answers. In the face of the "disobedience," it must.
And in doing so, state law changes.
Let's take one of Professor Cover's examples first.58 The courts and
the civil rights sit-in protestors agreed that the Constitution was to be
obeyed. They agreed that the Equal Protection Clause was the relevant
rule to judge the constitutionality of segregation in public accommoda-
tions. But the courts and the protestors had radically different under-
standings of what that rule meant. The protestors were committed to
living out their understanding in action. They sat in. The courts then
had to decide how committed they were to living out their understand-
ing. Official law could not remain static in the face of the community's
law. To reaffirm the official understanding required the demonstration of
increased commitment: the judges had to be willing to fill the jails in the
name of the state's law, whereas before the protestors' manifestation of
57. Cover, Nomos, supra note 1, at 11. Professor Cover explains:
The state becomes central in the process not because it is well suited to jurisgenesis
[the creation of legal meaning] nor because the cultural processes of giving meaning
to normative activity cease in the presence of the state. The state becomes central
only because ... an act of commitment is a central aspect of legal meaning. And
violence [as to which the state has an imperfect but important monopoly] is one
extremely powerful measure and test of commitment.
Id. at 11 n.30.
58. See id. at 47.
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commitment the state did not have to make this choice.59
Now let's take an example from legal ethics. The Tax Reform Act
of 19841 requires people to report cash payments of $10,000 or more
received in their trade or business.6 1 The person who received the money
must fill in a reporting form, IRS Form 8300, which asks for the paying
party's name, address, social security number and occupation and, when
applicable, the name of the person on whose behalf the transaction was
conducted.62 In October 1989 the IRS sent letters to 956 lawyers, de-
manding that they fully complete these forms.6 3 The lawyers had sub-
mitted incomplete forms, claiming much of the information could not be
provided because it was protected by the attorney-client privilege. 64 The
vast majority of lawyers receiving the IRS demand letter refused to com-
ply.6" The IRS then issued ninety summonses to noncomplying lawyers
who had reported unusually large cash payments or who had declared
multiple instances of cash payments over $10,000.66 Many, if not most,
of the ninety lawyers refused to comply. The government brought a test
case in the Southern District of New York to force compliance. The
59. As Professor Cover states:
The community that disobeys the criminal law upon the authority of its own consti-
tutional [or "ethical"] interpretation.., forces the judge [the executive branch offi-
cial or the legislator] to choose between affirming his interpretation of the official law
through violence against the protestors and permitting the polynomia of legal mean-
ing to extend to the domain of social practice and control. The judge's [or other
official's] commitment is tested as he is asked what he intends to be the meaning of
his law and whether his hand will be part of the bridge that links the official vision of
the [law] with the reality of people in jail.
Id. at 47-48.
60. Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 685 (1984) (codified as
amended at 26 U.S.C. § 60601 (1988)).
61. 26 U.S.C. § 6050I(a), (b) (1988).
62. See id; 26 C.F.R. § 1.60501-1 (1991) (Treasury regulations detailing the information
to be reported on Form 8300).
63. Alexander Stille, On Disclosure of Attorney Fees: A Strategic Retreat for the IRS,
NAT'L L.J., May 14, 1990, at 3.
64. Id This claim of privilege was asserted even though courts unanimously have held, in
other contexts, that client identity and fee information generally are not protected by the privi-
lege. See, eg., United States v. Hodge & Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347, 1355 (9th Cir. 1977); United
States v. Haddad, 527 F.2d 537, 538-39 (6th Cir. 1975); Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633,
637 (2d Cir. 1962). See generally EDWARD W. CLEARY ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE
§ 90 (3d ed. 1984) (explaining general rule that fees and identity are not privileged informa-
tion). The courts uniformly describe as rare the circumstances under which client identity and
fee information might be privileged information. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoenas
(Hirsch), 803 F.2d 493, 497 (9th Cir. 1986). But cf Corry v. Meggs, 498 So. 2d 508, 511 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (holding state statutory privilege includes fees and identity).
65. Stille, supra note 63, at 3 ("Only 95 lawyers answered the letters by providing client
information, according to Ellen Murphy, director of public information at the IRS.").
66. Id.
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district court ordered the lawyers to comply, holding that nothing in the
case justified departing from the general rule that client identity and fee
information are not privileged.67 After the district court ruling and with
organized bar support,68 many of the other ninety lawyers who had re-
ceived summonses and the other 771 lawyers who did not respond to the
IRS demand letter continued to resist. 9 These lawyers and bar groups
claimed that complying with state law (as manifested by the federal stat-
ute, the IRS regulations, the IRS activities in applying these rules to law-
yers, the long line of court precedents suggesting there is no valid claim
of privilege regarding client identity and fee, and the district court opin-
ion) would violate the ethical responsibilities of the lawyers involvedY°
For example, the president of the Criminal Trial Lawyers Association of
Northern California urged other lawyers to resist: "There are ethical
responsibilities we have as lawyers that foreclose[] giving information
which may put our clients in jeopardy."7 On appeal the United States
67. United States v. Fischetti, No. M-18-304, slip op. at 51-52 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 1990).
68. The organized bar demonstrated its support of these lawyers in various ways. The
Association of the Bar of the City of New York, the National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers and the New York Council of Defense Lawyers filed amicus briefs on behalf of the
lawyers in Fischetti. The American Bar Association communicated to the Justice Department
that wholesale enforcement of the federal law would have a devastating effect on the attorney-
client relationship. See Respondents' and Intervenors' Joint Memorandum of Law at 5, Fis-
chetti (No. M-18-304) (letter dated Nov. 9, 1989, from the ABA's Grand Jury Committee to
James Bruton, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Tax Division).
Perhaps most important for my purposes, several bars have issued ethics opinions stating
or strongly suggesting that compliance with the demands of the IRS or similar state revenue
agency is unethical, at least in the absence of a court order, and that even when a court order
exists, the lawyer may ethically choose not to comply. See, e.g., Chicago Bar Ass'n, Op. 86-2
(1988); Ethics Advisory Comm., Nat'l Ass'n of Crim. Def. Lawyers, Formal Op. 89-1 (1989);
Fla. Bar, Staff Op. TEO 88-203 (1988); State Bar of Ga., Advisory Op. 41 (1984); State Bar of
N.M., Op. 1989-2 (1989).
69. Steve Albert, Courting a Showdown: More Lawyers Defy IRS Demands for Client
Data, LEGAL TIMEs, Apr. 30, 1990, at 2.
70. For example, one bar group, arguing in support of the lawyers in Fischetti, said:
Because of ethical considerations (see, e.g., ABA Model Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility Disciplinary Rule 4-101; ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6),
since 1985 thousands of criminal law practitioners across the country have com-
pleted their 8300 Forms, but have declined to provide the names of the clients or
other information identifying the clients.
Memorandum of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York Committee on Criminal
Advocacy as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Motion to Quash an I.R.S. Summons at 7-9,
Fischetti (No. M-18-304) [hereinafter ABCNY Brief in Fischetti].
71. William Carlsen, U.S. Demands Data on Clients: Drug War Tactic Hits Lawyers, S.F.
CHRON., Jan. 15, 1990, at Al, A8. Consider also the argument of counsel in Fischetti:
[W]e are here because we have no choice but to be here. We are not here as willing
gladiators, we are here because the government began this proceeding. We are ethi-
cally counseled, in a number of opinions that we have cited, not to disclose client
identity without testing the enforceability of the statute in a court.
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Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld the district court deci-
sion, dismissing as "without merit" the contention that the reporting re-
quirement conflicts with the attorney-client privilege.7 2 After this
decision, when asked what advice he would give to lawyers in the circuit,
the head of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers'
"8300 Task Force" commented: "I would say many people subscribe to
the notion that you don't violate a confidence until you are ordered to do
so by a court. 73 From the context it is obvious he meant personally
ordered.
To justify the use of the word "law" to describe a community's no-
mos, I have thus far suggested that "law" reveals the necessary and dy-
namic interplay between communal and state law, which is otherwise
masked. Am I describing "advocacy" and not "law"? 7 4 The normative
understanding offered by the sit-in protestors or the lawyers in the exam-
ples above is, of course, in one sense advocacy, but it is not only advo-
cacy.75 The sit-in protestors and the lawyers "are not simply advocates,
Fischetti, No. M-18-304, slip. op. at 26.
72. United States v. Goldberger & Dubin, P.C., 935 F.2d 501, 504 (2d Cir. 1991). "The
[privilege] protects only those disclosures that are necessary to obtain informed legal advice
and that would not be made without the privilege." Id This is the only case thus far decided
on this issue. A case brought by lawyers to test the IRS summons before any government
action was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. See In re IRS Summons to Hall, No. LR-C-90-
221, 1990 WL 127105, at *5-6 (E.D. Ark. July 31, 1990).
73. Fred Strasser, Lawyers Must Name Names, NAT'L L.J., June 24, 1991 at 18 (quoting
Gerald B. Lefcourt, head of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers' "8300
Task Force").
74. For Professor Cover's discussion of the distinction between advocacy and the commu-
nity's law, see Cover, Nomos, supra note 1, at 28-29.
75. Professor Cover explains:
[T]o state the problem as one of unclear law or difference of opinion about the law
seems to presuppose that there is a hermeneutic that is methodologically superior to
those employed by the communities that offer their own law. One might suppose
that this assumption had been put to rest by Justice Jackson's famous aphorism:
"We are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are
final." ...
Alternatively, the statist position may be understood to assert implicitly, not a
superior interpretive method, but a convention of legal discourse: the state and its
designated hierarchy are entitled to the exclusive or supreme jurisgenerative capac-
ity. Everyone else offers suggestions or opinions about what the single normative
world should look like, but only the state creates it. The position that only the state
creates law thus confuses the status of interpretation with the status of political dom-
ination....
Although this second position may be good state law-the Constitution pro-
claims itself supreme-the position is at best ambiguous when viewed as a descrip-
tion of what the various norm-generating communities understand themselves to be
doing.
Id. at 42-43 (quoting Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
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for they are prepared to live and do live by their proclaimed understand-
ings of the Constitution"76 and other law.
Law may be distinguished from "mere advocacy" by examining
whether the expressed understanding is intended to be realized in action.
This does not mean that all, many, or any group members will actually
continue to live by the group's law in the face of a strong commitment by
the state to kill off the communal law.77 When the state expresses a
strong commitment, the community is faced with choices similar to those
the state faces when the community expresses strong commitment. The
community (or the subcommunity that is actually threatened with vio-
lence) must decide what its law means: does it require members to use
violence (or allow violence to be inflicted upon them) in the name of their
law, or should the community's law be reinterpreted to incorporate the
76. Id. at 29.
77. By calling the normative vision I will describe "law," I am, however, making the
following empirical claim: Most lawyers understand a lawyer's obligations from within the
bar's normative vision. This means that most lawyers decide how to act and how to judge the
propriety of their acts (and those of other lawyers) based on the bar's nomos as I describe it, at
least when the state is unlikely to insist on its vision, which includes, for example, all the times
that the lawyer's actions are unlikely to come to the state's attention. I rest this claim on three
primary types of evidence: bar ethics opinions, see infra text accompanying notes 116-19; the
arguments made by bar groups in amicus briefs; and cases (reported in court decisions and in
newspaper accounts) that involve lawyers acting upon the bar's normative vision. Finally, the
work of other scholars, who notice a divergence between the ethics rules and other law in a
variety of legal contexts, supports my argument. See, eg., Theresa A. Gabaldon, Free Riders
and the Greedy Gadfly: Examining Aspects of Shareholder Litigation as an Exercise in Inte-
grating Ethical Regulation and Laws of General Applicability, 73 MINN. L. REv. 425 (1988)
(discussed infra note 145); L. Ray Patterson, Legal Ethics and the Lawyer's Duty of Loyalty, 29
EMORY L.J. 909 (1980) (discussed infra note 167); Subin, supra note 2, at 1107-08 (discussed
infra note 167); see also Robert Hewitt Pate, III, Comment, Evans v. Jeff D. and the Proper
Scope of State Ethics Decisions, 73 VA. L. REV. 783, 794-95 & nn. 73-83 (1987) (addressing
attorney's fee waivers, discussed infra note 145).
I do not rest my argument on survey evidence that purports to document the attitudes of
lawyers or to catalogue their activities. First, there are few such surveys. Second, many of the
questions and answers asked in such surveys are not particularly illuminating given the analy-
sis I present here, i.e., knowing whether or not lawyers believe that such and such is a precept
of ethics does not tell one much about what lawyers think the precept means or how it should
be weighed in comparison with other precepts. For a similar refusal to rely on survey results
to support a description of the bar's nomos, see Robert P. Lawry, The Central Moral Tradition
of Lawyering, 19 HoFsTRA L. RaV. 311, 318 n.49 (1990). On the differences between Profes-
sor Lawry's description and my own, see infra note 257. My refusal to rely on survey evidence
should not, however, be mistaken for an admission that the survey evidence contradicts what I
say here. It does not. See, eg., infra note 198 (referring to one such survey). Compare Profes-
sor Lawry's assertion that a survey reported by Professor Freedman contradicts the organized
bar's stated ethos. Lawry, supra, at 318 n.49 (citing MONROE FREEDMAN, LAWYERS ETHICS
IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 38 (1975)). Professor Freedman's survey purports to show that
90 to 95% of the responding lawyers would act contrary to what the ethics rules say on their
face and, the rules notwithstanding, would call a perjurious witness to the stand. Id. The
survey does not contradict the bar's position as I describe it.
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state's understanding? To choose between these alternatives, communi-
ties with law (as opposed to mere advocates) appeal to what Professor
Cover calls "a secondary hermeneutic-the interpretation of the texts of
resistance."78 Because of the state's powerful, albeit imperfect, monop-
oly on violence, communities with divergent understandings of law must
(and do) develop "an understanding of what is right and just in the vio-
lent contexts that the group will encounter."7 9 As we shall see later,"0
the profession's nomos includes such texts of resistance, including rules
on the degree of resistance to be offered, narratives of martyrdom and
triumphant courage, and narratives that justify and define the normative
boundary between state and profession and the drastic consequences for
the group and the society of state action that violates that boundary.81
IV. Two LAWS MASQUERADING AS ONE
No nomos is static, not only because it is in constant interaction with
other normative visions, but also because each nomos is itself the source
of new combinations of precepts, narratives, and commitment-new nor-
mative visions.82 Thus, it is futile to try to capture in words a complete
picture of a normative vision. One, however, can portray central features
in a nomos' topography that identify it and distinguish it from other nor-
mative visions. In this section I will begin to paint a picture of the pro-
fession's law by explaining and exploring how it differs from state law
and how those differences are hidden from view.
78. Cover, Nomos, supra note 1, at 49.
79. Id.
80. See infra notes 381-409 and accompanying text.
81. In an insightful article that explores the profession's ideology as revealed in the ABA's
Model Rules of Professional Conduct and the commentary on those rules by the bar and legal
academics, Professor Deborah Rhode concludes that the legal profession's "contemporary ide-
ology portrays the legal profession as a distinctive moral community, whose norms depart
from ordinary conceptions of civic virtue." Rhode, supra note 15, at 618. The distinctive
moral community that Professor Rhode so skillfully describes is the same one I see and will
picture in this piece. Where my thesis differs most from hers is that I argue that the norms of
that distinct community depart from the public nomos, not merely as reflected in "ordinary
conceptions of moral virtue," but also as reflected in the state's law. Further, just as Professor
Rhode sees radical moral skepticism as a primary justification for the "amorality" of the pro-
fession's contemporary ideology, see id. at 620-23, I see legal realism (and most post-realist
jurisprudential theories) as an explanation for the failure of knowledgeable legal ethics scholars
to identify the profession's ethos as inconsistent with state law. In the post-realist world, there
are few who dare to speak of what the state's law is for fear of the charge of engaging in some
form of naive positivism. To ignore the state's important role in creating a public nomos with
characteristics that might distinguish it from alternative legal visions, however, is to miss an
important means of analyzing that nomos and the state's use of violence in support of it. Pro-
fessor Cover's theory of law provides a means of speaking of state law that avoids both the
static vision of positivism and the disempowerment of those who would reform the state's law.
82. See supra note 20 (discussing Professor Gordon's article).
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A. What We Might Expect to Find
The legal profession is, by definition, inextricably connected to the
state and its laws. The state has the last say over such central matters of
group definition as who may be admitted to group membership and who
may be excluded.83 Moreover, the central privilege of membership in the
profession is the right to speak to the state on behalf of another in the
state's courts. Thus, the profession is dependent on the state for bound-
ary and functional definition, central matters in the normative vision of
any community. But the state's nomos is similarly dependent on the pro-
fession. To be a lawyer is to have a right to participate in the creation
and maintenance of the state's nomos that is denied to other persons in
the society.
As an expression of the real interdependence of these two normative
worlds, we would expect to find significant areas in which they coincide.
Further, to the degree that the two worlds differ, we would expect to find
that the profession's nomos favors an accommodationist stance, i.e., "one
that goes to great lengths to avoid confrontation or the imposition upon
adherents of demands that will in practice conflict with those imposed by
the state."84 Finally, the intensity and particular nature of the interde-
pendence of bar and state increase the need of all involved to maintain
the myth of a unitary normative system. The idea that the ministers of
the state's law are somehow less than faithful to that law is simply too
powerful a suggestion to be incorporated easily into either the state's or
the bar's normative system. Thus, we would expect to find that each
normative world has developed means of masking the existence of the
profession's conflicting norms. In exploring the profession's nomos, we
will find the sharing of norms with the state and the masking of the alter-
native nomos, but the prediction of an accommodationist stance will need
some modification. At a number of critical points where the profession's
nomos diverges from the state, the state shows a weak commitment to its
normative vision. Real accommodation is rarely necessary; the appear-
ance of accommodation, which is another way of saying "a masking of
the differences," will do.
B. The Hierarchy of Norms
For the most part, the bar and the state agree on the precepts that
are relevant to the law governing lawyers: precepts contained in the
83. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHIcs §§ 2.2.1, 2.2.2, 3.2, 15.1, 15.2
(1986).
84. Cover, Nomos, supra note 1, at 33.
85. See infra notes 314-80 and accompanying text.
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Constitution of the United States; the ethics rules as embodied in various
codes promulgated by the bar; the common law of lawyering, particu-
larly the attorney-client privilege; and precepts embodied in "other law,"
including the law of torts, criminal law, securities law and the law of
procedure. I say "for the most part" for two reasons. First, the state
treats ethics rules as "law" only to the extent that they are (and in the
form in which they are) adopted by the state. On the other hand the bar
may treat as law ethics rules adopted by the ABA or a state bar organiza-
tion but not adopted by the state. 6 Second, the extent to which the bar
accepts that precepts of "other law" govern the conduct of lawyers is not
clear. Sometimes lawyers and bar groups speak as if lawyers enjoy some
form of immunity from the precepts of other law. 7 But, even if we put
aside for the moment these two areas of potential disagreement on
precepts" and assume that the bar and the state are in total agreement
on the relevant precepts, the existence of shared precepts indicates a uni-
tary normative system only if the precepts are ordered by each group (the
bar and the state) in the same way. They are not. In the bar's nomos
ethics rules 9 are presumed to control when they conflict with other law,
while in the state's nomos other law is presumed to control when it con-
fficts with the ethics rules.
In the state's hierarchy of norms-as it exists in theory 0 -ethics
rules occupy a relatively low status. Ethics rules are generally court
rules, not legislative,9 1 and they are usually state law, not federal law.9 2
86. See infra notes 195-99 and accompanying text for a discussion of the amendment,
which was not adopted by most states, to the MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBIL-
rry DR 7-102(B)(1) (1974).
87. See infra text accompanying notes 374-78 for a discussion of the position taken by bar
groups in United States v. Cintolo, 818 F.2d 980 (1st Cir. 1987).
88. Notice that we are also putting aside for the moment an even greater source of poten-
tial disagreement: disagreement about the "meaning" of the precepts that both bar and state
agree are relevant. Disagreement about the "meaning" of precepts will be explored after estab-
lishing here the disagreement between state and bar over the ordering of precepts. The "mean-
ing" of a precept is, of course, dependent on its order in a hierarchy of precepts.
89. This is not to say that in the bar's nomos each precept in the ethics rules carries equal
power to trump other law. The bar is so weakly committed to some rules that they may be
said to have taken on the status of "non-law" for the bar, and thus they lack the power to
trump other law. See infra text accompanying notes 154-56.
90. "There is a systematic hierarchy-only partially enforced in practice but fully opera-
tive in theory-that conforms all precept articulation and enforcement to a pattern of nested
consistency." Cover, Nomos, supra note 1, at 16-17. Professor Cover cites JOHN C. GRAY,
THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW (1909), and H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW
(1961), especially chapters three and five of Hart's book, as attempts to articulate the state's
hierarchy of norms and their pattern of nested consistency. Cover, Nomos, supra note 1, at 17
n.44.
91. WOLFRAM, supra note 83, § 2.6.3, at 57.
92. See, e.g., id. § 2.4.2, at 44-45.
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Those two facts relegate ethics rules to a low status in the state's hierar-
chy of precepts. First, federal constitutional requirements, including
those on procedure, trump all other law.9" Second, federal law trumps
state law.94 Third, on matters of substantive law, legislation trumps rules
adopted by courts.9" Fourth, on matters of procedure, federal legislation
trumps rules adopted by federal courts; 96 and federal rules of procedure
adopted pursuant to congressional authorization, such as the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, trump rules adopted by federal courts, which
include ethics rules.97 And while in many states rules of procedure
adopted by a court pursuant to the court's inherent powers (which is how
ethics rules are adopted) trump conflicting state legislative pronounce-
ments on procedure, this may be truer in theory than in practice.9" Fi-
nally, federal and state courts often state that the only instances in which
they are bound to treat the ethics rules as binding precepts are in discipli-
nary proceedings against lawyers. 99 Thus, even when the ethics rules
93. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803).
94. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
95. See, e.g., A. Leo Levin & Anthony G. Amsterdam, Legislative Control over Judicial
Rule-Making: A Problem in Constitutional Revision, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 14 (1958) ("Noth-
iag could be clearer than the fact that courts in the exercise of the rule-making power have no
competence to promulgate rules governing substantive law."). Of course, the distinction be-
tween substance and procedure is far from clear, but that does not alter the fact that the
hierarchical precept is well settled. The debate over what distinguishes "substance" from
"procedure" assumes the validity of the hierarchical precept.
96. See, eg., Sara S. Beale, Reconsidering Supervisory Power in Criminal Cases: Constitu-
tional and Statutory Limits on the Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1433,
1465-66 (1984).
97. See FED. R. Civ. P. 83, which in turn is derived from 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a) (1988)
(providing that rules of court may be adopted so far as they are not inconsistent with congres-
sional legislation or rules enacted pursuant to this Enabling Act).
98. Most state courts still assert the exclusive power to regulate the profession and thus in
theory would strike down legislation directed exclusively at lawyers. See WOLFRAM, supra
note 83, § 2.2.3, at 27 n.46. Several caveats are necessary, however. First, when state courts
strike down legislation because it interferes with the court's power to regulate the profession,
the legislation is generally legislation that regulates lawyers only, not legislation, such as a
criminal law, that applies to lawyers and all others. Id. § 2.2.3, at 27-28. But see id. § 2.2.3, at
28 (citing cases in which courts used inherent powers to limit laws of general application).
Second, state supreme courts "[o]ften... stop short of declaring invalid a statute.., with the
announcement that the court finds the legislative intent congenial and the regulation will be
permitted to exist as valid." Id. This accommodationist approach to legislation generally
characterizes state court decisions on legislation affecting judicial procedure. See JACK B.
WEINSTEIN, REFORM OF COURT RULE-MAKING PROCEDURES 77-88 (1977). "No serious
student of the subject would today accept Wigmore's thesis that the legislature has no power to
effect judicial procedure." Id. at 79.
99. See, e.g., Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 444 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that
courts need not resolve whether representation is a violation of the ethics rules to determine
whether to disqualify a lawyer at trial), vacated on other grounds, 449 U.S. 1106 (1981); W.T.
Grant Co. v. Haines, 531 F.2d 671, 676-77 (2d Cir. 1976) (holding that lawyer's violation of
ethics rule against advising unrepresented party is insufficient basis upon which to dismiss
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purport to speak directly on a matter and are the only existing source of
precept on the question, they may be ignored with relative ease so long as
the case is not a disciplinary proceeding.
SThe strongest evidence that the bar's hierarchy of norms differs
from the state's is found in the bar narratives that explicate the rules-
ethics opinions-and we shall turn to those sources in a moment. It is,
however, worth considering first what, if anything, the ethics rules them-
selves say about their place in the hierarchy of possible norms. On their
face the ethics rules are somewhat ambiguous as to their relationship to
other norms. Unlike, for example, the Constitution, which declares itself
and other federal law to be supreme to state enactments,1c° neither the
Model Code of Professional Responsibility'01 nor the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct'02 as drafted by the American Bar Association or
as enacted by the states contains any similar general and express declara-
tion of its place in relation to other norms. While the Model Code's
Preamble begins with an explanation of the importance of the rule of
law, 03 neither the Preamble, the Preliminary Statement, the disciplinary
rules nor the ethical considerations state, as a general proposition,
whether the Code or other law is presumed to govern in the case of a
conflict.' As for the Model Rules, the Preamble and Scope sections
contain more references to the existence of other law governing lawyers
than similar sections of the Model Code, but again, they contain no ex-
plicit statement on the general hierarchy of norms. In fact, the refer-
ences to other law in the Preamble and Scope sections of the Model
Rules highlight the ambiguity of the relationship of the Rules to other
law. The Preamble and Scope sections of the Rules include the following
client's lawsuit or disqualify the law firm); Southern Valley Grain Dealers Ass'n v. Board of
County Comm'rs, 257 N.W.2d 425, 432 (N.D. 1977) (holding that violation of ethics rules
does not require reversal of case when violation played no part in lawyer's decisionmaking
process).
Courts typically consult the ethics rules in nondisciplinary cases involving a lawyer's con-
duct, but they treat the rules as a source of guidance rather than as binding precept. Typical of
this approach is the following statement from Woodruff v. Tomlin, 616 F.2d 924 (6th Cir.) (en
banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 888 (1980): "We recognize that the Code of Professional Respon-
sibility '[does not] undertake to define standards for civil liability of lawyers for professional
conduct.' Nevertheless, it certainly constitutes some evidence of the standards required of at-
torneys." Id. at 936 (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (quoting TENN. SULP. CT. R. 38 app.
preliminary statement).
100. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
101. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1981).
102. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983).
103. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY pmbl. (1981).
104. This omission is in all probability largely attributable to the traditional understanding
of the relationship between law and ethics, which masks the potential for any such conflict.
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statements about other law: 105
[1] A lawyer's conduct should conform to the require-
ments of the law, both in professional service to clients and in
the lawyer's business and personal affairs....
[2] [a] Many of a lawyer's professional responsibilities are
prescribed in the Rules of Professional Conduct, as well as sub-
stantive and procedural law. [b] However, a lawyer is also
guided by personal conscience and the approbation of profes-
sional peers ....
[3] [a] . . . Virtually all difficult ethical problems arise
from conflict between a lawyer's responsibilities to clients, to
the legal system [presumably including other law] and to the
lawyer's own interest in remaining an upright person ....
[b] The Rules . . . prescribe terms for resolving such
conflicts.
106
[4] [a] The Rules presuppose a larger legal context shap-
ing the lawyer's role. [b] That context includes court rules and
statutes relating to matters of licensure, laws defining specific
obligations of lawyers and substantive and procedural law in
general. [c] Compliance with the Rules, as with all law in an
open society, depends primarily upon understanding and vol-
untary compliance, secondarily upon reinforcement by peer
and public opinion and finally, when necessary, upon enforce-
ment through disciplinary proceedings. [d] The Rules do not,
however, exhaust the moral and ethical considerations that
should inform a lawyer, for no worthwhile human activity can
be completely defined by legal rules....
[5] [a] Under various legal provisions, including constitu-
tional, statutory and common law, the responsibilities of gov-
ernment lawyers may include authority concerning legal
matters that ordinarily reposes in the client in private client-
lawyer relationships.... [b] These Rules do not abrogate any
such authority.
[6] [a] Violation of a Rule should not give rise to a cause
of action nor should it create any presumption that a legal duty
has been breached.... [b] [The Rules] are not designed to be a
105. The numbers and letters in front of the statements are mine, inserted to make later
reference to these statements easier.
106. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT pmbl. (1991).
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basis for civil liability .... [c] Accordingly, nothing in the
Rules should be deemed to augment any substantive legal duty
of lawyers or the extra-disciplinary consequences of violating
such a duty.
10 7
[7] [a] Moreover,108 these Rules are not intended to gov-
ern or affect judicial application of either the attorney-client or
work product privilege .... [b] The fact that in exceptional
situations the lawyer under the Rules has a limited discretion to
disclose a client confidence does not vitiate the proposition that,
as a general matter, the client has a reasonable expectation that
information relating to the client will not be voluntarily dis-
closed and that disclosure of such information may be judicially
compelled only in accordance with recognized exceptions to the
attorney-client and work product privileges. 109
Despite the seemingly straightforward injunction in [1], which sug-
gests that other law is always binding and that it is arguably, if not pre-
sumptively, authoritative in cases of conflict with the Rules, °10 the above
statements also contain strong suggestions of a different hierarchy of
norms. First, the nomos portrayed by these statements is self-consciously
open-ended, i.e., the statements invite personal and informal group inter-
pretations to flourish as potential sources of authoritative norms to be
realized in action. 1 Second, if "the legal system" in statement [3][a]
can be understood to include precepts embodied in other law, as I have
suggested with my brackets, then [3][b] suggests that the Rules provide
the mega-text for resolving conflicts with other law and thus constitute
higher authority. Third, each time other precepts are mentioned in a list
that includes the Rules, the Rules are mentioned first, which invites one
to view the Rules as higher authority.' Fourth, the statements explic-
107. Id. scope (emphasis added). The Model Code contains a similar, although less auda-
cious, statement: "The [Model] Code ... [does not] undertake to define standards for civil
liability of lawyers for professional conduct." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIL-
rry preliminary statement (1981).
108. This paragraph immediately follows the one quoted above as [6].
109. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT scope (1991).
110. The more ambiguous statement in [4][a] also might be read to suggest that in general
other precepts trump the Rules.
111. Statements [2], [4][c], 4][d]. This "open-ended nomos" corresponds to what Profes-
sor Cover calls the "paideic ideal-type." Cover, Nomos, supra note 1, at 12-17. In an open-
ended nomos any ordering of the norms is subject to challenge, including the order expressed
in the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. The portrayal of the nomos as open-ended is
evident in other sections of the Model Rules and Model Code. See, eg., MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(2) (1981) (a lawyer may reveal "[c]onfidences
and secrets when.., required by law or court order" (emphasis added)).
112. Statements [2][a], [4][c]; see, eg., MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
DR 4-101(C)(2) (1981).
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itly provide that other law trumps the Rules in certain instances, which
invites the reading that such a hierarchy is the exception.'
13
My point here is not that one hierarchy is a "correct" interpretation
of the Rules and the other is not, nor that the ambiguity is the "cause" of
the "confusion" about which hierarchy is "correct." Rather, the point is
that in a code drafted for state adoption by a community whose under-
standing of the appropriate hierarchy of norms is different from that of
the state,1 4 some ambiguity as to the appropriate hierarchy should be
expected, and that ambiguity does exist in the ethics rules.' What is
more surprising, given the degree of interdependence of bar and state and
the state's ability to marshall force to enforce its norms, is the degree to
which the rules overtly suggest that state norms are not primary.
We are now ready to turn to the narratives that reveal the divergent
normative hierarchies. The evidence that the bar has a different hierar-
chy of norms is particularly strong because it appears in bar ethics opin-
ions, narratives that the bar intends as "law"-intends, that is, to be
realized in action. For the state, court opinions provide a body of narra-
tives (and a source of precepts, which flow out of those narratives) that
are intended to be realized in action.' 6 Ethics opinions perform a simi-
lar function in the bar's nomos: they are narratives (and the source of
precepts) intended to be realized in action."' Because ethics opinions
113. Statements [5], [6], [7]. Notice, too, that while statements [6] and [7] explicitly state
that tort law and evidence law (the attorney-client privilege) should trump the Rules, the state-
ments concede this only to the extent that tort law proposes less stringent standards for the
lawyer's duty of care toward the client than the Rules and only to the extent that the attorney-
client privilege is more protective of client confidences than the Rules.
114. The existence of this ambiguity does not necessarily mean that the bar and the state
have divergent understandings of the appropriate hierarchy of norms. However, the ambiguity
is consistent with this thesis. Similarly, the fact that states which have adopted the Rules have
not eliminated the ambiguity does not necessarily mean that the state and the bar share an
understanding-albeit an ambiguous one-of the hierarchy of norms. The fact that two com-
munities share precepts is not sufficient to establish the existence of a unitary nomos.
115. While the ambiguity is certainly suggestive of the existence of divergent understand-
ings about the appropriate hierarchy of norms, the arguments in this Article do not rest on
such relatively weak evidence. If, however, one accepts on faith for the moment that such a
divergence on hierarchy exists, the ambiguity in the ethics rules makes it easier to see how
divergent understandings can be maintained or, at least, how the divergence can be masked.
116. I assume this point is self-evident. Of course, by prefacing the sentence in the text
with the words "for the state," I do not mean that the bar generally rejects these narratives as
law. Rather, what I mean is that, to the extent the narratives embedded in the courts' opinions
conflict with the narratives of the bar, the state's nomos is revealed in the courts' opinions and
the bar's nomos in its texts.
117. Ethics opinions are issued generally in response to inquiries by members of the bar
about how to act in a particular situation. Thus, they are understood by author and audience
as interpretation intended to guide action. Although the opinions in many jurisdictions are
officially titled "advisory," they typically respond in language that is authoritative: they say
that a lawyer may, may not, must not or must do something. Ethics opinions often contain
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are intended to be realized in action, they are by definition more than
mere advocacy.118 Ethics opinions are also a particularly strong source
of evidence of the content of the bar's nomos because they generally are
not subject to prior state control.' 19 They therefore express law to which
the bar, but not necessarily the state, is committed.
What do the ethics opinions tell us about the bar's ordering of
norms? Consider this excerpt from State Bar of New Mexico Advisory
Opinion 1989-2:
It is the intent of Congress under 26 U.S.C. § 60501 that
disclaimers. For example, the Committee on Professional Ethics of the State Bar of Wisconsin
includes at the end of its opinions the following statement:
Opinions and advice of the Committee on Professional Ethics, its members, and its
assistants are issued pursuant to Article IV, Section 5 of the State Bar Bylaws. Opin-
ions and advice are limited to the above facts, are advisory only, and are not binding
on the courts, the Board of Attorneys [on] Professional Responsibility, or any mem-
ber of the state bar of Wisconsin.
See, e.g., State Bar of Wis., Formal Op. E-90-3 (1990). Notice that nothing in this statement
belies the notion that the opinions are intended to guide action.
As the Wisconsin disclaimer suggests, courts do not consider the opinions binding law.
When the bar or an individual lawyer brings an ethics opinion to the attention of a court,
seeking to justify or condemn conduct based on that opinion, the court treats the ethics opin-
ion much as it does a law review article cited for similar purposes: the court rejects or ignores
an opinion when it disagrees with the opinion s reasoning and accepts an opinion when it
agrees. See WOLFRAM, supra note 83, § 2.6, at 67 ("Courts obviously do not feel bound [by
ethics opinions].... When a court does notice ethics opinions that are contrary to the court's
view, it generally seems not overly concerned about offering special justifications for rejecting
the opinion."); id § 12.6.5, at 672-73.
The bar's understanding that ethics opinions are intended to guide action, however, is
recognized by state law to the following extent: courts generally consider the seeking of, and
action taken in accordance with, an ethics opinion as evidence of the lawyer's good faith. Id
§ 2.6, at 67. That the state and the bar see ethics opinions differently suggests that the bar and
state have separate normative understandings.
118. See supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text.
119. The courts generally do not review or comment on such opinions, so that any differ-
ences in the two normative systems should be more apparent in ethics opinions than in ethics
codes, which in most instances are at least drafted with the intent that they be approved by the
state. See infra notes 169-70 and accompanying text. Unlike ethics rules, which in theory (or
to put it another way, which under the state's law) are not operative law until a court or
legislature adopts them, ethics opinions generally are not reviewed by a court before being
issued.
In some jurisdictions a lawyer may petition a court to review an ethics opinion. See, e.g.,
Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 726 S.W.2d 299, 299 (Ky. 1987) (rejecting an ethics opinion
which had stated that the bar's antisolicitation rule was constitutional), rev'd on other grounds,
486 U.S. 466 (1988); In re Advisory Opinion of Ky. Bar Ass'n, 613 S.W.2d 416, 416 (Ky.
1981) (reviewing an ethics opinion). To the extent the resulting court opinion accepts the
ethics opinion, the ethics opinion has the status of other case law. Apart from such review, the
only opportunity most courts have to approve or reject a bar interpretation offered in an ethics
rule is when the bar asserts that action in violation of an ethics opinion is conduct that war-
rants formal discipline or when the state prosecutes an action, and the lawyer asserts the opin-
ion as a defense or justification.
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an attorney who receives $10,000 or more in cash from a client
must report the receipt and the client's identity to the Internal
Revenue Service. This law provides no recognition of client
confidence. Violation of the law is a felony. On the other hand,
[the state court-adopted ethics rule] provides that, "A lawyer
shall not reveal information relating to representation of a cli-
ent unless the client consents .... It appears the intent of
the New Mexico Rules of Professional Conduct is that attorney
should not reveal exactly what the federal law requires attorney
to reveal. Thus, there is a conflict between [the federal statute
and the state rule]. Our Committee does not resolve the con-
flict, but we give guidance to New Mexico attorneys encounter-
ing it.
If the client [insists upon paying in cash and insists that
the attorney comply with the professional conduct rule by not
reporting the transaction], New Mexico law would permit the
attorney to decline the representation; 121 or ... to withdraw
122
There is another possibility for an attorney [in this situa-
tion]. While no attorney is ethically obligated to pursue it, for
the reasons stated later in this opinion, we believe pursuit of it
would be consistent with the highest ideals of the profession.
Since we have identified a conflict between the New Mexico
ethical rules and the federal law,123 an attorney may, with the
client's consent, agree to "make a good faith effort to determine
the validity, scope, meaning or application" of the law at
issue. 124
While New Mexico attorneys are not required to make this
good faith effort, the Committee notes that one commentator
120. State Bar of N.M. Advisory Opinions Comm., Advisory Op. 1989-2 (1989) (quoting
N.M. Sup. Cr. R. ANN. 16-106(A) (1986)).
121. Id. (citing N.M. Sup. Cr. R. ANN. 16-102(E) (1986)).
122. IdL (citing N.M. Sup. Cr. R. ANN. 16-116(B)(3), (6) (1986)).
123. Notice that the bar's hierarchy of norms here suggests an inversion of the Supremacy
Clause of the Constitution.
124. State Bar of N.M. Advisory Opinions Comm., Advisory Op. 1989-2 (1989) (quoting
N.M. Sup. Cr. R. ANN. 16-102(D) (1986)). Rule 16-102(D) is identical to rule 1.2(d) of the
Model Rules. In full, rule 1.2(d) provides:
A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that
the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss the legal conse-
quences of any proposed course of conduct with a client and may counsel or assist a
client to make a good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or appli-
cation of the law.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(d) (1991).
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suggests the very purpose of laws such as 26 U.S.C. 60501 is to
drive a wedge between lawyer and client with the end result
that persons accused of drug offenses will be weakened in their
ability to defend themselves.12 The Committee further notes
that, throughout the former Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity and the current Rules of Professional Conduct, there are
provisions requiring a lawyer to be mindful of his obligations to
provide legal assistance to those who need it.126 Thus, the
Committee is of the opinion that an attorney who chooses not
to decline the representation and who rather chooses to repre-
sent the client while challenging the law would uphold the
highest ideals and traditions of our profession. 27
Ethics opinions that actively and openly encourage disobedience of
other law, as this one does, in the name of compliance with the ethics
rules provide the strongest evidence that the bar's hierarchy of norms
places ethics rules above other state precepts. Such opinions are, how-
ever, relatively rare. 128  What is surprising is that they exist at all.
"[M]ost communities will avoid outright conflict with a judge's interpre-
125. State Bar of N.M. Advisory Opinions Comm., Advisory Op. 1989-2 (1989) (citing
Steven Wisotsky, Crackdown: The Emerging "Drug Exception" to the Bill of Rights, 38 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 889, 900-04 (1987)).
126. Id. (citing MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 2, EC 2-1
(1969); N.M. Sup. Cr. R. ANN. 16-601 to 16-602 (1986)).
127. Id. The New Mexico committee was split on whether lawyers who had not discussed
the IRS regulations with the client before accepting the $10,000 were prohibited from filing
any form with the IRS or could file a form that omits the client's identity. hia This opinion is
reproduced here as evidence of the bar's hierarchy of norms. It should be noted, however, that
the one court deciding this precise question not only used a different hierarchy of norms but
also rejected the bar's position on the merits. See United States v. Goldberger & Dubin, 935
F.2d 501, 505 (2d Cir. 1991).
128. Other examples of openly defiant ethics opinions include: Chicago Bar Ass'n, Op. 86-
2 (1988) (lawyer would not be condemned for filing a completed IRS form; "however, the
better course.., is to file an IRS form that asserts the attorney-client privilege and gives notice
... that information has been withheld"); Ethics Advisory Comm., Nat'l Ass'n of Crim. Def.
Lawyers, Formal Op. 89-1 (1989) (stating that lawyer who receives an IRS summons should
not disclose client confidences unless a court orders disclosure); State Bar of Ga., Advisory Op.
No. 41 (1984) (lawyer should pursue all reasonable avenues of appeal before complying with
requests from state agency); State Bar of Wis., Formal Op. E-90-3 (1990) (lawyer should not
make disclosure when faced with an IRS summons "unless and until a court, preferably an
appellate court, considers the validity of the summons and any judicial enforcement orders in
this area and that court's ruling requires such disclosure").
Openly defiant ethics opinions are much more likely to involve certain precepts, such as
the rule on confidentiality, than others. For a discussion of the centrality of confidentiality in
the bar's nomos, see infra text accompanying notes 159-256. The bar's demonstration of
strong commitment to certain precepts in the rules and weak (or negative) commitment to
other precepts is another aspect of the bar's hierarchy of norms and is not inconsistent with the
general proposition presented here: the bar's hierarchy differs from the state's because the bar
presumes that ethics rules (even if only some ethics rules) trump law, which the state considers
above the ethics rules.
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tations, at least when he will likely back them with violence."12 9 If this is
true of "most communities," the bar's special dependence on the state
would lead one to predict that it would be more true of the bar. Further,
the heterogeneity of the bar, which many commentators see as a com-
plete and effective obstacle to the maintenance of any group nomos,
130
suggests that the bar could muster at most a weak commitment to any
normative understanding contrary to state law. 131 Thus, the existence of
any texts of resistance that are both forceful and committed is surprising
and will require further explanation.
1 32
Much more common than the New Mexico opinion are ethics opin-
ions stating that the ethics rules permit, but do not require, compliance
with other law.' 33 While less dramatic, these opinions also provide evi-
dence that the bar's hierarchy of norms presumes that ethics rules trump
other norms. How else can one understand the question, do the ethics
rules permit compliance with other law? How else can one understand
the answer, compliance is permitted? Typical of this sort of opinion is
the following excerpt from the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York, Opinion 1990-2:131
In response to a document request served by the plaintiff, the
[lawyer] was advised by his client [the chief executive officer of
the corporate defendant] that the corporate defendant had pre-
viously produced all responsive documents to a government
agency pursuant to an earlier subpoena, and that no copies of
the documents had been retained. [The lawyer, after confirm-
ing that the government agency was in possession of the docu-
ments,] advised the plaintiff that neither his client nor the
corporate defendant possessed any documents called for by the
document request.
The [lawyer] subsequently learned from his client that sev-
eral boxes of documents responsive to the.., document request
had been stored by the client with a third person. The [lawyer]
129. Cover, Nomos, supra note 1, at 53.
130. See, eg., sources cited supra note 6.
131. "The normative universe is held together by the force of interpretive commitments
." Cover, Nomos, supra note 1, at 7.
132. See infra text accompanying notes 308-409 (discussing the bar's strong commitment
and the state's weak commitment).
133. See, eg., ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1349
(1975) ("[We do not decide whether local criminal law makes it unlawful for S to fail to reveal
the information .... If disclosure is required by such law, S may, but is not required under DR
4-101(C)(2), to make disclosure."); Chicago Bar Ass'n, Op. 86-4 (undated) (lawyer is permit-
ted but not required to disclose to IRS its overpayment to client if he is under a legal obligation
pursuant to statute or regulation to disclose such information).
134. Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Op. 1990-2 (1990).
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informed his client that the plaintiff should be advised of the
existence of these documents. The client, however, took the po-
sition that the [lawyer] learned this information in the course of
a confidential attorney-client communication and instructed
the [lawyer] not to disclose the information.
Although this committee does not opine on the applicabil-
ity of court rules I3 5 to particular sets of facts, it is within our
purview to consider whether obligations imposed by court rules
are "required by law" within the meaning of DR 4-
101(C)(2).136 In this committee's opinion, a lawyer's obliga-
tions under Rule 26(e)' 37 are "required by law" within the
meaning of DR 4-101(C)(2) since the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure "have the effect of law."' 38
Therefore, assuming the [lawyer] concludes that the infor-
mation received from his client ... provides the [lawyer] with
actual knowledge that his prior response to plaintiff's docu-
ment request was inaccurate, this committee concludes that
under DR 4-101(C)(2) the [lawyer] may disclose to the plaintiff
the existence of the documents... , even though that informa-
tion may constitute a "confidence" and/or "secret."
Should the [lawyer] choose not to disclose the information,
he would have to consider whether continued representation of
the client might violate the Code. EC 7-1 provides that it is the
duty of a lawyer to represent "his client zealously within the
bounds of law, which includes Disciplinary Rules and enforcea-
ble professional regulations."
135. Id. Throughout this opinion the term "court rules" is meant to refer to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and not to the ethics rules, although they too are rules adopted by the
court in New York.
136. Id (referring to N.Y. JUD. LAw § 29 app., DR 4-101(C)(2) (McKinney 1975), which
provides that a lawyer may disclose a confidence or secret when "required by law").
137. Id (referring to FED. R. Civ. P. 26(e), which provides that a party generally is not
required to supplement a response made in discovery to include information later acquired as
long as the response was complete when made). Rule 26(e) lists several exceptions. See, e.g.,
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(e)(2)(A) (requiring that an answer be supplemented if the party or lawyer
learns that the original response was based on information that the party knew was incorrect
when the original response was filed); id 26(e)(2)(B) (requiring that an answer be supple-
mented if the party learns that, although correct when made, "the circumstances are such that
a failure to amend the response is in substance a knowing concealment"). The Advisory Com-
mittee Note explains that these two exceptions are designed to cover the situation in which the
"lawyer obtains actual knowledge that a prior response is incorrect," but that they do not
impose a continuing obligation to check prior answers. Id. 26 advisory committee's note.
138. Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Op. 1990-2 (1990) (citing 4 CHARLES
ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1030, at 125
(2d ed. 1987)) (other citations omitted).
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DR 7-102(A)(3) provides: "In his representation of a cli-
ent, a lawyer shall not ... [c]onceal or knowingly fail to dis-
close that which he is required by law to reveal." Because this
committee considers obligations imposed by the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure to be ones "required by law" within the
meaning of DR 7-102(A)(3), the [lawyer] would be required to
terminate representation of the client (assuming the [lawyer]
has concluded that Rule 26(e) requires correction of the prior
discovery response), because continued representation would
entail a violation of this Disciplinary Rule. 139
While this opinion "allows" the lawyer to comply with other law, it
explicitly acknowledges the possibility that the lawyer may choose not to
do so. Also notice the committee's claim that it does not "opine" on
court rules. Ethics committees often state that they will not pass on
"legal" questions."4 This position avoids overt confrontation with the
state and affirms the existence of a discrete normative space in which
"ethics" govern, not "law." However, as the New Mexico opinion dis-
cussed above demonstrates, the "rule" that ethics committees will not
pass on questions of other law yields when the principle involved is deter-
mined to be important enough to risk overt confrontation.
Further evidence of the bar's hierarchy of norms is found in a New
York Law Journal story announcing the New York ethics opinion quoted
above. The story begins: "A city bar ethics committee has determined
for the first time that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure fall under the
'required by law' dictum of the Disciplinary Rules, permitting attorneys
to disclose confidential information from clients when they have actual
knowledge that prior representations were inaccurate." 1 4' The article
never suggests that the ethics opinion is unremarkable to the extent that
rule 26(e) imposes an obligation to disclose. 142 It thus supports the prop-
osition that other law generally occupies a lower status than ethics rules
in the bar's nomos.
The bar's understanding that ethics rules trump other law (or qual-
139. Id
140. See, eg., ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Rules of
Procedure 9, in 1 ABA INFORMAL ETHICS OPINIONS 6 (1975) ("The Committee will not issue
opinions on questions of law .... ."); WOLFRAM, supra note 83, § 2.6.6, at 67.
141. Martin Fox, Bar Ethics Panel Clarifies Rules on Client Secrets, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 7,
1990, at I (emphasis added). The article does not explain why it calls the "required by law"
portion of Model Code DR 4-101 "dictum," which suggests that most lawyers would under-
stand and find noncontroversial the use of that term in this context. Id. (commenting on
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101 (1981)). The word "dictum"
emphasizes the nonbinding character of the lawyer's obligation to comply with other law.
142. Id.
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ify it or render it ambiguous) is also evident in its efforts to pass ethics
rules or interpret existing rules to stop state action that the courts have
held is permitted under other law. Ethics rules that would require prose-
cutors to get prior judicial approval and demonstrate extreme need
before subpoenaing lawyers to testify before grand juries about their cli-
ents' affairs 143 are just one example of this. Other examples include eth-
ics rules and ethics opinions prohibiting the disclosure of client fraud in
connection with the sale or purchase of securities to the Securities and
Exchange Commission, purchasers, or stockholders; 1" those prohibiting
143. See supra notes 33-47 and accompanying text.
144. In February 1974 the ABA adopted an amendment to Model Code DR 7-102(B)(1)
that all but eliminated the lawyer's duty to reveal a client's fraud in which the lawyer's services
had been used. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY DR 7-102(B)(1) (1974); see
infra notes 195-99 and accompanying text. It is generally known that this amendment was a
response to several court decisions that had alarmed the securities bar, particularly SEC v.
Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535, 542 (2d Cir. 1973) (holding that a lawyer who negligently pre-
pared an erroneous opinion used to sell securities could be enjoined from future violations of
the securities laws), and to the position being advanced by the SEC on securities lawyers'
obligations to the SEC and to stockholders, particularly as evidenced by its complaint in SEC
v. National Student Marketing Corp. See Complaint, SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp.,
457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978) (No. 225-72), reprinted in [1971-72 Transfer Binder] Fed. See.
L. Rep. (CCH) 93,360, at 91,913 (D.D.C. Feb. 3, 1972) [hereinafter National Student Mar-
keting Complaint]; see also Junius Hoffman, On Learning of a Corporate Client's Crime or
Fraud, 33 Bus. LAW. 1389, 1405-07 (1978) (explaining that the amendment was one of a series
of attempts by bar groups to resolve the "conflict" raised between the state's position and the
securities lawyers' ethical obligations); infra note 319 (describing the bar's reaction to the posi-
tion taken by the SEC in the 1970s on the responsibility of securities lawyers).
The article by Junius Hoffman describes other efforts by the ABA and state bars in the
1970s to restrict the obligations of securities lawyers under the securities laws by passing ethics
rules and issuing interpretations of ethics rules. Hoffman, supra, at 1406-08. One example
notable for its breadth is The Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Report by
Special Committee on Lawyers' Role in Securities Transactions, 32 Bus. LAW. 1879 (1977)
[hereinafter ABCNY Report on Securities Transactions].
In the 1980s this struggle over the law governing securities lawyers was played out in the
ABA's adoption of rules 1.13 and 1.6. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules
1.13, 1.6 (1983). Rule 1.13, as adopted, eliminated the lawyer's discretion to disclose criminal
or fraudulent corporate activity to stockholders, government agencies, or those defrauded by
the corporation's activities-discretion that had been included in the draft presented to the
House of Delegates. See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & SUSAN P. KONIAK, THE LAW AND
ETHICS OF LAWYERING 759 (1990) (explaining the difference between the adopted rule and
the draft, and juxtaposing the text of the adopted rule and the draft proposal); see also Stephen
Gillers, Model Rule L13(c) Gives the Wrong Answer to the Question of Corporate Counsel Dis-
closure, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 289, 291-94 (1987) (discussing the evolution of rule 1.13,
focusing on three drafts between 1980 and 1982); Harvey L. Pitt, The Georgetown Proposals, 36
Bus. LAW. 1831, 1834-35 (1981) (explaining the connection between the ABA's work on rule
1.13 and the SEC's position).
Rule 1.6 eliminated the lawyer's discretion to reveal client fraud-discretion that had
been included in the Kutak draft. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Rectification of Client Fraud:
Death and Revival of a Professional Norm, 33 EMORY L.J. 271, 296-98 (1984); infra notes 217-
56 and accompanying text (discussing rule 1.6).
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the simultaneous negotiation of attorneys' fees in civil rights cases;1 45 and
those prohibiting disclosure of information to the Legal Services
Corporation.
146
Finally, this ordering of norms is apparent and pervasive 47 in other
145. See Pate, supra note 77, at 794-95 (discussing the conflict between ethics opinions and
other law on fee waivers).
That the effort to trump state law through ethics opinions largely abated after the
Supreme Court's decision in Evans v. JeffD., 475 U.S. 717 (1985), is not conclusive of the bar's
acceptance that state law trumps the ethics rules or the bar's interpretation of those rules.
After all, the ethics opinions stood in the face of contrary legal interpretations from lower
federal courts. See id. at 787 nn.20-25 (discussing the pre-Evans law in the federal circuits).
At most, this acquiescence to the Supreme Court's interpretation suggests some limit on the
bar's commitment to its alternate vision. See infra text accompanying notes 381-409 (discuss-
ing the bar's texts of resistance).
In his dissent in Evans, Justice Brennan invited the bar to use ethics opinions to try to
outlaw simultaneous negotiations. Evans, 475 U.S. at 765 (Brennan, J., dissenting). This invi-
tation for the bar to continue its own normative understanding is consistent with Justice Bren-
nan's general approach of inviting alternative normative understandings to counteract the
Court's decisions.
Pate's is the most thorough consideration of the relationship between ethics opinions and
state law in the legal literature. The author observes and documents the overlap of state law
and "ethics," and the conflict and competition over norms that this produces. Given that few
commentators have focused on these matters, this piece by then-student Robert Hewitt Pate,
III is quite remarkable. As a virtual pioneer in this area, Mr. Pate cannot be faulted for failing
to see all the implications of what he had discovered. Compare Professor Gabaldon's article,
supra note 77. She carefully documents and explores in the context of shareholder litigation
the differences between what she calls "laws of general applicability" (state law) and what she
calls "the ethics regulation" (which, as she uses that term, includes both bar law and state
law). See id at 425-27. In discussing ethical regulation, Professor Gabaldon does not focus on
the different meanings that those rules may have for the bar and the state. Id.
146. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1394
(1975); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1287 (1974);
N.H. Bar Ass'n, Formal Op. 1988-9/13 (1989). As a firm supporter of legal services organiza-
tions, this seems like a good place to make explicit that I see the law-generating power of non-
state communities as not only descriptive of the world of law around me and inevitable, but
also as a good thing. I do not ascribe to all of the bar's vision of law as described in this
Article-a point I will come back to in concluding this piece. But the fact that the private bar
has a vision that is different from the state is for me a cause for some celebration and not
dismay. My celebration comes from the sacred stories that I share with my colleagues at the
bar-stories of the danger of unmitigated state power and of the special destiny and history of
the profession as protectors of the oppressed and of individual (and, at least in my subcom-
munity, as protectors of minority group) rights.
147. This ordering of norms is so pervasive that some significant evidence of it can be
found in the vast majority of texts that refer to legal ethics and were authored by lawyers in
private practice. Most articles on legal ethics written by lawyers in academia also reflect the
bar's order of norms. There are, of course, exceptions, but they are relatively rare and often
ambiguous. See, eg., Lewis H. Van Dusen, Ethics and Specialized Practice-An Overview of
the Momentum for Reexamination, 33 Bus. LAW. 1565, 1572 (1978). Van Dusen has ex-
pressed his belief that "those members of the profession who would view more specialized
articulations of professional responsibility as a source of defense in potential actions against
them for violating the securities laws misconstrue the relationship between professional re-
sponsibilities and legal obligations." Id. Oddly, the footnote Mr. Van Dusen appends to this
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bar texts, such as reports of bar committees, bar resolutions and amicus
briefs. 48 Consider the following examples:
Application of § 60501 to attorneys is contradicted by Canon 4
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.149
Public policy, we strongly believe, is best served by lawyers act-
ing in conformance with their obligation to their cient[s] and
others as prescribed under the [Model Code]. Accordingly, lia-
bility should not be imposed upon lawyers whose conduct is in
conformance with the [Model Code].' 50
These developments [in the case law] relate to the legal
liabilities of securities lawyers and raise questions which can
only be answered in the last event by courts and legislatures.
However, the uncertainties they have engendered in the minds
of securities lawyers are not confined to problems of legal liabil-
ity; they extend also to questions of professional responsibility,
and this is an issue upon which lawyers, and not only judges
and legislators, may speak with authority.'
We recognize that lawyers do not have the ultimate deci-
sion as to their own standards of conduct .... We believe,
however, that.., a lawyer complying with the guidelines [is-
sued in this text] should not be subject to discipline or liability
by the SEC or the courts." 2
statement cites Model Code EC 6-5 and not any of the court decisions that have rejected or
ignored such defenses. Id at 1572 n.21 (citing MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSI-
BILITY EC 6-5 (1969)). An earlier note in that piece does, however, mention such cases. Id at
1571 n.18. Model Code EC 6-5 states that a lawyer should act competently not just because he
fears civil liability or discipline, but because he "should have pride in his professional endeav-
ors." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY EC 6-5 (1981).
148. Admittedly, these sources standing alone could be construed as mere advocacy; but as
the preceding discussion demonstrates, they do not stand alone.
149. Memorandum on Behalf of Amici National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers
et al. in Opposition to Enforcement of Summonses Issued by the Internal Revenue Service and
to Compelled Compliance with IRC Section 60501 at 41, United States v. Fischetti, No. M-18-
304, slip op. (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 1990) [hereinafter NACDL Brief in Fischettil. The NACDL
was joined on the brief by the New York Criminal Bar Association, the New York State Bar
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, the National Network for the Right to Counsel and
the New York Civil Liberties Union. Id.
150. Statement of Policy Adopted by the American Bar Association Regarding Responsi-
bilities and Liabilities of Lawyers in Advising with Respect to the Compliance by Clients with
Laws Administered by the Securities and Exchange Commission, reprinted in 61 A.B.A. J.
1085, 1086 (1975) [hereinafter ABA Policy on Advising on Securities Matters].
151. This statement goes quite far in revealing the existence of separate normative under-
standings and asserting the right of the bar's competing nomos to exist alongside that of the
state.
152. ABCNY Report on Securities Transactions, supra note 144, at 1882-83.
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There is, of course, much in bar texts about the special obligations of
lawyers to see to it that their clients obey the law and to obey and
demonstrate respect for the law themselves." 3 What of this? First, as
other commentators have remarked, much of this talk is not intended to
guide action, 154 and thus is not "law." Second, to the extent this talk is
"law," it is not evidence that the bar places other law above the ethics
rules unless the text (1) relates to cases of conflict between the two
sources of norms and (2) dictates that other law governs because other
law is the superior norm. The bar does not talk this way often, 5 s and
when it does the obligation to obey other law is described as an ethical
obligation.156 These examples thus do not show that the bar recognizes
other law as trumping the Code: even if all ethics opinions held that the
lawyer's ethical obligation was to obey other law, at most that would
show an extremely accommodationist stance toward the state nomos. It
would not prove, so long as the obligation to obey law was portrayed as
an "ethical" obligation, that the ethics rules are not considered the supe-
rior source of obligation.
A traditionalist might object to my argument at this point: "Of
course ethics committees speak of the duty to obey other law as an ethi-
cal obligation. How else could they speak without usurping the function
of the courts by expounding on what state law requires the lawyer to
do?" 157 Thus, our traditionalist would argue, we cannot make too much
of the fact that ethics opinions never locate the obligation to obey other
law in other law because to do so would require them to interpret other
law directly. Of course, the traditionalist would then have to describe as
"mistakes" the ethics opinions that countenance disobedience and that
suggest that obedience is not required by ethical norms. Nevertheless, let
us take this traditionalist objection seriously for a moment. The strong-
est support for the traditionalist position is found in the ethics opinions
that suggest that a lawyer must obey other law. These opinions, how-
153. See Gordon, supra note 15, at 1-10.
154. Id. at 13.
155. But see, eg., ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 352
(1985) (explaining that a lawyer must have a reasonable basis in law for any position she
advises a client to take on a tax return, and discussing what "reasonable basis" means); Van
Dusen, supra note 147, at 1571-72.
156. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 352
(1985); ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 1141 (1970).
157. Ethics committees are for this very reason bound by their own rules not to expound
on law. See supra note 140. Such operating rules reflect the traditional understanding of the
relationship between law and ethics. As we have seen, however, ethics opinions often tackle
"legal issues" while reciting their obligation not to. Of course, the argument in this Article is
that these coexisting normative worlds in fact overlap all the time and conflict at critical
points. Ethics committees therefore cannot avoid tackling "legal issues."
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ever, generally ground this duty in particular provisions of the ethics
rules, 58 which is consistent with the presumption that the hierarchy
places ethics rules over other law and is difficult to reconcile with the
traditionalist's understanding that ethics rules begin where state law
leaves off.
V. THE CENTRALITY OF CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE BAR'S NoMos
A. Introduction
The bar texts discussed in the previous section suggest the centrality
and power of the norm of confidentiality in the bar's nomos. Those texts
show that it is confidentiality, and particularly the duty to keep client
confidences from the state, more often than any other norm, that triggers
the obligation to resist competing state norms 5 9 and that justifies the
passage of ethics rules to "undo" state pronouncements. 6  That the bar
deems individual acts of resistance and group efforts to repeal state pro-
nouncements to be appropriate responses to state efforts to secure client
confidences reveals the bar's interpretation of the norm-i.e., that it is
absolute or nearly absolute.
Confidentiality is a constitutional norm in the bar's nomos. By
"constitutional norm," I mean a norm so central to group definition (that
which constitutes a group) that the group perceives threats to the norm
as threats against the group itself-against the group's very existence;
that the group sees proposals to change the norm as proposals to change
the essence/character/function of the group itself; and consequently that
the group feels extreme action in defense of the norm is justified. That
the norm is constitutional is implicit in the texts examined in the last
section.
Why does the bar see this norm as constitutional? That question is
addressed in the next section, which relates the bar's sacred stories. Here
the issue is how the bar elevated the norm to a position of prominence
158. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 352
(1985). But see ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 1141 (1970) ("[I]f the
attorney is required by law to make a disclosure ... the ethics rules are drafted in such a way
as to remove any ethical bar to disclosure or to reporting and the only relevant consideration
would be the application of legal rules."). Notice that, while this opinion does not rely on a
specific ethics provision, it still suggests that the ethics rules could have barred a lawyer from
obeying the law. It is also interesting that this highly deferential opinion, the most deferential
ABA opinion I found in my research, involved disclosing the whereabouts of a deserter from
military service during the Vietnam War. The intense normative commitment of those on
either side of the Vietnam War question may explain the bar's eagerness to put the state's
nomos, and not its own, on the line here.
159. See supra notes 128, 133.
160. See supra notes 143-46 and accompanying text.
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and how it maintains it in that position, not why. If the bar's under-
standing of confidentiality provides the most frequent source of conflict
with other state law, we would not expect the ethics rules (which are
shared with the state) to reflect the bar's understanding of the norm.
How then was the norm elevated when the bar does not have exclusive
control over the authoritative wording of the precepts? This is the ques-
tion that concerns us here.
As just predicted, the special importance of the norm of confidenti-
ality in the bar's nomos is not apparent on the face of the ethics codes as
adopted by the states, nor is it readily apparent on the face of the ethics
rules as drafted by the ABA. Confidentiality is not the first norm stated
in the Canons of Professional Ethics,161 the Model Code of Professional
Conduct, or the Model Rules of Professional Responsibility. It is instead
covered in canon 37 (out of forty-seven in the Canons of Professional
Ethics),162 canon 4 (out of nine in the Model Code) 163 and model rule 1.6
(the sixth of seventeen rules in the first of eight articles).'6 Moreover,
the language describing confidentiality in all three documents is rela-
tively dry and straightforward, 65 and each document contains excep-
161. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (1937).
162. As originally adopted in 1908, the Canons did not deal directly with confidentiality.
The only reference to the subject was in canon 6 on conflicts of interests. A lawyer was forbid-
den to accept employment that might require the disclosure of the client's "secrets or confi-
dences." Id Canon 6. In 1928, the first time the Canons were amended, canon 37 on
confidentiality was added. Id Canon 37 (1928).
163. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 4 (1981) (entitled "A Law-
yer Should Preserve the Confidences and Secrets of a Client").
164. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1991). Moving the norm
closer to the front of the ethics rules may in part be an attempt by the bar to affirm its commit-
ment to the norm at a time when the bar sees the norm as under increasing attack by the state.
165. Canon 37 of the Canons of Professional Ethics, entitled "Confidences of a Client,"
provides in part:
It is the duty of a lawyer to preserve his client's confidences. This duty outlasts
the lawyer's employment, and extends as well to his employees; and neither of them
should accept employment which involves or may involve the disclosure or use of
these confidences, either for the private advantage of the lawyer or his employees or
to the disadvantage of the client, without his knowledge and consent, and even
though there are other available sources of such information. A lawyer should not
continue employment when he discovers that this obligation prevents the perform-
ance of his full duty to his former or to his new client.
CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 37 (1937).
Model Code DR 4-101, entitled "Preservation of Confidences and Secrets of a Client,"
provides in part:
(A) "Confidence" refers to information protected by the attorney-client privilege
under applicable law, and "secret" refers to other information gained in the profes-
sional relationship that the client has requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of
which would be embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimental to the client.
(B) Except when permitted under DR 4-101(C), a lawyer shall not knowingly:
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tions to the duty to keep client confidences.166 Nothing in the
description of the norm in these three ethics codes reveals its centrality
or power in the bar's nomos. 16 7 Compare, for example, the position and
(1) Reveal a confidence or secret of his client.
(2) Use a confidence or secret of his client to the disadvantage of the client.
(3) Use a confidence or secret of the client for the advantage of himself or of a
third person, unless the client consents after full disclosure.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101 (1981).
Model rule 1.6, entitled "Confidentiality of Information," provides in part:
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client unless
the client consents after consultation, except for disclosures that are impliedly au-
thorized in order to carry out the representation, and except as stated in paragraph
(b).
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(a) (1991).
166. Canon 37 of the Canons of Professional Ethics provides that a lawyer "is not pre-
cluded from disclosing the truth" when accused by the client of wrongdoing and that "[tlhe
announced intention of a client to commit a crime is not [a] confidence [the lawyer] is bound to
respect." CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHIcs Canon 37 (1937).
The Model Code lists four exceptions to the rule on confidentiality:
A lawyer may reveal [confidences or secrets]:
(1) ... with the consent of the client... after a full disclosure to [her].
(2) ... when permitted under Disciplinary Rules or required by law or court order.
(3) [when they involve t]he intention of his client to commit a crime ....
(4) [when] necessary to establish or collect his fee or to defend himself or his employ-
ees or associates against an accusation of wrongful conduct.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY DR 4-101(C) (1981).
The Model Rules provide:
A lawyer may reveal [confidential] information to the extent the lawyer reason-
ably believes necessary:
(1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer
believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm; or
(2) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy
between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or
civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was in-
volved, or to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's
representation of the client.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b) (1991).
167. Some commentators read the cursory treatment of confidentiality in the original Ca-
nons and the failure to define "confidences" in the amended Canons as evidence that the bar's
understanding of the duty of confidentiality was more limited and that the norm was less
central, in my terms, than it is for the bar today. See, e.g., Patterson, supra note 77, at 944-45;
Subin, supra note 2, at 1107. These commentators argue that DR 4-101 in the Model Code
represents a significant change from the bar's "traditional," limited understanding of confiden-
tiality to a modern, expanded understanding. For example, Professor Subin, who writes to
explain the divergence of the ethics rules on confidentiality from state law on confidentiality,
dates the divergence from the adoption of the Code. See Subin, supra note 2, at 1107-08. The
Canons, he claims, were consistent with state law. Id. Professor Patterson apparently agrees.
See Patterson, supra note 77, at 944-45.
While it may be true that the bar's understanding of the norm of confidentiality has
changed somewhat over time, I do not think that any such claim can be substantiated by
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text of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.1 68
The masking of the centrality and power of the confidentiality norm
in the ethics codes is explicable. The Model Code and Model Rules were
drafted by the bar, but they were intended to be adopted by the state.
169
The Canons were drafted with the hope that they would, at least, influ-
ence the state. 170 One would thus not expect these documents to reflect
on their face the bar's understanding of confidentiality, if, as I claim, it is
over this norm that the bar's nomos diverges most from the state's.
Before moving on to explore the bar texts that order the norms in
the ethics codes and elevate confidentiality to a position of supremacy, I
want to emphasize what is new and what is not new in the theory I am
presenting, because the ground to be covered on confidentiality in the
next several pages has been well traveled by other commentators. This is
not the first article to notice that the bar's understanding of confidential-
referring to the precepts alone. In my opinion, the commentators referred to above rely too
heavily on analysis of the language of the precepts and too little on the stories and commitment
that fill out the meaning of the rules. To know whether (and how much) the bar's understand-
ing on confidentiality has changed over time, one must compare not only the written precepts
but also the texts explaining those precepts and the action deemed justified in the name of
those rules and stories. While I will not attempt in this Article to provide precise answers to
what the bar's nomos looked like at various points in history, my examination of the texts
elaborating the precepts suggests a greater continuity over time than the commentators above
have suggested. See infra notes 173-256 and accompanying text.
168. Not only is the Amendment first, but its language suggests no exceptions. It states:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble .... " U.S. CONsT. amend. I (emphasis added).
169. Both the Model Code and Model Rules were written with the intent that they would
officially be adopted by the state as law. After the ABA adopted the Model Code, it "launched
a highly organized campaign to persuade the states to adopt the Code as the official local set of
standards." WOLFRAM, supra note 83, § 2.6.3, at 56. The effort launched on behalf of the
Model Rules was more modest, id § 2.6.4, at 63, but that does not change the fact that the
Model Rules were written and adopted by the ABA with the intent that they would become
state law.
170. "The Canons were probably not intended to have any direct legal effect, but it is clear
that the ABA leadership contemplated that they would be influential in lawyer discipline pro-
ceedings in courts." Id § 2.6.2, at 55 (footnote omitted). Moreover, whatever the intent of
those who drafted the original Canons in 1908, by 1937, when the ABA amended the Canons,
it was clear that courts were using the Canons as a source of the law governing lawyers. See,
e-g., People ex reL Colorado Bar Ass'n v. Ginsberg, 87 Colo. 115, 121, 285 P. 758, 760 (1930);
People v. McCallum, 341 Ill. 578, 595-96, 173 N.E. 827, 833 (1930) (Dunne, C.J., Stone, J. &
DeYoung, J., dissenting); In re Greathouse, 189 Minn. 51, 62, 248 N.W. 735, 740 (1933); In re
Thatcher, 83 Ohio St. 246, 253, 93 N.E. 895, 897 (1910). A few states already had adopted the
Canons as state law by 1937. See, eg., In re Galton, 289 Or. 565, 582, 515 P.2d 317, 326
(1980) (noting that the Canons were adopted by statute in 1935); In re Arctander, 110 Wash.
296, 305, 188 P. 380, 383 (1920) (noting that the Canons were adopted by statute in 1917).
And the federal courts were using the Canons as evidence of the applicable legal standards.
See, eg., American Can Co. v. Ladoga Canning Co., 44 F.2d 763, 772 (7th Cir. 1930); United
States ex reL Randolph v. Ross, 298 F. 64, 66 (6th Cir. 1924).
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ity diverges from state law. Other commentators have insightfully and
meticulously described the divergence between the bar's vision and that
of the state.
1 71
On the other hand, these commentators have had little to say about
the questions that are the focus of this Article: how such divergence
could have come about and why it has proved so resilient. It is as if these
questions are outside the scope of legal analysis. Armed only with tradi-
tional theories of law, one is forced to talk of this persistent divergence as
if it were some sort of continuing blunder. But this explanation is unsat-
isfying. How is it that the profession and the courts, both presumably
expert in discerning such "mistakes," have failed to see and correct an
error that these commentators have noticed and described in published
articles? Without further explanation is it plausible to believe that so
many lawyers and judges simply failed to notice the divergence or that
either group would simply change its opinion upon having someone point
out the divergence? The failure of these commentators to grapple with
the reasons for and meaning of the divergence they identify is not a fail-
ure of these particular scholars, but rather an expression of the tradi-
tional boundaries of legal analysis.1 72
B. The Triumph of Confidentiality in Ethics Opinions
The ethics codes may mask the power of the norm of confidentiality,
but the ethics opinions interpreting the codes make it plain. A pattern
emerges in these opinions: rules affirming a duty or the discretion to
disclose are either narrowed to the point of near-irrelevance or held to be
overridden by rules requiring silence. First, consider the rules and ethics
opinions under the Canons.
Canon 37, which stated the duty to keep confidences and included a
171. For a comprehensive discussion of how the bar's understanding of confidentiality di-
verges from state law, see Subin, supra note 2, at 1106-57. For further discussion on this
subject, see Wayne D. Brazil, Unanticipated Client Perjury and the Collision of Rules of Ethics,
Evidence and Constitutional Law, 44 Mo. L. REv. 601, 615-22 (1979); David J. Fried, Too
High a Price for Truth: The Exception to the Attorney-Client Privilege for Contemplated Crimes
and Frauds, 64 N.C. L. REv. 443, 490-98 (1986); Patterson, supra note 77, at 944-45.
172. The Critical Legal Studies movement, with its insistence on revealing and emphasiz-
ing divergence (conflict) in law, is perceived as a threat precisely because of the fear that legal
analysis becomes pointless at the moment that we identify divergence as more than a "mis-
take." Unfortunately, Critical Legal Studies scholarship, with some important exceptions, has
thus far been least satisfying in suggesting what lies beyond the acknowledgement of diver-
gence. I say "unfortunately" because I believe that after "divergence" there is still a world of
law out there to be explored and that there are meaningful ways to explore it. One way of
understanding Professor Cover's work in Nomos, supra note 1, and Violence, supra note 1, is
that he demonstrated the richness, complexity and importance of law and legal analysis in a
world that acknowledges divergence, indeterminacy, the political and the violent in law.
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self-defense exception, also provided: "The announced intention of a cli-
ent to commit a crime is not included within the confidences which [the
lawyer] is bound to respect."173 But ABA Formal Opinion 268 stated
that a lawyer who learns that his client intends to commit the crime of
perjury and consequently withdraws has no discretion to reveal the in-
tended perjury to successor counsel. 74
Similarly, canon 29 provided: "The counsel upon the trial of a
cause in which perjury has been committed owe it to the profession and
to the public to bring the matter to the knowledge of the prosecuting
authorities." 171 Moreover, canon 41 stated:
When a lawyer discovers that some fraud or deception has
been practiced, which has unjustly imposed upon the court or a
party, he should endeavor to rectify it; at first by advising his
client, and if his client refuses to forego the advantage thus un-
justly gained, he should promptly inform the injured person or
his counsel, so that they may take appropriate steps. 176
Nevertheless, ABA Formal Opinion 287 held that a lawyer who dis-
covers that his client has committed perjury in a civil case should not
disclose it because that would violate the duty to keep the client's confi-
dences. 177 The reasoning of this opinion reveals the centrality and power
of the norm of confidentiality, other rules notwithstanding. The opinion
begins with a series of quotes from various sources that portray the norm
as absolute. For example, from ABA Formal Opinion 91: "'[lIt is essen-
tial to the administration of justice that there should be perfect freedom
of consultation by client with attorney without any apprehension of a
compelled disclosure by the attorney to the detriment of the client.' ,T178
Having established through quotation the power of the norm, the opinion
proceeds:
On its face [canon 29] would apparently make it the duty
of the lawyer to disclose his client's prior perjury to the prose-
cuting authorities. However, to do so in this case would in-
volve the direct violation of Canon 37.
173. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETmics Canon 37 (1937). Read literally, this is a wonder-
fully narrow exception: when does a client ever do this? But cf. Patterson, supra note 77, at
944-45 (arguing that the Canons were less protective of confidentiality than the Code); Subin,
supra note 2, at 1107-08 (same).
174. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 268 (1945).
175. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETics Canon 29 (1937).
176. Id Canon 41.
177. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 287 (1953).
178. Id (quoting ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 91
(1933)) (emphasis added).
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Accordingly, it is essential to determine which of the Ca-
nons controls.
Neither Canon 41 nor Canon 29 specifically requires the
lawyer to advise the court of his client's perjury, even where
this was committed in a case in which the lawyer was acting as
counsel and an officer of the court. We do not consider that
either the duty of candor and fairness to the court, as stated in
Canon 22, or the provisions of Canon 29 and 41 above quoted
are sufficient to override the purpose, policy and express obliga-
tion under Canon 37 
7 9
These ethics opinions elevating the norm of confidentiality above
other norms and interpreting it to require silence in almost all cases"'8
are typical of those issued under the Canons.' There are two ethics
179. Id
180. One exception to confidentiality is consistently affirmed in ethics opinions under the
Canons and later codes. This exception allows a lawyer to disclose confidences to collect his
fee or defend himself against an accusation by the client. See, eg., ABA Comm. on Profes-
sional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 19 (1930).
181. For example, Opinion 202, which is cited in the footnote to DR 4-101(C)(3) of the
Model Code, presumably as authority for the proposition that a lawyer may disclose the cli-
ent's intent to commit a crime, is in fact another testament to the power and scope of the
confidentiality norm. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(3)
n.17 (1981) (citing ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 202
(1940)). Opinion 202 involved the following situation. The lawyer was asked to draw up a
contract. Given the facts he knew, he could (and did) reasonably infer that the contract might
be used to perpetrate a fraud and conceal the perpetration of embezzlement, a felony. He drew
up the contract and warned the client in a separate memo that unless the client disclosed the
embezzlement to the affected party before executing the contract, "much greater liability...
might result." ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 202 (1940).
The client executed the contract without making disclosure. Id.
Although the ethics opinion repeats the exception of canon 37, which allows a lawyer to
reveal the client's intent to commit a crime, it holds that in this case that exception is not
applicable because: (1) the client did not actually tell the lawyer that it was going to execute
the contract without disclosure of the embezzlement before doing so; and (2) the "transaction
has been consummated." It goes on to hold that canon 37 prohibits disclosure to anyone but
the client; the client in this situation includes the board of directors of the client-company. Id
The opinion never mentions canon 41, which requires the lawyer to disclose client fraud which
the client refuses to rectify, or canon 15, which states that the office of attorney must not be
used for "any manner of fraud or chicane" for any client. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS
Canon 15 (1937).
For other opinions permitting nondisclosure, see ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics,
Informal Op. C 778 (1964) (relying on ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances,
Formal Op. 287 (1953); ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 216
(1941) (holding that a lawyer did not need to reveal information to the court on a pending
collusive divorce, even though that information was not disclosed in the course of rendering
legal services); ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 23 (1930)
(holding that "[a]n attorney for a fugitive from justice should not disclose the fugitive's hiding
place to the prosecuting authorities," and that when the client is a court-appointed guardian,
his lawyer is not required to reveal a fraud perpetrated by the client upon the client's ward,
canon 41 notwithstanding, because canon 37 trumps canon 41).
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opinions under the Canons that do not follow this pattern: ABA Formal
Opinions 155 and 156, which were both issued on May 4, 1936. Opinion
155 holds that a lawyer must reveal the whereabouts of a client who has
fled the jurisdiction while out on bail."8 2 It appears to be in direct con-
ffict with an earlier ABA opinion on the subject, Formal Opinion 23;183
however, it does not overturn that opinion.' 4 The other aberrant opin-
ion, Formal Opinion 156, holds that when the client is violating his pa-
role and refuses to stop, the lawyer must advise the authorities."' The
only ethics opinion mentioned in Opinion 156 is Formal Opinion 155.186
Whatever explains the appearance of Opinions 155 and 156 in 1936, the
more limited view of confidentiality expressed in those opinions was not
present six years earlier when Opinion 23 was issued, nor was it evident
four years later.18 7 Moreover, by 1953 the aberrant twins of 1936 were
openly disowned, but not overruled, in Formal Opinion 287.188
The Model Code as adopted by the ABA did not make explicit that
ethics opinions under the Canons had subordinated competing norms to
the obligation to keep confidences. '1 9 First, the subordinated canons are
182. ABA Comm. on" Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 155 (1936).
183. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 23 (1930) ("An
attorney for a fugitive from justice should not disclose the fugitive's hiding place to the prose-
cuting authorities ....").
184. Instead, without explanation, it asserts: "A similar question was considered by the
committee in Opinion 23. What was said in that Opinion, as applied to the facts then before
the committee, is not in conflict with the views here stated." ABA Comm. on Professional
Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 155 (1936).
185. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 156 (1936).
186. Id (citing ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 155
(1936)). The caption on Opinion 156 lists canons 5, 15, 16, 32, 37, and 44 as the canons
interpreted, but the body of the opinion does not refer to any of these canons and does not try
to reconcile this opinion with Formal Opinion 23. Id
187. See ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 202 (1940).
Opinion 202 cites to and quotes from Opinion 155 with approval, but ultimately finds it irrele-
vant. Id. Opinion 202 is discussed supra note 181.
188. See ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 287 (1953)
("Any inconsistency.., between our decisions in Opinions 155 and 156 and that in Opinion 23
[holding that a lawyer should not disclose a fugitive's hiding place] we would resolve in favor
of Opinion 23."). In two later opinions on the fugitive problem, issued under the Model Code,
Opinions 155 and 156 are mentioned but not followed. See ABA Comm. on Professional
Ethics, Informal Op. 1141 (1970) (trying to reconcile Opinions 155 and 156 with Opinion 23
by limiting the first two opinions to cases in which "the client is under the immediate jurisdic-
tion of the court," and holding that in the present case disclosure was not required); ABA
Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1453 (1980) (holding that a
lawyer has no "affirmative duty" to disclose the client's whereabouts to the court, absent the
prior imposition of such a duty by the court).
189. The ethics opinions under the Canons had subordinated more or less explicitly the
following canons to the obligation to keep confidences: CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS
Canon 41 (1937) (requiring disclosure of client fraud); id. Canon 37 (allowing disclosure of
future crimes); Id. Canon 29 (requiring disclosure of perjury); id. Canon 22 (requiring candor
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repeated in the Model Code with little change.1 9° Second, neither DR 4-
101 of the Model Code (the confidentiality rule) nor any of the Model
Code rules that correspond to the subordinated canons (at least, as the
Model Code rules were originally adopted) 191 reveal the supremacy of
confidentiality expressed in the ethics opinions. 9
Just as we found in examining the Canons, however, once we
to the court). The list of the canons that the ethics opinion subordinated to the obligation to
keep confidences might well be expanded to include: id. Canon 32 ("No client... is entitled to
receive nor should any lawyer render any service ... involving disloyalty to the law whose
ministers we are .. or deception or betrayal of the public."); id. Canon 22 ("The conduct of
the lawyer before the Court ... should be characterized by candor.... ."); id. Canon 15 ("The
office of attorney does not permit... any manner of fraud or chicane.").
190. Canon 41, requiring the lawyer to disclose client fraud, was repeated in DR 7-
102(B)(1). See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrY DR 7-102(B)(1) (1969)
(adopting CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 41 (1937)). The exception to confidenti-
ality on disclosure of future crimes in canon 37 was repeated in DR 4-101(C)(3). See id. DR 4-
101(C)(3) (repeating CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 37 (1937)). Although canon
29, requiring the revelation of perjury, was not restated in the Model Code, the language of
DR 7-102(B)(1) requiring disclosure of fraud perpetrated upon "a person or tribunal" could
reasonably be understood as continuing the canon 29 duty. See id DR 7-102(B)(1) (emphasis
added). Thus, assuming the ABA dropped canon 29 to signify a change in the norms stated on
the face of the Canons, it obscured the change, which is significant.
The Code did make one change relevant to the present discussion: the general duty of
candor to the court contained in canon 22 was replaced by DR 7-102(A) and (B) of the Model
Code. See id. DR 7-102(A) (adopting duty of candor espoused in CANONS Or PROFESSIONAL
ETHICS Canon 22 (1937)); DR 7-102(B) (same). Instead of enunciating a general duty of can-
dor as did canon 22, DR 7-102(A) lists specific instances requiring candor. For example, DR
7-102(A)(3) prohibits "[c]onceal[ing] or knowingly fail[ing] to disclose that which [the lawyer]
is required by law to reveal"; DR 7-102(A)(4) prohibits "[k]nowingly us[ing] perjured testi-
mony or false evidence"; and DR 7-102(A)(5) prohibits "[k]nowingly mak[ing] a false state-
ment of law or fact." Id. DR 7-102(A)(3), (4), (5). The list may be read as circumscribing the
general duty of candor expressed in the Canons, but the list is sufficiently lengthy and broadly
enough constructed that, particularly in conjunction with the requirement to reveal fraud on
the tribunal in DR 7-102(B), it is unclear what more, if anything, canon 22 covered. See id.
DR 7-102(B); CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 22 (1937).
191. Model Code DR 7-102(b)(1) was amended in 1974. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(B)(1) (1974); see infra text accompanying notes 195-99 (discussing
this amendment).
192. Professors Patterson and Subin argue that the language of the Model Code diverged
from state law in a way the Canons did not, by defining confidentiality in Model Code DR 4-
101(A) to include more than the attorney-client privilege, i.e., to include "secrets" as well as
"confidences." Patterson, supra note 77, at 941-45 (interpreting MODEL CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(A) (1969)); Subin, supra note 2, at 1107-09 (same). I be-
lieve Professors Patterson and Subin have correctly identified language in the Model Code that
demonstrates, albeit not explicitly, the nomos expressed in the ethics opinions issued under the
Canons-i.e., a nomos in which confidentiality is a supreme norm. Professor Subin comments
that
[t]he message from the organized bar was clear: confidentiality, viewed historically
as an obstacle, albeit a necessary one, to the disclosure of pertinent information, was
now to be treated as a good of the highest order. The Code's thrust was that disclo-
sure was the evil, and rarely if ever necessary.
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broaden our inquiry to include more than the precepts shared by bar and
state, the bar's normative vision becomes apparent. First, the Prelimi-
nary Draft of the Model Code did not include a corollary to canon 41.193
Canon 41, already eviscerated in the bar's nomos by ethics opinions, was
dropped completely from the Preliminary Draft of the Model Code. A
corollary to canon 41, DR 7-102(B)(1), was added before final adoption
of the Model Code, 9 4 apparently to respond to severe criticism by repre-
sentatives of the public. Second, in 1974, five years after the adoption of
the Model Code, DR 7-102(3)(1) was amended by the ABA. 195 The
1974 amendment tacked an exception onto the duty to reveal unrectified
client fraud: "except when the information is protected as a privileged
communication."' 196 Third, less than a year after adopting this amend-
ment, the ABA issued an ethics opinion, ABA Formal Opinion 341,
which interpreted the 1974 amendment as negating the duty, contained
in DR 7-102(B)(1), to reveal fraud. 197 Fourth, the bar apparently ac-
cepted as its law the ABA amendment and the interpretation of it given
in Opinion 341,198 even though most states rejected the amendment.199
Subin, supra note 2, at 1108. While I believe that Professor Subin correctly describes the bar's
understanding of the norm, I disagree that the Model Code made this "clear."
I also disagree with Professor Subin's dating this normative vision to the Model Code, id.,
and with Professor Patterson's conclusion that the "expanded scope of confidentiality [in the
Model Code] had [the] unintended consequence[]... [of] vitiat[ing the duty] ... to reveal a
client's fraud." Patterson, supra note 77, at 945 (emphasis added). Professor Patterson dates
the bar's celebration of the norm of confidentiality to the 1880s, see id. at 914-15, 944-45, but
both he and Professor Subin fail to note that the subordination of other norms took hold long
before the Model Code was written and DR 7-102(B)(1) was amended.
193. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 341 (1975)
(noting that the preliminary draft of the Code of Professional Responsibility did not contain a
requirement that the lawyer reveal client fraud).
194. See R.W. Nahstoll, The Lawyer's Allegiance: Priorities Regarding Confidentiality, 41
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 421, 430 (1984).
195. Id at 430-32 (giving legislative history of the 1974 amendment and Formal Opinion
341, which interpreted the amendment).
196. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(B)(1) (1981).
197. Id.
198. For discussion of the debate in the ABA House of Delegates on the proposed Model
Rules provision on confidentiality, see infra notes 217-56 and accompanying text. See STEVEN
D. PEPE, STANDARDS OF LEGAL NEGOTIATIONS: INTERIM REPORT FOR ABA COMMISSION
ON EVALUATION OF PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS AND ABA HousE OF DELEGATES 251, 254-
55 (1983), excerpted in GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & DEBORAH L. RHODE, THE LEGAL
PROFESSION: RESPONSIBILITY AND REGULATION 206-08 (Ist ed. 1985). Over half of the
more than 2500 lawyers surveyed by Pepe said they would not disclose an unrectified client
fraud in which their services had been used-i.e., that they would act in accordance with the
bar's law. This attitude was as prevalent in states where the bar's amendment had not been
adopted by the state as it was in states that had adopted the amendment. Id.
199. Hazard, supra note 144, at 294 n.38. Professor Hazard states:
As of 1983, only fourteen states had adopted the amended version of [DR 7-
102(B)(1)]. One additional state, Iowa, has adopted a version of the rule that appar-
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Opinion 341 shows that, ambivalence on the face of the Model Code
notwithstanding, confidentiality continued to trump other norms in the
bar's nomos.2 °° The language and reasoning of Opinion 341 make clear
the centrality and power of confidentiality for the bar. The opinion be-
gins by emphasizing that the Preliminary Draft of the Model Code did
not contain a duty to reveal client "misconduct,"2 "1 and it speaks ap-
provingly of that approach: "Perhaps the omission was due to the com-
mittee's consideration of the high fiduciary duty owed by lawyer to client
and consideration of the firm support found in the law of evidence for the
attorney-client privilege."20 2 Moreover, while the opinion attributes the
addition of DR 7-102(B)(1) to the concern expressed by some lawyers
that the Model Code lacked a corollary to canon 41, the opinion's refer-
ence to canon 41 is terse. The reference is accompanied by neither a
statement of support for the principle articulated in canon 4.1 nor an ex-
planation of that principle.2 °0 The opinion thus suggests that the addi-
tion of DR 7-102(B)(1) was not so much (or at all) a fumction of
commitment to the principle articulated in canon 41 as it was an expres-
sion of sentimental attachment to the language of the Canons. And, ac-
cording to the authors of Opinion 341, it was an expression of sentiment
that caused an immediate and serious problem.
The problem was that DR 4-101(C)(2), which allows a lawyer to
reveal information about the client when another disciplinary rule per-
ently ties the exception to the duty to disclose to the more limited evidentiary attor-
ney-client privilege rather than the confidentiality privilege of the Code ....
Id (citing IOWA CODE ANN. § 602 app. A, Canon 7, DR 7-102(B)(1) (West Supp. 1983); 4
NATIONAL REPORTER ON LEGAL ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY ABA 6
(1983) (Roy M. Mersky ed., 1983)). "Another analyst counts seventeen states as having
adopted the 1974 amendment." Id (citing Nahstoll, supra note 194, at 433).
200. See Frederick D. Lipman, The SEC's Reluctant Police Force: A New Rolefor Lawyers,
49 N.Y.U. L. REv. 437 (1974). Lipman's article was written before Opinion 341 was issued
and explains: (1) DR 7-102(B)(1) as amended "represents a significant expansion of the lim-
ited duty to reveal... under the ABA Canons;" (2) Canon 41 "had been given a strict and
limited construction by the ABA Committee on Professional Ethics;" (3) if the amendment is
limited to matters covered by the attorney-client privilege, securities lawyers might have to
reveal their client's "past" securities fraud committed in the course of the representation be-
cause securities fraud is considered an ongoing crime; and (4) the ABA should therefore
amend DR 7-102(B)(1) to make revealing fraud to the defrauded person a matter entrusted to
the lawyer's discretion, and not a duty. Id. at 454-58.
201. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 341 (1975). The
Opinion's use of "misconduct" instead of the more familiar "fraud," which is the word used in
both the Canons and the Model Code, seems calculated to suggest both the breadth of the
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mits disclosure, extends not only to secrets2° 4 (sensitive information
about the client that falls outside the privilege205) but also to confidences
(information protected by the attorney-client privilege).20 6 Since DR 7-
102(B)(1), as originally drafted, did not exempt privileged information
from the information the lawyer was required to disclose and DR 4-
101(C)(2) extended to privileged information, the Code seemed to re-
quire a lawyer to reveal information "which he also was duty-bound not
to reveal according to the law of evidence. '2°7 The 1974 amendment
"was necessary... to relieve lawyers of exposure to such diametrically
opposed professional duties.
20 8
The justification of the 1974 amendment provides a direct acknowl-
edgment of the potential for ethics rules to compete and conflict with
other law. Other law seems to "win" here, which may help explain the
overt acknowledgement of the conflict, but the "win" is illusory. First,
other law wins by virtue of the amendment to DR 7-102(B)(1), not in its
own right. According to the opinion, the amendment was "necessary" to
resolve the dilemma-necessary not because the ethics rules must con-
form to other legal precepts but "to relieve lawyers of exposure to such
diametrically opposed professional duties.
209
Second, having acknowledged that "diametrically opposed duties"
existed before the amendment, Opinion 341 seeks to justify the resolution
provided by the 1974 amendment.210 In other words bringing the ethics
rules in line with other law is not itself sufficient justification for the 1974
amendment. The amendment has to be right in itself; to discover what is
right-to justify the amendment-the Committee turns to the bar's no-
mos as embodied in Opinion 287.
Third, the identified conflict between the attorney-client privilege
and the original version of DR 7-102(B)(1) is itself clearly visible only
from within the bar's nomos. In the state's nomos, the crime/fraud ex-
ception to the attorney-client privilege looms large.211 The courts show
204. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(A) (1981), quoted
supra note 165.
205. Sensitive information would include, for example, information about the client com-
municated to the lawyer by a third party. Information communicated by a third party is not
privileged. See CLEARY ET AL., supra note 64, § 89, at 212-13; 8 JOHN H. WIGMORE, Evi-
DENCE § 2291, at 619 (John T. McNaughton ed., rev. ed. 1961).
206. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(A) (1981), quoted
supra note 165.
207. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 341 (1975).
208. Id.
209. Id. (emphasis added).
210. Id.
211. A classic statement of the breadth of the crime/fraud exception to the attorney-client
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little commitment to the norm of confidentiality when the client has used
the lawyer's services to perpetrate a crime or fraud.212 Thus, in the
state's nomos it is not clear whether there is any conflict between the
privilege and unamended DR 7-102(B)(1), which would explain why the
majority of states saw no reason to adopt the 1974 amendment. For the
bar the conflict appears and the amendment is "necessary" because the
bar's understanding of confidentiality leads it to understand the attorney-
client privilege as all but impervious to the stated exceptions. The state's
understanding that privileges in evidence law, including the attorney-cli-
ent privilege, are to be interpreted narrowly,213 is inverted in the bar's
nomos where it is the exceptions to the privilege that are interpreted
narrowly.
Finally, although Opinion 341 explains the need for the 1974
amendment by talking of the conflict that would otherwise exist between
the ethics rule and evidence law, the Opinion holds that the amendment
does much more than merely cure this conflict. The Opinion holds that
the amendment to DR 7-102(B)(1) all but wipes out the ethics rule.214
Opinion 341 interprets the amendment as a reaffirmation of the bar's no-
privilege appears in Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1 (1936). Writing for the court, Justice
Cardozo said: "The privilege takes flight if the relation is abused. A client who consults an
attorney for advice that will serve him in the commission of a fraud will have no help from the
law." Id. at 15.
212. See, eg., United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 574-75 (1989) (holding that a trial court
may order an in camera review of attorney-client communications to see whether the crime/
fraud exception applies upon a rather modest showing by the party seeking to pierce the
privilege).
213. All privileges are interpreted narrowly because they interfere with the truth-seeking
function of a trial. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974); NLRB v. Harvey,
349 F.2d 900, 907 (4th Cir. 1965). For a detailed description of the limits on the attorney-
client privilege, see WOLFRAM, supra note 83, § 6.3. Professor Wolfram provides the following
summary of state law: "Once the attorney-client privilege has struggled into existence, it lives
a fragile life threatened by forces that can snuff it out." Id. § 6.4.1.
214. Opinion 341 interprets the word "privileged" in DR 7-102(B)(1) to mean both confi-
dences or secrets, as defined by DR 4-101(A). ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Re-
sponsibility, Formal Op. 341 (1975) (interpreting MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(B)(1), 4-101(A) (1981)). Thus, DR 7-102(B)(1) is interpreted as
saying: The lawyer shall reveal frauds the client has committed by using the lawyer's services
when the client refuses to rectify them, except when such revelation would be privileged or
embarrassing to the client. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-
101(A) (1981) (defining material secrets as those that might embarrass or be detrimental to the
client). Of course, all such revelations would embarrass the client.
Opinion 341 denies that it wipes out DR 7-102(B)(1):
[Tihe duty [to disclose fraud] would remain in force if the information clearly estab-
lishing a fraud ... committed by a client in the course of representation were ob-
tained by the lawyer from a third party (but not in connection with his professional
relationship with the client), because it would not be a confidence or secret of a client
entitled to confidentiality.
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mos, a nomos in which the norm of confidentiality trumps other norms,
particularly the duty to reveal client fraud:
The conflicting duties to reveal fraud and to preserve confi-
dences have existed side-by-side for some time.
However, it is clear that there has long been an accommo-
dation in favor of preserving confidences either through prac-
tice or interpretation. Through the Bar's interpretation in
practice of its responsibility to preserve confidences and secrets
of clients, and through its interpretations like Formal Opinion
287, significant exceptions to any general duty to reveal fraud
have been long accepted.21 Apparently, the exceptions were so
broad or the policy underlying the duty to reveal so weak that
the earlier drafts of the Code of Professional Responsibility
omitted altogether the concept embodied in Canon 41. None-
theless, DR 7-102(B) is a part of the Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility and must be given some meaning. Some of the
exceptions to a general duty to reveal have been built into the
Disciplinary Rule itself (for example, that the information must
"clearly establish" fraud; that it must be received "in the course
of representation;" and [since 1974] that it must not be infor-
mation "protected as a privileged communication").
Formal Opinion 287, which dealt with a lawyer's duty to
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 341 (1975). It is difficult,
if not impossible, to imagine such a case arising.
Of course, one could make a neat legal argument that this still allows the lawyer to reveal
information in accordance with the exceptions in DR 4-101(C). See, e.g., Hazard, supra note
144, at 294 n.38 (making the argument but pointing out that this would effectively cancel the
1974 amendment). Opinion 341 also suggests this reading, although it surely was not the
intent of Opinion 341 to cancel the 1974 amendment: "[I]n cases where [DR 4-101's] excep-
tions apply, DR 7-102(B) may make the optional disclosure of information under DR 4-101 a
mandatory one. For example, when disclosure is required by a law, the [amendment] is not
applicable and disclosure may be required." ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Respon-
sibility, Formal Op. 341 (1975) (emphasis added).
Several things suggest that we should not make too much of this apparent concession.
First, notice that in the example the disclosure is not only required by law and thus permissible
under DR 4-101, but also apparently required by DR 7-102(B)(1). Presumably this is one of
those rare cases where the fraud is not a "secret." Thus, there are two separate sources (other
law and an ethics rule) that require revelation, and yet all the Committee can manage is a weak
statement that disclosure in such a case "may" be required. Second, Opinion 341 reaffirms and
relies on Opinion 287. Opinion 287 said a lawyer should not reveal the client's intent to com-
mit perjury. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 287 (1953).
But the exception in DR 4-101(C)(3) allows a lawyer to reveal this, because perjury is a crime.
Finally, other statements in Opinion 341 and the overall tone of the argument presented
therein suggest an understanding of confidentiality as a near-absolute duty. Id.
215. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 341 (1975). No-
tice in this sentence and the one immediately preceding it the explicit appeal to committed
interpretation (interpretation in practice) as a source of law.
reveal a perjury committed earlier by his client, represents
merely one of the exceptions to old Canon 41 ....
The tradition (which is backed by substantial policy con-
siderations) that permits a lawyer to assure a client that infor-
mation (whether a confidence or a secret) given to him will not
be revealed to third parties is so important that it should take
precedence, in all but the most serious cases, over the duty im-
posed by DR 7-102(B). 16
C. The Fight Over Rule 1.6
Once one understands that for the bar the norm of confidentiality
had for a long time been elevated above other norms, the outcry from the
bar2 17 over the Kutak Commission's218 proposed rule on confidentiality
becomes comprehensible. The version of rule 1.6 presented by the Kutak
Commission to the ABA House of Delegates in 1983 was on its face
more protective of client confidentiality than the Model Code adopted by
the ABA in 1969.219 Unlike the Model Code, the proposed rule made no
mention of disclosures to comply with other law, court orders or other
ethics rules.22 0 It limited the lawyer's discretion to reveal the client's
intent to commit a crime, allowing such discretion only for serious
crimes against persons or property.221 And instead of requiring lawyers
to reveal client fraud committed against a third party222 through the law-
216. Id.
217. See ANDREW L. KAUFMAN, PROBLEMS IN PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 145 (3d
ed. 1989); Hazard, supra note 144, at 287.
218. "Kutak Commission" was the informal name for the American Bar Association Spe-
cial Commission on the Evaluation of Professional Standards, which drafted the Model Rules.
It was named after its chairperson, Robert J. Kutak.
219. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b) (Final .Draft 1981), re-
printed in A.B.A. J., Oct. 1981, at Supp. [hereinafter Kutak 1.6]. Kutak 1.6 provided in perti-
nent part:
A lawyer may reveal [confidential] information to the extent the lawyer reason-
ably believes necessary:
(2) to prevent the client from committing a criminal or fraudulent act that the
lawyer reasonably believes is likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm or
substantial injury to the financial interests or property interests of another; [or]
(3) to rectify the consequences of a client's criminal or fraudulent act in the
commission of which the lawyer's services had been used.
Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.; cf. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(3) (1981) (al-
lowing a lawyer to reveal the client's "intention... to commit a crime").
222. The duty to disclose client fraud upon the tribunal, also a part of DR 7-102(B)(1), was
retained in model rule 3.3, as proposed by the Kutak Commission and as adopted by the ABA.
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yer's services, it allowed lawyers to reveal such fraud.2 23
These limits on the language of the Code did not, however, go far
enough for many members of the bar. The proposed rule did not include
a corollary to the 1974 amendment, the amendment that in the bar's view
reinstated and reaffirmed its understanding that confidentiality trumped
the duty to reveal unrectified fraud in which the lawyer's services had
been used. Moreover, whatever the Model Code might say about discre-
tion to reveal any intended crime of the client, the bar's understanding, as
is apparent from Formal Opinions 287224 and 341,225 was that no such
sweeping discretion existed. Kutak 1.6 simply did not reflect the bar's
law of confidentiality; hence the outcry.
The American Trial Lawyers Association (ATLA) was so outraged
by the Kutak Commission's work, particularly its proposals on confiden-
tiality, that it drafted a complete alternative, the American Lawyer's
Code of Conduct (ALCC).22 6 The Preface to the ALCC states:
Our first principle remains that a client must be able to confide
absolutely in a lawyer, or there may be little point in anyone's
having a lawyer. We have rejected one concept that the Kutak
Commission apparently espouses, that lawyers have a general
duty to do good for society that often overrides their specific
duty to serve their clients.227
The ALCC provisions on confidentiality were much more protective
of that norm than the Kutak proposals, the Model Code on its face, and
the ethics rules as they had been adopted in the various states.228 Almost
See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(B)(1) (1981); MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3 (1983).
223. Kutak 1.6, supra note 219.
224. See supra notes 197-216 and accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 200-16 and accompanying text.
226. THE AMERICAN LAWYER'S CODE OF CONDUCT (1982) [hereinafter ALCC].
227. Theodore I. Koskoff, Preface to id. The preface, written by the president of the Amer-
ican Trial Lawyers Association (ATLA) from 1979 to 1980, is openly hostile to and suspicious
of the Kutak Commission and its supporters. "Chairman Kutak and his friends" are all but
charged with treason. Id The preface accuses the Commission of "side-stepping" the issues
and "ramrod[ing]" changes through the ABA. Id. The preface ends by promising that,
should the ABA adopt the Kutak proposals, ATLA will continue to resist:
We are not willing to allow the Kutak Rules to become the law of legal ethics by
default. We intend to fight in the state bar associations, and in the state courts, to
preserve the constitutional concept of what a lawyer is, and what a lawyer's duties
are.
I invite you to join... the fight.
Id.
228. Under the ALCC, supra note 226, confidences may be revealed without client consent:
(1) "to the extent required ... by law, rule of court, or court order, but only after good faith
efforts to test the validity of the law, rule, or order have been exhausted," id. Rule 1.3;
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as protective of confidentiality was the amendment to Kutak 1.6 pro-
posed by the American College of Trial Lawyers (the College), a smaller
and more elite group of trial lawyers than ATLA. The College's amend-
ment eliminated completely the lawyer's discretion to reveal client fraud
in which the lawyer's services had been used. It further narrowed the
exception on revealing a future crime to allow disclosure only when the
crime would result in death or serious bodily injury.22 9
How had the Kutak Commission proposed so wrongheaded a rule?
Where had the Commission gotten its strange ideas?
The Commission's answer was simple: its proposal was "essentially
consistent with the law as it stood, soberly considered. 2 30 "[The] legal
facts," as Professor Geoffrey C. Hazard, the Reporter for the Kutak
Commission, later wrote, "were of little moment to the critics [of Kutak
1.6]. They persuaded the bar that the Kutak proposal would have
opened wide new exceptions to confidentiality, whereas in fact the Kutak
proposal would have narrowed these exceptions.
'2 31
What Professor Hazard misses is that the "legal facts" to which he
alludes were not "legal facts" in the bar's nomos. The proposal did cre-
(2) when a judge or juror has been subjected to a bribe or extortion, id. Rule 1.4; and (3) in
self defense, although if the accusation is from a third party the lawyer must wait for formal
charges to be instituted against her, id. Rule 1.5. Moreover, the ALCC limits the lawyer's
option of withdrawing from representation when the client is committing a crime or fraud
because it treats withdrawal in such circumstances as tantamount to indirectly revealing a
client confidence. Id. Rules 1.2, 6.6. Consequently, a lawyer may withdraw in noncriminal
cases only when the client has "induced the lawyer to take the case or to [act] ... on the basis
of material misrepresentations" but only "if withdrawal can be accomplished without a direct
violation of [client] confidentiality." Id. Rule 6.5. A lawyer may not withdraw on these
grounds in criminal cases. Id.
229. This amendment was adopted and with little modification became model rule 1.6.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1983).
230. Hazard, supra note 144, at 298.
231. Id. The "legal facts" were pointed out to the critics by some of the supporters of the
Kutak proposal during the ABA House of Delegates debate on rule 1.6. For example, Mr.
Robert Cummins argued: "[The critics of the Kutak proposal] misperceive the current scope
of [DR 1-102,] they misperceive the scope of Canon 4, they misperceive the scope of Canon 7
and I respectfully submit that they have overlooked the current status of case law in this area."
ABA House of Delegates Transcript, Tape 2, at 50 (Feb. 7, 1983) [hereinafter ABA Tran-
script] (on file with author) (statement of Robert Cummins); see also id. at 44 (statement of
Dean Norman Redlich) (pointing out that Kutak 1.6 was consistent with then-current law); id.
at 51 (statement of Peter Moser, speaking on behalf of the ABA Committee on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility) ("[Tihe proposed amendment is now the rule in a small minority
of states ....").
The critics' response is perhaps best captured by John Elam, speaking on behalf of the
College in support of that organization's amendment to Kutak 1.6, in the last speech before the
vote on the amendment: "[W]hen the Commission suggests that [its proposed rule 1.6] will
not change the role [of the lawyer] they are misspeaking because when you allow ... discretion
[to reveal confidences], you are changing the rules." Id. Tape 3, at 2 (statement of John Elam).
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ate wide new exceptions to confidentiality as that norm was understood
by the bar. The Kutak proposal was essentially inconsistent with the
bar's law as it stood, soberly considered. It was on that ground that the
ABA House of Delegates rejected the Kutak draft of rule 1.6.
Listen to the critics of Kutak 1.6 in the ABA House debate:
The American College of Trial Lawyers moves to amend
[Kutak 1.6] because in its present form this rule will transform
the role of the attorney and change his duties to his client.232
What the [Kutak] rules seek to do is to cast aside a statutory
scheme that has recognized the sanctity of the disclosures of a
client to his lawyer and to create an adversarial relationship
between the lawyer and his client.233
[Kutak] 1.6 ...seriously undermines the attorney's duty to
protect client confidences.234
For as long as I have known, this profession has regarded its
remedy [to client fraud] as being withdrawal .... This profes-
sion for so long as I have known, has not regarded the proper
remedy to be the revelation of the secrets of the client.235
The reality and strength of the bar's nomos to members of the pro-
fession is further demonstrated by the remarks of some of the supporters
of the Kutak proposal. While some supporters understood the law from
the state's perspective,236 others argued from a position grounded in the
bar's nomos. For example, one supporter stated, regarding client fraud in
which the lawyer's services were used: "[I]t would be quite wrong if
[Kutak 1.6] said that a lawyer must disclose. ' 237 But that is exactly what
the Code required in most states.2 38 Another supporter portrayed Kutak
232. Id. at 23 (statement of John Elam) (emphasis added). The amendment he refers to
was adopted as model rule 1.6. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1983).
233. ABA Transcript, supra note 231, Tape 2, at 29 (statement of Justice William H. Er-
ickson of the Colorado Supreme Court, speaking in his role as State Delegate for the Colorado
Bar) (emphasis added).
234. Id. at 30 (statement of Robert M. Landis) (emphasis added); see also id. at 31 (state-
ment of Louis G. Davidson, Assembly Delegate) ("If you begin to open the door in a way that
really seriously undermines th[e] lawyer client privilege then the lawyer who does not make
disclosure is exposed to very serious sanctions and liability because of the charge ... that he
could have made disclosure."). Notice that Mr. Davidson assumed that an ethical duty not to
disclose would stop the imposition, presumably under other law, of "very serious sanctions and
liability." Id.
235. Id. at 43 (statement of A.B. Conant, speaking on behalf of the General Practice Sec-
tion of the ABA).
236. See comments cited supra note 231.
237. ABA Transcript, supra note 231, Tape 2, at 26 (statement of Dean Erwin N. Gris-
wold, Assembly Delegate).
238. See supra notes 201-02 and accompanying text.
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1.6 as a step into the future-as new law:
[S]imply stated, [the question is:] can a client who is about to
commit or has already committed a crime or a fraud and who
has implicated an innocent lawyer in the matter, rely on confi-
dential information to prevent that lawyer in his or her discre-
tion from taking action to prevent the act about to be done or
to rectify the consequence of the act already done. I submit to
you that answer should be a firm no. I submit the lawyer
should have the discretion.., to reveal the information ....
[Kutak 1.6] would articulate that the lawyer will not be the
pawn of the client's illegal purposes. Today we have a tremen-
dous opportunity and.., this might be our finest hour.239
The supporters, armed only with arguments based on "foreign" law
(the state's law) or on calls for reform, lost. The ABA House of Dele-
gates, voting 207 to 129 in favor of the College's amendment to rule 1.6,
overwhelmingly reaffirmed the bar's law.2 ° According to the procedure
adopted by the ABA to govern consideration of the Kutak draft, the
House was to debate and vote on all the black-letter rules before moving
on to discuss and vote on the official comments.24 1 The debate on the
rules, including rule 1.6, took place in February 1983 and was so lengthy
that consideration of the official comments had to be postponed until the
August meeting of the ABA.242 The supporters and opponents of Kutak
1.6 agreed to work together to revise the comment to rule 1.6 as
amended.243 This delay gave the supporters another chance to convince
their opponents that the bar's law placed lawyers in jeopardy under state
law-in jeopardy of being accused and possibly convicted or held civilly
liable for client frauds in which their services had been used. The sup-
porters explained: If a lawyer withdraws from a fraudulent transaction
without warning the victim or otherwise revealing the fraud, and the vic-
tim continues to rely on the lawyer's past participation in the transaction
as a sign that all is on the up and up, the lawyer might be civilly liable to
the victim.
24
Moreover, a lawyer can be held criminally liable as an aider and
abettor of his client's fraud if a jury finds that the lawyer knew of the
fraud while acting on behalf of the client245 (or was so reckless in not
239. ABA Transcript, supra note 231, Tape 2, at 45-46 (statement of S. Shepherd Tate,
former President of the ABA).
240. ABA Transcript, supra note 231, Tape 3, at 3; Schneyer, supra note 17, at 713.
241. Hazard, supra note 144, at 301.
242. Id. at 302.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 302-03.
245. See HAZARD & KONIAK, supra note 144, at 63-65.
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discovering the fraud earlier that the lawyer had to have "deliberately
closed his eyes" not to have seen it while actively representing the cli-
ent).246 Precluding lawyers from disclosing the fraud upon discovery de-
prives lawyers of one effective way of demonstrating that before that time
they had no knowledge of scheme and thus were not knowingly aiding
and abetting it. The opponents responded with an accommodation to
state law: the lawyer may signal that something is wrong so long as she
does not reveal the content of confidential communications.247 This ac-
commodation was included in the comment to rule 1.6, which was
amended to allow a lawyer to "giv[e] notice of the fact of withdrawal,
and... [to] withdraw or disaffirm any opinion, document, affirmation, or
the like."248 The comment is silent on the need for and purpose of this
addition. The accommodation is thus hidden from view. It was accepted
in August 1983 by the ABA House of Delegates, along with the rest of
the comments to the Model Rules.249
At one level the revised comment can be understood as allowing
what rule 1.6 itself appears to forbid-disclosure of unrectified client
fraud in which the lawyer's services were used: "Giving a signal-going
through a ritual that is intended to be a signal and is understood as a
signal-is surely to 'reveal' the information that the signal denotes.
'2 0
Although an effective signal and outright disclosure may be equivalent
from the perspective of the client and the victim, from the perspective of
the person forced to limit his communications to signals-from the per-
spective of the lawyer, who is forced to communicate in so unnatural a
manner-they are materially different. The very requirement that direct
communication be dispensed with in favor of signals allows the bar to
reaffirm the power of the norm of confidentiality even as it provides an
escape from it.
Moreover, banishing the "exception" to the comment, giving it at
best the status of a sort of common law,251 suggests that it should be
relied on as the basis of action in only the most urgent cases. After all,
the lawyer who acts upon a comment does so at some risk because, ac-
cording to the Model Rules, "[c]omments are intended as guides to inter-
pretation, but the text of each rule is authoritative. '25 2 Thus, by placing
246. United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854, 862 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953
(1964).
247. Hazard, supra note 144, at 302-03.
248. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 cmt. (1991).
249. Hazard, supra note 144, at 303.
250. Id. at 304.
251. Id. at 305.
252. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT scope (1991).
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the accommodation in the comment and not the rule, the bar further
reaffirms its understanding of the norm of confidentiality.253 Accommo-
dation of state law is one thing; concession and recognition are quite
another.
A model ethics code is not state law, however, until adopted by a
court,2 54 and the majority of state courts refused to adopt rule 1.6 as
recommended by the ABA. Instead, most courts adopted confidentiality
rules at least as permissive of disclosure as the Kutak draft had been, and
in a number of cases, more so.2"5 The state courts thus reaffirmed their
understanding of the norm of confidentiality, just as the bar had reaf-
firmed its understanding.256
VI. THE BAR's SACRED STORIES
Thus far our attention has been focused primarily on precepts. We
have seen that in the bar's nomos, ethics rules have the power to trump
other sources of law and the norm of confidentiality has the power to
253. Compare New York's approach, which incorporates the substance of this Comment
into the Code itself.
A lawyer may reveal:
Confidences or secrets to the extent implicit in withdrawing a written or oral
opinion or representation previously given by the lawyer and believed by the lawyer
still to be relied upon by a third person where the lawyer has discovered that the
opinion or representation was based on materially inaccurate information or is being
used to further a crime or fraud.
N.Y. JUD. LAW § 29 app., DR 4-101(C)(5) (McKinney Supp. 1992).
254. See supra text accompanying note 86.
255. 2 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING
app. 4, at 1259-66 (2d ed. 1991).
256. Despite a cold reception by the state courts, the bar has stuck to its position. In 1991
the ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility proposed to the ABA House of
Delegates that rule 1.6 be rewritten to restore much of the substance of the Kutak proposal.
The Committee's proposal would have added the following language to model rule 1.6: "A
lawyer may reveal ... information ... to rectify the consequences of a client's criminal or
fraudulent act in the commission of which the lawyer's services had been used." AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION, REPORTS WITH RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 2
(1991) (Report 108B).
The Committee explained that the amendment was necessary because rule 1.6 as adopted
in 1983 "threaten[s] to unfairly subject lawyers to potential civil liability and criminal prosecu-
tion." Id. at 8. In other words, rule 1.6 as then written was contrary to state law. The Com-
mittee admitted that the inconsistency between rule 1.6 and state law was great enough that
"[w]e have ... declined to issue ethics opinions announcing the undesirable conclusions we
believe to be required by the present provisions of [rule 1.6] . .. ." Id. Notwithstanding this
blatant admission of the inconsistency between the ethics rules and other law, the ABA House
of Delegates rejected the amendment, leaving the conflict in place. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIA-
TION, SUMMARY OF ACTION TAKEN BY THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF THE AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION 11 (Aug. 1991) (amendment rejected by a standing vote of 158 to 251).
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trump other ethics rules. These insights have provided us with a skeleton
of the bar's nomos, with enough material to compare bar law to state law
and conclude that they are different and with enough material to discern
the constitutional significance for the bar of confidentiality, but not
enough material to understand what holds the nomos together. For that
we need to turn from precept to narrative.257
The central and recurring theme in the profession's narratives por-
trays the lawyer as champion, defending the client's life and liberty
against the government, which is portrayed as oppressor, willing, ready
and able to use its power to destroy the individual and the values society
holds dear.258 The story has many versions. 259 One standard version,
the defense of John Peter Zenger, is relied on in the amicus brief filed
jointly by the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers
(NACDL), the National Network for the Right to Counsel (NNRC) and
the American Civil Liberties Union, among others, in Caplin & Drysdale,
Chartered v. United States26° and United States v. Monsanto:
261
Zenger was tried in the colony of New York in 1735 for
seditious libel based on his printing a newspaper critical of the
Governor of the colony, the tyrant William Cosby. Two noted
257. Two recent articles on the legal profession rely heavily on narratives to construct what
I call the bar's nomos. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J.
1239 (1991); Lawry, supra note 77. The difference between them is that Professor Hazard's
piece is explicitly redemptive, while Professor Lawry's is not. Professor Hazard uses the bar's
central narratives to reveal a nomos that coincides with the one I depict in this Article. He
then relies heavily on exiled narratives-i.e., narratives that have lost (or never had) the status
of law within the bar (narratives that do not demand action in accordance with their morals in
the present)-to argue for a reconstructed nomos. Hazard, supra, at 1266-80. On the other
hand, Professor Lawry contends that the critics (and supporters) of the bar's nomos have got it
wrong; he argues that one can find in bar texts and stories a different nomos, which he believes
better describes how lawyers actually behave, and which he thus claims better describes the
bar's nomos or what he calls the bar's central moral tradition. Lawry, supra note 77, at 318-21.
My analysis suggests that despite Lawry's claim that his work is descriptive, it is redemptive,
and that the narratives he uses are exiled-i.e., not law. Professor Lawry, especially in the
conclusion of his article, shows some ambiguity about whether his effort is descriptive or
redemptive:
If the adversary ethic so damned by [Professors] Luban and Shaffer is of recent vin-
tage or represents a distortion of healthy partisanship, then let us try to articulate
why this is so and decide what can be done about it. My contention is that "reform"
or "modification" of lawyers' ethics within the adversary system is a secondary chal-
lenge to the task of getting the central idea of lawyering straight to begin with.
Id. at 363 (footnotes omitted).
258. See Hazard, supra note 257, at 1242-46 (describing versions of this central narrative);
see also THOMAS L. SHAFFER, FAITH AND THE PROFESSIONS 1-38 (1987) (describing profes-
sional narratives).
259. See Hazard, supra note 257, at 1242-46.
260. 491 U.S. 617 (1989).
261. 491 U.S. 600 (1989).
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New York lawyers who had been leaders in the political move-
ment opposing Cosby, James Alexander and William Smith,
came to Zenger's defense. Judge James DeLancey, a Cosby
lieutenant appointed by the Governor as Chief Justice of the
New York Supreme Court, presided at the trial. He rebuffed
the lawyers' attempts to win Zenger's release and set an exces-
sive bail. When the defense attorneys challenged DeLancey's
authority to act as judge, DeLancey responded by disbarring
them. This unprecedented order.., was a partisan "tactic to
deprive Zenger of competent legal counsel ......
Following the disbarment of his attorneys, Zenger, with-
out funds, immediately petitioned the court for appointment of
counsel. DeLancey obliged him by appointing John Chambers,
"a competent lawyer but a Governor's man." Zenger's allies
were concerned, and Alexander and Smith began to look for
another lawyer to try the case. Alexander, although disbarred,
had continued to work on the case, and developed a more dar-
ing strategy than the conventional one conceived by Chambers.
The plan was to base Zenger's defense on the truth of the news-
paper articles, trying Crosby in the process, and on that basis to
seek a jury acquittal on the libel charges. Alexander engaged
Andrew Hamilton, a distinguished attorney from the neighbor-
ing colony of Pennsylvania, to execute the defense plan.
Hamilton took over the defense following Chambers'
opening statement and made an impassioned plea to the jury in
support of the liberty to expose and oppose tyranny by speaking
and writing truth. Admitting that Zenger had published the
statements in question, he asserted that the printer could not,
however, be convicted of libel for printing the truth. Judge De-
Lancey instructed the jury that it was to determine only
whether Zenger had published the statements, leaving the law
of libel to the court. But the jury acquitted Zenger.
... The trial of John Peter Zenger played a significant role
in establishing the American tradition of an independent crimi-
nal defense bar serving as a meaningful check against a partisan
or corrupt judge or prosecutor. The Zenger trial and the im-
portance of the right to representation by counsel of choice
were fresh in the minds of the Framers when they drafted the
Sixth Amendment.262
262. Joint and Combined Amicus Brief of the National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers et al. in Support of the Petitioner Caplin & Drysdale, Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered
v. United States, 491 U.S. 617 (No. 87-1729) (1989), and the Respondent Monsanto, United
States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600 (No. 88-454) (1989), at 17-21 [hereinafter NACDL Amicus
Brief in Caplin & Drysdale] (citations omitted) (quoting JAMES ALEXANDER, A BRIEF NAR-
RATIVE OF THE CASE AND TRIAL OF JOHN PETER ZENGER, PRINTER OF THE NEw YORK
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This narrative reveals several aspects of the bar's nomos. First, it
explains the group's claim to nomic autonomy. In this narrative, lawyers
through their actions assert their independence from English tyranny.
The independence of the bar presages the American Revolution. Law-
yers fearless of government control contribute to the Revolution's suc-
cess by protecting those, like Zenger, who would stir up discontent.
Moreover, they protect the norms, like freedom of the press, in whose
name the Revolution was fought, and thereby guarantee the continuation
of the normative world that the Revolution engendered. In sum, accord-
ing to the story, a material and normative world in which the bar is in-
dependent from government control preceded, helped bring about and is
necessary to maintaining the nation's material and normative
existence.263
This is a powerful claim to nomic autonomy. By connecting the bar
to the state's creation and continuation, the bar's stories portray the
state's vulnerability and its dependence on the bar. The mythology of
creation,
whether the narrative device is that of Robinson Crusoe, the
Pilgrim Fathers, the conquest of Canaan, or Mount Sinai,...
always provides the typology for a dangerous return. Revela-
tion and (to a lesser extent) prophecy are the revolutionary
challenges to an order founded on revelation. Secession is the
revolutionary response to an order founded on consent or social
contract.264
The bar's stories express a dual vision of the state's birth. First,
WEEKLY JOURNAL 20-21 (Stanley N. Katz, 1st ed. 1963)). NACDL is a voluntary bar organi-
zation with a national membership of more than 5000 lawyers. See id. at 1-2. NACDL was
joined on the brief by the NNRC, an organization established in early 1986 to defend the right
to counsel against government intrusion, and by the American Civil Liberties Union, the New
York Civil Liberties Union, and the American Civil Liberties Union of Virginia. See id. at 4.
263. Another version of this story involves Lord Erskine's defense of Thomas Paine in
1792 against a charge of seditious libel for the publication of The Rights of Man. See LLOYD
PAUL STRYKER, FOR THE DEFENSE 210-26 (1947). Erskine's oft-quoted closing argument in
that case makes explicit the connection between the bar's independence and the normative
existence of the state:
"I will forever, at all hazards, assert the dignity, independence, and integrity of the
English Bar, without which impartial justice, the most valuable part of the English
constitution, can have no existence."
Id. at 217 (quoting Erskine); see also Brief of the National Lawyers Guild (Amicus Curiae on
Behalf of Petitioners) at 7-8, 13-14, Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961) (No. 28)
[hereinafter Guild Amicus Brief in Konigsberg] (using the Erskine story and quotation as the
central narrative, along with references to the Zenger trial and Darrow's defense of the school-
teacher in the Scopes trial); Pickholz, supra note 49, at 1850-51 (using the Erskine story to
criticize the Securities and Exchange Commission's position and the Kutak Commission's pro-
posals on the disclosure of client fraud).
264. Cover, Nomos, supra note 1, at 23-24.
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stories, like the Zenger tale and the many speeches in which lawyers take
credit for opposing the Stamp Act and signing the Constitution,265 em-
phasize the bar's leading role in the state's birth, portraying the process
as one of normative challenge and normative reconstruction. These sto-
ries carry an implicit threat: we created you and we can destroy you. 266
A second creation motif, however, enters to mute the threat and trans-
form the bar's destructive power into a saving force. This motif reminds
the state that the normative challenge was realized through violent popu-
lar revolution. It is the people who can destroy the state, and it is the bar
and its nomos which can prevent that by forestalling the normative chal-
lenge-by upholding the state's nomoS. 267  In sounding this second
theme, lawyers commonly invoke De Tocqueville:
[T]he authority [Americans] have entrusted to members of the
265. Bar stories that give lawyers primary credit for the creation and legitimacy of the state
are legion. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON PROFESSIONALISM TO THE BOARD OF
GOVERNORS AND THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 1
(1986) [hereinafter ABA REPORT ON PROFESSIONALISM] (beginning by giving lawyers credit
for having "produced one of history's greatest documents of freedom," the Constitution); Eu-
gene C. Thomas, Some Straight Talk About Lawyers on Law Day USA, A.B.A. J., May 1987,
at 6, 6 (then-president of the ABA describing lawyers as "leaders of the movement for inde-
pendence," telling of their opposition to the Stamp Act and detailing how many lawyers signed
the Declaration of Independence, attended the Constitutional Convention and signed the Con-
stitution); Quotes, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1986, at 25, 25 (" 'When doctors were prescribing leeches to
cure General Washington's cold, lawyers were drafting the Declaration of Independence and
the Constitution.'" (quoting James Bond, Dean of the University of Puget Sound School of
Law, addressing the Rotary Club of Tacoma)).
266. One of the most celebrated bar stories, that of Queen Caroline's defense by Lord
Brougham, makes explicit the power of the bar to destroy the state. See 2 PROCEEDINGS IN
THE HOUSE OF LORDS, TRIAL OF QUEEN CAROLINE 5 (London, Wright 1821); infra notes
295-305 and accompanying text. The NACDL brief in Caplin & Drysdale conjures the threat
by concluding with the following words:
We, the People, cherish the right to counsel and the primary right to choose our
own counsel. We disfavor, even eschew, forfeitures. The latter is now encroaching
on the former. If the Government's blind expansion of a legal fiction is not stopped,
the result will be to take the adversary out of the adversary process. The Sixth
Amendment is at stake.
We ask this Court to hold strong for Freedom ....
NACDL Amicus Brief in Caplin & Drysdale, supra note 262, at 92-93.
267. Narratives expounding this theme are plentiful. For example:
"I came to realize that without a Bar trained in the traditions of courage and loyalty,
our constitutional theories of individual liberty would cease to be a living reality....
So I came to feel that the American lawyer should regard himself as a potential
officer of his government and as a defender of its laws and constitution."
Motion for Leave to File Brief Amici Curiae and Brief at 4, Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S.
36 (1961) (No. 28) (filed by a group of California attorneys) (quoting HENRY LEWIS STIMSON,
ON ACTIVE SERVICE IN PEACE AND WAR at xxi-xxii (1948)); see Frank G. Tyrell, The Law-
yer Lights the Way, 13 CAL. ST. B.J. 40 (1938); Lloyd Wright, Milestones and Concepts of the
Lawyer-Citizen, 41 A.B.A. J. 797, 797 (1955).
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legal profession, and the influence that these individuals exer-
cise in the government, are the most powerful existing security
against the excesses of democracy....
... [W]ithout this admixture of lawyer-like sobriety with
the democratic principle, I question whether democratic insti-
tutions could long be maintained; and I cannot believe that a
republic could hope to exist at the present time if the influence
of lawyers in public business did not increase in proportion to
the power of the people.268
It is also captured in the explanation of Shakespeare's line: "The
first thing we do, let's ldl all the lawyers." '269 Bar leaders never tire of
pointing out that this line was "spoken by one who was plotting how to
overthrow the government."27 ° As explained by a recent ABA president,
the moral of the tale is clear: "Through the rebels' threat, Shakespeare
reminds the groundlings that lawyers, as protectors of that system of or-
dered liberty, are as much an obstacle to a rebellion that would curtail
liberty as any garrisoned castle."271
Through these creation motifs, the bar explains why both the state,
which it can destroy, and the people, whose will to rebel it can thwart,
272
are often hostile to the bar and its nomos.273 At the same time, the motifs
express why the state and the people are ultimately beholden to the bar
and its nomos. 274 Attacks on the bar are therefore to be expected from
268. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 272, 276 (Phillips Bradley
ed., 1945) (1st ed. 13th prtg. 1980), quoted in John D. Randall, Our Professional Responsibility:
Lawyers Make Freedom a Living Thing, 43 A.B.A. J. 315, 318 (1957); see also Guild Amicus
Brief in Konigsberg, supra note 263, at 12 (quoting this same passage from De Tocqueville).
269. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE SECOND PART op KING HENRY THE SixTH act 4, sc.
2, 1. 70 (Blaisdell Pub. Co. 1969).
270. David R. Brink, The Image, the Truth, and the Bard, 68 A.B.A. J. 510, 510 (1982)
(Brink was then president of the ABA); see John 3. Curtin, "Killing" All the Lawyers, A.B.A.
J., Sept. 1990, at 8, 8 (Curtin was then president of the ABA).
271. Curtin, supra note 270, at 8; see Brink, supra note 270, at 510 ("Shakespeare under-
stood that the bulwark of an orderly society is its legal profession.").
272. In the stories the implicit threat is that the people might overthrow the state in its
material form; the explicit threat found in the morals is that the people will overthrow the
state's normative vision.
273. The state's hostility to the bar is expressed in the central theme elaborated above and
appears as a feature of most of the bar's sacred stories. The public's hostility to the bar is
another important theme. Bar leaders are constantly talking about what they call "lawyer-
bashing" by the public. See, eg., ABA REPORT ON PROFESSIONALISM, supra note 265, at 4-5;
Brink, supra note 270, at 510; Curtin, supra note 270, at 8.
274. My claim about what the stories "express" or "explain" is only a claim that represent-
atives of the bar commonly use these stories to express the ideas that I have described. The
stories can be and are, however, often used to express other ideas. By their nature, narratives
"are subject to no formal hierarchical ordering, no centralized, authoritative provenance, no
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both the state and the public, and may justifiably be resisted.
The second aspect of the bar's nomos explained by the Zenger tale is
the location and elaboration of a boundary line between the bar's norma-
tive space and the state's. Just as religious communities and the press use
the First Amendment,275 and as other communities have used property
or corporate law276 "to create boundaries [from the state] for [their] com-
munities and their quasi-autonomous law,"277 the bar uses the Sixth
necessary pattern of acquiescence" or interpretation. Cover, Nomos, supra note 1, at 17. Pro-
fessor Gordon, for example, shows how the creation/maintenance motif can be used to con-
struct a bar nomos centered on the republican virtues of maintaining the public nomos-a
nomos that Professor Gordon hopes will replace the existing nomos, which is centered on the
duty to the client. See Gordon, supra note 15, at 17-19.
275. On religious communities using the First Amendment as a boundary rule, see Cover,
Nomos, supra note 1, at 27-29. On the press's use of the First Amendment as a boundary rule,
see Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 679-81 (1972) (describing the reporter's argument,
which was rejected by the Court, that the First Amendment protects journalists from having to
reveal their sources to a grand jury); Brief for Amici Curiae Advance Publications, Inc. et al.
at 11, Cohn v. Cowles Media Co., 111 S. Ct. 2513 (1991) (No. 90-634) (arguing that the First
Amendment prevents a source from suing a reporter for breaking a promise to keep the source
confidential, an argument rejected by the Court, Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2516); Brief for Amicus
Curiae Association of American Publishers, Inc. at 7, Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of
the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991) (No. 90-1059) (arguing that the First
Amendment protects the press and authors from laws prohibiting publishers from paying-for
writing the stories of their crimes-those who have been convicted, accus , or who admit
having committed crimes); Facts on File, WORLD NEws DiG. 748 A3 (1976) (describing
Daniel Schorr's nine refusals to answer questions about his sources posed by a House Ethics
Panel and quoting Schorr's explanation that his silence was based on "professional conscience
as well as [the First Amendment, freedom of the press] constitutional right" (brackets in
original)).
276. As Professor Cover explained:
Property and corporation law have also been bases for claims to creation of an
insulated nomic reserve. The company town, mine, or plant often asserts a right to
law creation and enforcement with respect to social relations. Such claims were a
pervasive condition of industrial life throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries .... Perhaps the most compelling historical example of the use of private
law in the generation of a nomos was the creation of a polity out of the corporate
charter of Massachusetts Bay. And although such dramatic instances of the norma-
tive authority of the corporate charter are rare, modern corporation law continues to
bear the formal character of a grant of norm-generating authority.
Cover, Nomos, supra note 1, at 30-31 (footnotes omitted).
My experience teaching business ethics leads me to conclude that Professor Cover under-
stated the norm-generating capacity of corporations. Corporate institutions manage to gener-
ate and maintain normative systems, although the norms generated and maintained may not be
those reflected on the face of the ethics codes adopted by corporations. See generally ROBERT
JACKALL, MORAL MAZES: THa WORLD OF CORPORATE MANAGERS (1988) (elaborating on
the normative vision maintained in several corporate entities studied by the author); John M.
Conley & William M. O'Barr, The Culture of Capital: An Anthropological Investigation of
Institutional Investment, 70 N.C. L. REV. 823 (1992) (describing results of an anthropological
study of normative culture of major pension funds).
277. Cover, Nomos, supra note 1, at 30.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Amendment as a boundary to justify and explain the end of the state
law's domain and the beginning of the bar's nomos37 8 State doctrine also
recognizes that the Sixth Amendment protects some space in which the
bar's norms should operate without state interference. For example, in
Strickland v. Washington,279 the Court stated:
The Sixth Amendment... relies.., on the legal profession's
maintenance of standards sufficient to justify the law's pre-
sumption that counsel will fulfill the role in the adversary pro-
cess that the Amendment envisions.... The proper measure of
attorney performance remains simply reasonableness under
prevailing professional norms....
... Intensive scrutiny [by the court] and rigid [court im-
posed] requirements for acceptable assistance could dampen
the ardor and impair the independence of defense counsel, dis-
courage the acceptance of assigned cases, and undermine the
trust between attorney and client.280
That state doctrine recognizes that the Sixth Amendment provides
some boundary to its own law and some corresponding space for the
bar's nomos is not surprising, nor does it mean that we are looking at a
unitary legal vision shared by bar and state.28 1 The shape and nature of
the boundary between the state's normative space and the community's
"differs depending upon which side of the wall our narratives place us
on."'282 Thus, for the state, whatever boundary the Sixth Amendment
creates is limited by the state's understanding of the contours of that
Amendment-for example, that it applies only to criminal proceedings
283
and does not apply to grand jury investigations.284 In the bar's nomos,
the amendment's sweep and the boundary it creates against the imposi-
278. See supra text accompanying note 262 (quoting final paragraph of the Zenger tale as
told in the NACDL Amicus Brief in Caplin & Drysdale).
279. 466 U.S. 668 (1983).
280. Ia at 688-90 (citations omitted).
281. Professor Cover explains:
The community must mark off its nmos by a normative boundary from the
realm of civil coercion, just as the wielders of state power must establish their bound-
ary with a... community's resistance and autonomy. Each group must accommo-
date in its own normative world the objective reality of the other. There may or may
not be synchronization or convergence in their respective understandings about the
normative boundary and what it implies.
Cover, Nomos, supra note I, at 28-29.
282. Id. at 31.
283. See CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
§ 31.02, at 764-67 (2d ed. 1986).
284. Id. § 23.05(b), at 523-24.
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tion of state norms are much broader.2 5 The bar's interpretation can
differ markedly from the state's because for the bar the boundary and the
precept it is using to represent the boundary, here the Sixth Amendment,
take their shape not from state law but from the bar's narratives, which
create, justify and maintain the boundary.
Of course, the bar and its members are obviously neither completely
blind to nor unaffected by what they might call, to emphasize its contin-
gent status, current state doctrine. Where the state is least likely to see
the boundary in the Sixth Amendment, the bar may use some other pre-
cept-the Fifth Amendment,286 the First Amendment,287 the attorney-
client privilege288 or the ethics rules289-to support its claim to nomic
autonomy. 290 Like any community with its own vision of law living
within the shadow of the state, the bar is deeply interested in convincing
the state (and overlapping normative communities) to accept the bound-
ary as the bar envisions it. Therefore, it chooses its boundary rule with
285. See, e.g., NACDL Brief in Fischetti, supra note 149, at 25-39 (arguing that the Sixth
Amendment applies whenever a client retains a lawyer); Freeman, supra note 49, at 1795 (ar-
guing that the Sixth Amendment boundary applies in considering legitimacy of state interfer-
ence with lawyers in civil and counseling situations). For the bar, state doctrine
notwithstanding, the Sixth Amendment boundary prevents the application of fee forfeiture
statutes to attorneys' fees. See, e.g., NACDL Amicus Brief in Caplin & Drysdale, supra note
262, at 57; Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Bar Assoc. at 8-10, Caplin & Drysdale,
Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989) (No. 87-1729) [hereinafter ABA Amicus Brief
in Caplin & Drysdale]; Paul B. Johnson, American Bar Association Criminal Justice Section
Report to the A.B.A. House of Delegates, in ANNUAL MEETING REPORTS wrrH RECOMMEN-
DATIONS TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 3-5 (1986) (reported in Item No. 125A). It prevents
the IRS from requiring lawyers to submit the names of their clients. See, e.g., NACDL Brief
in Fischetti, supra note 149, at 25-39. It may even prevent the SEC from prosecuting or other-
wise disciplining lawyers who do not disclose their clients' fraudulent schemes. See generally
Freeman, supra note 49 (discussing Sixth Amendment problems with SEC disclosure
requirements).
286. See, e.g., ABA Amicus Brief in Caplin & Drysdale, supra note 285, at 11-12; NACDL
Brief in Fischetti, supra note 149, at 34-39.
287. See, eg., NACDL Amicus Brief in Caplin & Drysdale, supra note 262, at 49-50; Guild
Amicus Brief in Konigsberg, supra note 263, at 13-14 & n.15; Randall; supra note 68, at 317;
William L. Ransom, The Organized Bar Must Remain Independent, 10 CAL. ST. B.J. 315, 315
(1935); T.P. Wittschen, Letter to W.C. Jacobsen, 11 CAL. ST. B.J. 27, 30-32 (1936).
288. See, e.g., ABCNY Brief in Fischetti, supra note 70, at 2-15.
289. See, e.g., NACDL Brief in Fischetti, supra note 149, at 40-46; ethics opinions cited
supra notes 128, 133.
290. Professor Cover writes:
The principles that establish the nomian autonomy of a community must, of course,
resonate within the community itself and within its sacred stories. But it is a great
advantage to the community to have such principles resonate with the sacred stories
of other communities that establish overlapping or confficting normative worlds.
Neither religious churches.., nor utopian communities.., nor cadres of judges...
can ever manage a total break from other groups with other understandings of law.
Cover, Nomos, supra note 1, at 33.
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an eye to state doctrine, particularly when arguing to the state. This does
not mean that the bar's understanding of the boundary is disjointed, ex-
ternally determined or a matter of mere convenience. 291 For on the bar's
side of the wall the boundary inheres in, and is rendered relatively stable
by, narrative-not constitutional precept or other state law.
For the bar, the moral of its narratives is duty to client first. 292 The
precept that above all represents this moral is the duty to keep client
confidences-the bar's constitutional norm.293 This is the key to under-
standing why confidentiality is a constitutional norm for the bar. Confi-
dentiality presupposes and implements the duty of loyalty to one's
client-the moral of the bar's sacred tales. Confidentiality aids in creat-
ing a mini-community between lawyer and client-an island of immunity
in which the client is sovereign and the lawyer is, so to speak, grand
vizier.294 The maintenance of such islands can be seen as one of the guid-
ing purposes of the nomos, and a strong barrier of confidentiality is the
sine qua non of such a world. Confidentiality is the bar's constitutional
norm because, notwithstanding the bar's use of other precepts to rein-
force (and convince the state to accept) the boundary between the bar
(and the islands it is dedicated to protecting) and the state, it is the bar-
rier from the bar's side of the wall.
Various provisions of state law, particularly the Sixth Amendment
and the attorney-client privilege, reflect the norm of confidentiality and
provide a means of arguing to the state that it is obligated to honor the
boundary, to recognize the bar's right to nomic autonomy. But from the
perspective of the group, the nomos exists with or without state recogni-
tion-that is what it means to claim the right to one's own law.
The third thing to notice about the bar's stories is that the central
theme of fearless advocate versus government oppression generates a pre-
ferred hierarchy of norms. The Zenger story celebrates ethical obligation
over state law and, among ethical obligations, devotion to client over
obedience to law or court order-precisely the hierarchy we found exists
in the bar's nomos. It also dictates a privileged position and a generous
reading of state precepts that embody the norm of devotion to client (and
which implicitly acknowledge a sphere of nomic autonomy for the bar)
291. "Even an accommodationist sectarian position--one that goes to great lengths to
avoid confrontation or the imposition upon adherents of demands that will in practice conflict
with those imposed by the state-establishes its own meaning for the norms to which it and its
members conform." Id.
292. The Brougham quotation, see infra text accompanying note 296, makes this moral
explicit. See Patterson, supra note 77, at 909-11 (discussing the effect of the Brougham story
and moral on the bar's ethos).
293. See supra text accompanying notes 159-60.
294. I am indebted to Professor Hazard for this phrase.
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like the Sixth Amendment and the attorney-client privilege. Another
classic bar story, Lord Brougham's defense of Queen Caroline,2 95 pro-
vides a summary statement of the bar's normative hierarchy, which is,
not surprisingly, oft-quoted by members of the bar:
[A]n advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one per-
son in all the world, and that person is his client. To save that
client by all means and expedients, and at all hazards and costs
to other persons, and, amongst them, to himself, is his first and
only duty; and in performing this duty he must not regard the
alarm, the torments, the destruction which he may bring on
others. Separating the duty of a patriot from that of an advo-
cate, he must go on reckless of consequences, though it should
be his unhappy fate to involve his country in confusion.29 6
The fourth aspect of the bar's nomos elaborated by the bar's narra-
tives is the connection between the normative and material worlds: be-
tween a norm and circumstances in the world and between the norm and
action in the world. Narratives infuse norms with "history and
destiny., 297 By providing history and destiny, narratives connect the
norms embedded in them to both the material world of the past and the
material world of the realizable future-to what the world was when the
norm was dormant (or nonexistent) and to what the world might be, if
the norm fulfills its destiny.298 In the NACDL Amicus Brief in Caplin &
Drysdale the Zenger story performs this function for the Sixth Amend-
ment.299 It explains the world out of which the norm evolved, and
thereby provides the norm with its purpose: to change that world.
Narratives connect the normative world not only to the material
worlds of past and future, but also to the material world of the present by
providing a "repertoire of moves-a lexicon of normative action ' '3°° that
communicates which acts threaten the norm and which acts are licensed
to protect it. Narratives thus imbue the actions of state officials and
295. See Hazard, supra note 257, at 1244; see also 2 PROCEEDINGS IN THE HOUSE OF
LORDS, TRIAL OF QUEEN CAROLINE, supra note 266, at 5 (discussing origins of the story).
296. 2 PROCEEDINGS IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS, TRIAL OF QUEEN CAROLINE, supra note
266, at 5.
297. Cover, Nomos, supra note 1, at 5.
298. This is what Professor Cover meant when he wrote, "Law may be viewed as a system
of tension or a bridge linking a concept of a reality to an imagined alternative-that is, as a
connective between two states of affairs, both of which can be represented in their normative
significance only through the devices of narrative." Id
299. "The most famous trial of the colonial era, one that had a profound effect on the
Framers [of the Sixth Amendment]-the trial of printer John Peter Zenger-stands as a vindi-
cation of the right to appear through chosen counsel rather than one appointed by the court."
NACDL Amicus Brief in Caplin & Drysdale, supra note 262, at 17-18.
300. Cover, Nomos, supra note 1, at 9.
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group members with normative significance by establishing "paradigms
for behavior." 0' 1
In the Zenger tale, for example, the government is tyrannical, and
its judges and prosecutors are partisan or corrupt. All state action is
therefore, at best, suspect, and the story makes it clear that state action
aimed at controlling counsel is not only specifically included in the list of
suspect activity; it is especially suspect. State laws may be conceived and
employed as instruments of oppression. Such unjust laws may therefore
be vigorously opposed, and a jury-and perhaps the people in general as
represented by Zenger-may specifically be encouraged to disobey them.
Court orders are unfair-excessive and unprecedented. Faced with un-
just court orders, lawyers may disobey. The state is dangerous, and all
its power is arrayed against the client Zenger, a victim of oppression.30 2
Apparently, once in the clutches of the law, the client is capable of no
further action and must depend on his lawyers for redemption.30 3 The
lawyers are clever, noble and brave.3° Given the respective characters of
301. Id.
302. While the imperiled situation of the client is a constant in bar stories, the worthiness
of the client or the cause is not. Some stories give no information by which to judge the client's
cause. For example, we are given little information on which to judge Queen Caroline or her
cause in the standard version of that story. See Hazard, supra note 257, at 1244, for a classic
description of the case. More important, in other sacred stories the client himself is the op-
pressor. For example, consider the story of John Adams's defense of the British soldiers
charged with murder in the Boston Massacre. See Morris L. Ernst & Alan 0. Schwartz, The
Right to Counsel and the "Unpopular Cause", 20 U. PrTT. L. REV. 727, 728 (1959); see also
Lawry, supra note 77, at 362-63 (recounting the Adams story and the story of lawyer David
Goldberger's defense of the Nazis who wished to march in Nazi regalia through Skokie, Illi-
nois, a town with a large population of concentration camp survivors). Read together, these
stories communicate that the norms and hierarchy of norms expressed by the stories are valid
without regard to the particular client or cause.
303. The portrait of the client as vulnerable and passive is common in bar narratives. The
client in these tales is often a mere shadow of a character. To the degree the tales include
client action at all, that action takes place off-stage, so to speak, and is ancillary to the main
drama. This feature of the bar's narratives celebrates the lawyer's authority to decide and act
as the lawyer sees fit and, correspondingly, minimizes the client's role as participant in the
representation. These are not tales that celebrate the norms of consultation with the client or
client involvement in decisionmaking. Many commentators have criticized lawyers for treat-
ing clients just as these narratives suggest. See, eg., Derrick A. Bell, Serving 71vo Masters:
Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470,
482-93 (1976); William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Profes-
sional Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. REv. 30, 52-75 (a brilliant contribution to the literature); Wasser-
strom, supra note 24, at 1. I know, however, of no one who has connected this attitude with
the bar's central stories.
304. Notice that even the lawyer Chambers, "a Governor's man," is "competent," if not as
clever as he should be. More significant, even he is relatively independent of the state-at least
compared to the judge. Chambers apparently cooperates with Hamilton to the extent of stay-
ing on the case and making an opening statement, however mild compared to Hamilton's. See
supra text accompanying note 262.
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the state, the client and the lawyers, and the nature of the state's instru-
ments and institutions, the lawyer's actions are justified and heroic. In
this tale the lawyers' dedication to the nomos celebrated by the story is
expressed by challenging the judge's authority, disobeying court orders,
and appealing to the jury to ignore the law and acquit. In the Brougham
story, dedication to the nomos justifies, according to the moral, bringing
"destruction" on others and "involv[ing one's] country in confusion. ' 30 5
Other tales, which emphasize what I called earlier the second crea-
tion motif (the people pose the real threat to the state), suggest another
paradigm: the lawyer as instrument of reconciliation, the lawyer as pur-
veyor of the state's nomos. The remote and impersonal state can perpet-
uate its nomos only through force or the threat of force. The lawyer, on
the other hand, in her mini-community with the client can bring the
state's nomos to the client personally using dialogue instead of violence to
further the state's aims.3 6
These stories and the paradigms embedded in them are used to in-
terpret the actions of the state and to justify the bar's responses in mod-
em tales of struggle-struggles outside the criminal context, struggles
without obvious political import, and struggles in which the defendant is
neither poor, nor helpless, nor otherwise obviously vulnerable to the
power of the state. For example, it was through these stories and para-
digms that the securities bar understood and explained the importance of
resisting the SEC's efforts to require lawyers to reveal securities frauds
committed by their clients in the course of the representation.30 7
305. As Professor Hazard recently pointed out, it also licenses more particular action: ob-
taining an advantage in a civil case by threatening criminal prosecution. Hazard, supra note
257, at 1244. This tells us something about the status of the ethics rule that prohibits such
threats. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY DR 7-105 (1981). This rule was
dropped from the Model Rules, which confirms its low status within the profession.
306. "Crooked lawyers," i.e, those who use the mini-community to encourage actively the
client's violations of state law or who join with the client in performing blatantly illegal acts
under state and bar law, are outside the paradigm. They threaten the bar's nomic autonomy
by undercutting the reconciliation role promised by the second creation motif. Thus they may
be ostracized and hated by the rest of the profession for threatening the nomos.
The reconciliation paradigm is, however, not as powerful in the most common versions of
the bar's sacred tales as the paradigm of lawyer as champion. It nonetheless can be found. See
supra notes 267-71 and accompanying text. It is thus available for those who seek to re-form
the nomos. See Gordon, supra note 15, at 9; Hazard, supra note 257, at 1277-80.
307. On the corruption or partisanship of the lawyers for the SEC:
Of course, the government officials will say that they are not like George III's
minions, that they are much nicer fellows. This may very well be.. . , although I
cannot help noting the fact that the opening shot in this attack on the bar-the com-
plaint in the National Student Marketing case--was signed by a General Counsel of
the SEC who was later forced to resign in the Watergate scandal.
Given the fact that our government officials do not seek to rule us from overseas
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Without narratives precepts lack meaning, direction and a sense of
immediacy. Without narratives we do not know when our law is
threatened or what it demands we do in response. The narratives give
meaning, purpose and direction not merely to precepts but to the group
itself. They bring the bar's nomos to life and entrust it to the group,
which the tales themselves define.
VII. COMMITMENT
Because the nomos is but the process of human action stretched
between vision and reality, a legal interpretation cannot be
valid if no one is prepared to live by it.308
We call the state's normative vision "law" because we know that the
state means it. It is committed to its interpretation. It is prepared to act,
using all the resources of violence at its disposal, if necessary, to enforce
its interpretations. 9 Earlier, to justify my use of the word "law" to
describe the profession's normative vision, I argued that the profession
means it too, that it too is committed to its interpretations. 10 If, how-
ever, the profession's law diverges from that of the state, how can the
profession maintain its commitment, given the state's imperfect monop-
but are quite close, King George's tax collectors and Commissioner Kurtz [of the
SEC] have the same kind of powers ....
Freeman, supra note 49, at 1797. The National Student Marketing case is discussed infra text
accompanying notes 314-43.
On the courts as "lieutenants" of the executive:
[E]xperience has shown that ... courts with relatively little securities litigation tend
to adopt rules of decision which more closely reflect the SEC viewpoint than [courts]
where both the bench and bar have developed the sophistication... to match that of
the Commission. Consequently, the SEC can establish a favorable precedent in a
court receptive to its views in order to hold that precedent over the heads of lawyers
elsewhere.
Lipman, supra note 200, at 475 (footnote omitted).
On returning to the world as it existed before the bar's norms emerged:
[C]onsider carefully the overall policy of the [Kutak proposals,] which is to place the
"interests of the justice system in a position of primacy over the interests of the client
when the two interests conflict."
Is this policy so different from that of William The Conqueror, or Henry II, who
insisted that those who would be "attorneys" must be more loyal to the King than to
the client? And that they must be prepared to sacrifice the interests of those seeking
their assistance to the interests of the King?
The securities bar should ask itself if progress in the justice system can be
achieved by returning to eleventh century England.
Pickholz, supra note 49, at 1853 (quoting Harold C. Petrowitz, Some Thoughts About Current
Problems in Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1275, 1289).
308. Cover, Nomos, supra note 1, at 44 (footnote omitted).
309. See Cover, Violence, supra note 1, at 1607-08.
310. See supra text accompanying notes 76-81.
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oly over violence?31' The answer lies in understanding that commitment
is not an all-or-nothing proposition for either the state or the commu-
nity.312 "[Miost communities will avoid outright conflict with a judge's
interpretations, at least when he will likely back them with violence.
'313
But, as we shall see, judges are particularly unlikely to assert their inter-
pretive power or back their interpretations with violence in cases in
which their understanding of law diverges from the bar's. The state's
commitment is weak. On the other hand, the bar's commitment is rela-
tively strong. Built as it is on a central narrative that predicts just such a
crisis between state demands and professional demands, the bar's law is
rich in norms and narratives of resistance. We shall see that the bar's
law is fairly sophisticated in elaborating what is allowed and required of
lawyers caught in this basic dilemma.
A. The Weakness of the State's Commitment
In cases involving the law governing lawyers, the courts show a
weak commitment to state law-to the maintenance of a state nomos-in
two basic ways. First, they are reluctant to create legal meaning and as a
consequence create little. Second, they show little inclination to back
with violence the legal meaning they do create. Consider the court's de-
cision in SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp.
314
In 1972, the SEC asked the district court to hold that several law-
yers and their law firms had violated the securities laws by failing to stop
their clients from closing a merger deal that the lawyers discovered had
been approved by the shareholders on the basis of materially misleading
documents. 315 The SEC asked the court to hold that under the securities
law these lawyers should have: (1) insisted that their clients postpone
the deal, revise the documents, and resubmit them to the shareholders;
311. To appreciate the importance of the question posed in the text, consider the following
quotation:
Certain efforts to [maintain a separate nomos] have a strange, almost doomed
character. The state's claims over legal meaning are, at bottom, so closely tied to the
state's imperfect monopoly over the domain of violence that the claim of a commu-
nity to an autonomous meaning must be linked to the community's willingness to live
out its meaning in defiance. Outright defiance, guerrilla warfare, and terrorism are,
of course, the most direct responses. They are responses, however, that may-as in
the United States-be unjustifiable and doomed to failure.
Cover, Nomos, supra note 1, at 52.
312. "Some interpretations are writ in blood and run with a warranty of blood as part of
their validating force. Other interpretations carry more conventional limits to what will be
hazarded on their behalf." Id. at 46.
313. Id. at 53.
314. 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978).
315. National Student Marketing Complaint, supra note 144, at 91,913.
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(2) tried to thwart the closing by refusing to issue their opinion letters;
and (3) resigned and disclosed the fraud to the shareholders or the SEC,
if the clients had closed the deal against the lawyers' advice and despite
their efforts to thwart it.316 The narrative the SEC told in its complaint
implied a precept: a lawyer who knows the client is committing securi-
ties fraud must stop the client, and failing that, must disclose.31 7 The
relief requested by the SEC-the commitment it asked the court to
demonstrate to the interpretation of law it offered-was a permanent in-
junction.318 The SEC asked the court to enjoin permanently these law-
yers from violating the securities laws.
The SEC put forth, in other words, a complete vision of law-norm,
narrative and commitment-that was at odds with the bar's nomos.
319
The court's decision showed commitment neither to the law it articulated
nor to the court's role as interpreter of law.
According to state doctrine, the judiciary's interpretations of state
law are authoritative. 320 To demonstrate commitment to its role as au-
316. Id
317. Notice the close connection between this precept and the language of canon 41 and
DR 7-102(B)(1) before its amendment. See CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL EmIcs Canon 41
(1908); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(B)(1) (1969).
318. National Student Marketing Complaint, supra note 144, at 91,913.
319. That the SEC's theory of required disclosure violated the bar's understanding of confi-
dentiality should be obvious from all that has preceded. The complaint also threatened the
bar's nomic autonomy because it claimed that state law should elaborate and limit the most
basic of a lawyer's duties, the duty to keep confidences. The bar reacted to defend its norma-
tive vision. While the case was pending, the ABA amended DR 7-102(B)(1) and issued Opin-
ion 341 to clarify its law on confidentiality and client fraud. In addition, the ABA House of
Delegates addressed the questions at issue in National Student Marketing more directly by
adopting a policy upon the recommendation of the ABA's Section of Corporation, Banking,
and Business Law. See ABA Policy on Advising on Securities Matters, supra note 150, at
1085-86. The bar's position was stated succinctly in the Section's report to the House:
We do not believe that the policy of disclosure as embodied in the SEC laws
warrants an exception to the basic confidentiality of the attorney-client relationship.
Such exceptions have to date been carefully reserved by the [Model Code] for far
more critical and limited situations. The statutes administered by the SEC give it no
power to require disclosure by lawyers concerning their clients beyond what is pro-
vided in the [Model Code].
American Bar Association, Report to the House of Delegates: Section of Corporation, Banking
and Business Law Recommendation, 31 Bus. LAW. 544, 547 (1975). For another example of
organized bar reaction to this case, see ABCNY Report on Securities Transactions, supra note
144.
320. The claim that judicial interpretations of state laws trump private interpretations is
implicit in all court decisions. An extreme instance of this claim is made in Walker v. Bir-
mingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967), which asserts that a judicial interpretation of the Constitution
has the power to trump a private interpretation even if a more authoritative judicial interpreta-
tion, i.e., one made by a higher court, later states that the initial judicial interpretation was
wrong. Id. at 320-21. The courts justify the privileged status of their interpretations by ap-
pealing to the texts of jurisdiction. "The most basic of the texts of jurisdiction ... are the
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thoritative interpreter, the court need not rule in one way instead of an-
other.321 What it must do, however, is affirm its power to decide and
affirm the power of state law to control the decision. The court may
affirm its power to decide by holding that it lacks the jurisdiction to de-
cide,322 and it may affirm the power of state law to control the decision
by holding that state law cannot control the decision.3 23 But, if it makes
apologies for the state itself and for its violence-the ideology of social contract or the rational-
izations of the welfare state." Cover, Nomos, supra note 1, at 54. The connection between the
authoritative status of state interpretations and the state's existence is explicit in this passage
from Hobbes:
"And therefore the Interpretation of all Lawes, dependeth on the Authority
Soveraign; and the Interpreters can be none but those, which the Soveraign, (to
whom only the Subject oweth obedience) shall appoint. For else, by the craft of an
Interpreter, the Law may be made to beare a sense, contrary to that of the Soveraign;
by which means the Interpreter becomes the Legislator."
Id at 54 n.147 (quoting THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 211-12 (W.G. Pogson Smith ed.,
1909) (1651)).
State doctrine in this country also provides that judicial interpretations tr ump interpreta-
tions of other state institutions or actors, although the various texts of jurisdiction that elabo-
rate this general principle require more or less deference to the interpretations of other state
institutions or actors depending on the law being articulated, the sphere of state action in-
volved, and the agents or agencies that are offering their own interpretation. See, eg., Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984) (stating that
courts should defer to an administrative agency's reasonable interpretation of a statutory
term); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 209 (1962) (explaining that constitutional interpretations
of other branches will not be reviewed by the courts when they involve "political questions").
321. In other words, in National Student Marketing the court could have shown commit-
ment to this role by exonerating the lawyers or condemning them-by deciding in accordance
with the bar's law or against it. "Among warring sects [here the bar and the SEC], each of
which wraps itself in the mantle of a law of its own, [judges] assert a regulative function that
permits a life of law rather than violence." Cover, Nomos, supra note 1, at 53. They do this by
asserting that one vision is law and the other not, attempting to kill off the version of law they
exile. "Theirs is the jurispathic office." Id. That judges characteristically kill off law rather
than create it is one of the more important insights of Professor Cover's work.
322. Professor Cover called this phenomenon the "irony of jurisdiction." Id. at 8. "Mar-
bury is a particularly powerful example of a general phenomenon. Every denial of jurisdiction
... is an assertion of the power to determine jurisdiction and thus to constitute a norm." Id. at
8 n.23 (emphasis added); see Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
Every denial of jurisdiction does not, however, assert the same amount of power as every
other denial of jurisdiction. Marbury's deep irony places it at one end of a continuum: the
Court's holding that it lacked the power to decide the case is all but eclipsed by the power it
asserted. While other cases denying the court's jurisdiction may express considerable court
power, the norm may be closer to the other end of the spectrum, where the denial of jurisdic-
tion expresses a power so diminutive that the irony is more pretense than substance. See LAU-
RENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTrrUTIONAL LAW § 4-7, at 231 (2d ed. 1988) ("[T]he
reluctance of most courts to embroil themselves in the resolution of'political disputes' between
the other branches of government in the United States Indochina intervention [the Vietnam
War], have combined to leave meager elucidation in the cases." (footnote omitted)).
323. We can think of this as the irony of boundaries. To paraphrase Professor Cover:
Every assertion by a court that the state's law includes a boundary rule is an assertion of the
power of state law to determine the boundaries and thus to constitute a norm, i.e., that state
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either of these choices, it must-if it is to show commitment to its role-,
articulate why those decisions are correct as a matter of state law, i.e., it
must identify some boundary rule for the court's power or the state's law
that is itself a matter of state law.324 In National Student Marketing, the
court showed a weak commitment to its own power to decide and a weak
commitment to the power of state law to control the decision.
The court agreed with the SEC that the lawyers had violated the
securities laws by knowingly and substantially assisting their clients to
commit fraud.325 It held that it is wrong under state law for lawyers who
are assisting their clients in securities transactions to keep silent when
they discover that their clients are committing fraud in those matters.326
It held that silence or inaction in such a situation is wrong under state
law because lawyers have a duty "to their corporate cient[s] ... to take
steps to ensure that the information [will] be disclosed to the
shareholders.
327
Having articulated these precepts, however, the court failed to con-
nect them to the lawyers' actions in this case: "[I]t is unnecessary to
determine the precise extent of their obligations here, since.., they took
no steps whatsoever to delay the closing .... But, at the very least, they
were required to speak out [to their clients] at the closing .... .328 In
failing to provide a narrative, in failing to connect norms to the actions of
the past, the court showed a weak commitment to its role as creator of
legal meaning. The court refused to explain what parts of the world as it
exists (represented in this case by the actions of the lawyers) are to be
changed by its norms. It thus created little law to project into the future.
Was it wrong under state law that the lawyers failed to resign? That they
failed to inform officers of the corporate client not present at the meet-
ing? That they failed to inform shareholders or the SEC? Does the law
demand that lawyers in the future do any of these things?3 29 With the
law is supreme to the extent it says it is. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 236
(1972) (holding that state law on compulsory education must accommodate the requirements
of the Amish religion to be valid under the First Amendment).
324. For example, in Yoder the Court did this by asserting the power of, and elaborating on
the meaning of, the First Amendment. Id. at 219-29.
325. SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682, 715 (D.D.C. 1978) ("Thus,
the Court finds that the attorney defendants aided and abetted the violation of § 10(b), Rule
lOb-5, and § 17(a) through their participation in the closing of the merger.").
326. Id. at 713.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. The answer to these questions will, of course, help determine how successful a lawyer
will be in delaying the closing by speaking to the clients. Is the lawyer limited to urging the
client to comply with state law? May the bar limit what the lawyer may do after this point and
thus what she may legitimately threaten to do in seeking to delay the closing?
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words "at the very least," the court admits that the narrative is incom-
plete, that state law has more meaning, but it does not assert its power to
control that meaning. Instead, it invites the bar to provide that meaning:
"The very initiation of this action . . . has provided a necessary and
worthwhile impetus for the profession's recognition and assessment of its
responsibilities in this area.
330
The court indeed appeared to concede its role as authoritative inter-
preter simultaneously to the bar and to the SEC. It speaks approvingly
of the prospect of bar law changing in response to the SEC's initiation of
proceedings, in response to the SEC's threat to invoke state violence in
the name of its interpretation. But the court refused to approve the
SEC's interpretation. By telling a community that it should reconsider
its behavior and beliefs in light of state power whether or not the use of
that power is legitimate, a court abandons its commitment to a state built
on the meaning of shared principles and helps constitute a state built
instead on obedience to authority. When I wrote above that to show
commitment to its role the court must affirm the power of state law to
control the decision, I did not mean the power of that law apart from its
legitimacy as interpretation. Only in a police state could such an affirma-
tion by a court demonstrate a strong commitment to its role. This is not
to say that courts in our system never side with power apart from its
interpretative legitimacy.33' It is to say that whenever a court credits
state power apart from its interpretive legitimacy, the court shows a
weak commitment to its institutional role.
332
To the extent the court in National Student Marketing conceded its
role as authoritative interpreter to the bar as opposed to the SEC, the
court again showed a weak commitment to its institutional role and to
state law. The concession itself is not what makes the court's move
weak; it is the ambiguous nature of the concession. A court can make
such a concession and still demonstrate a strong commitment to its role
and to state law by articulating a boundary rule of state law that the
court interprets as limiting the scope of state law and leaving a corre-
sponding realm of law to another group. Because the boundary itself is
state law and the court is elaborating its nature and shape, a strong com-
330. National Student Mktg., 457 F. Supp. at 714.
331. Professor Cover provided a powerful indictment of court decisions that accord defer-
ence to the violent acts of the state on the ground that they are violent acts of the state. Cover,
Nomos, supra note 1, at 56-58.
332. The decision in National Student Marketing has left the bar in just the position pre-
dicted by the analysis in the text, making law in the shadow of the SEC's power. For a de-
tailed discussion of how the state's failure of commitment leaves the bar in just such a position,
see Steven C. Krane, The Attorney Unshackled SEC Rule 2(e) Violates Clients' Sixth Amend-
ment Right to Counsel, 57 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 50 (1981).
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mitment is demonstrated both to state law and the court's role. Con-
sider, for example, the strong commitment to both the First Amendment
and the court's own power demonstrated in cases affirming the principle
of religious freedom against state interference.333
In National Student Marketing, however, the court's allusions to a
state boundary rule are not a demonstration of strong commitment. The
court explained its failure to create law by stating that further explication
would be "unnecessary [to resolve the case before it]"' 334 and that it
"must narrow its focus to the present defendants and the charges against
them. '335 These statements are allusions to the rule against rendering
advisory opinions. 336 By definition the advisory opinion rule creates at
most a temporary boundary. Its use affirms neither the limits of state law
nor the group's nomic space. Assuming the advisory opinion rule may
ever serve as an affirmation of the court's power,337 it did not serve that
333. See, eg., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972). In Yoder the Supreme Court
held that the First and Fourteenth Amendments prevented a state from compelling Amish
parents to send their children to high school. In so ruling the court elaborated on the nature
and scope of the First Amendment as a boundary rule that prevented state law from interfer-
ing with religious law. Id. at 215, 220-26. By interpreting the First Amendment the Court
showed commitment to its role as elaborator of the state's law. By invalidating the Wisconsin
trial court's conviction of the Amish parents who had not sent their children to high school,
the Court showed commitment to its power to decide whose law should win when a conflict
emerges between state law (Wisconsin's compulsory education law) and the group's law (the
Amish religion's principles against secondary education). Id. at 234.
334. National Student Mktg., 457 F. Supp. at 713.
335. Id. at 714. Various persons charged in the SEC's initial complaint settled with the
SEC before the court's decision and thus were no longer before the court. Id. at 687 & n.2.
336. The principle against rendering advisory opinions is grounded in the "case or contro-
versy" requirement of Article III of the United States Constitution and in the general principle
of separation of powers implicit in the Constitution. See 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1988); FED. R.
Civ. P. 57. Moreover, in addition to the constitutional and statutory sources of the rule in
both the federal and state systems, it is understood as a boundary rule implicit in the common-
law system. See, eg., EUGENE WAMBAUGH, THE STUDY OF CASES 9 (2d ed. Boston, Little
Brown 1894) ("[The court's duty is to consider the whole case to the extent, and only to the
extent, requisite in order to decide what... to do.").
According to traditional theory, the rule serves to avoid the "sheer ... dispersion of
thought" that would occur if legal questions were considered in the abstract, minimizes "the
play of personal convictions or preferences" because judges can only decide questions put to
them, and promotes the judiciary's role as "organs of the sober second thought" by limiting it
to judging actions already taken. All of this, according to the theory, helps ensure social ac-
ceptance of the courts' decisions and their authority to decide. HENRY M. HART & HERBERT
WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 67 (2d ed. 1973); see ALEX-
ANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 113-17 (2d ed. 1986).
337. The traditional justifications for the rule emphasize the court's weaknesses. This is
not in itself a bar, however, to using the rule to express strength. Law is capable of expressing
irony. Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792), may serve as an example of the use of the
advisory opinion rule to express court power. In that case a statute provided that the federal
circuit courts were to certify to the Secretary of War which persons were eligible to receive
pensions and the amount of the pension they were to receive. Most of the justices, sitting on
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function here. The case was before the court to determine whether an
injunction was warranted against the defendants. The test for that relief
articulated by the court was whether the defendants had acted badly
prior to engaging in the conduct that was before the court and how bad
their conduct was in the case before the court.338 What exactly the law-
yers did wrong and the degree to which it was wrong were thus issues
directly before the court. The court had to reach for the advisory opin-
ion rule to avoid discussing these issues. This stretch demonstrates the
court's weak commitment. The court used the advisory opinion rule in a
case where it did not naturally apply, as an excuse not to make law.
Moreover, the advisory opinion rule assumes "an ironic cast" 339 in this
case: the court's refusal to grant any relief against the defendants, a mat-
ter to which we turn next, renders the entire opinion no more than
advice.
The court refused to enjoin the lawyers from further violations of
the securities laws; it granted the SEC no relief against the defendants.
By denying relief, the court showed a weak commitment to the little law
it did create and to whatever more the securities laws might mean as
applied to lawyers whose clients are engaged in fraud. It refused to back
its interpretation with force, and more striking, it explained that force
was unnecessary, in part because the defendants were lawyers. The court
expressed its confidence that the defendants' "professional responsibili-
ties as attorneys and officers of the court" 34 would lead them to honor
the court's interpretation without force.341 In other words, state law de-
circuit, denied the statute's power to assign this function to the courts. Among the reasons
given was that under the statute the judges' decisions would be advisory because they could be
revised by the legislature or a member of the executive branch: "Such revision and controul
[sic] we deemed radically inconsistent with the independence of that judicial power which is
vested in the courts." Ide at 411.
For the most part, however, Justice Rutledge's opinion in Rescue Army v. Municipal
Court of Los Angeles, 331 U.S. 549 (1947), provides a succinct summary of how courts use the
advisory opinion rule. While defending the principle that the Court should decide only those
constitutional questions "strictly necessary," he nonetheless stated: "[E]very application [of
the advisory rule] has been an instance of reluctance, indeed of refusal, to undertake the most
important and the most delicate of the Court's functions, notwithstanding conceded jurisdic-
tion, until necessity compels it in the performance of constitutional duty." Id. at 569.
338. National Student Mktg., 457 F. Supp. at 716.
339. Cover, Nomos, supra note 1, at 7. Professor Cover used this phrase to describe the
thickness of legal meaning. In his example, it was the Due Process Clause's reference to "life"
that had taken on an ironic cast both for opponents of the death penalty and opponents of
abortion. Id. When a precept takes on an ironic cast for a community or for the society at
large, those who perceive the irony will view the state's invocation of the precept with suspi-
cion. See id.
340. National Student Mktg., 457 F. Supp. at 716.
341. Subsequent events suggest how misguided the court's confidence was and how the
court's weak commitment helps the bar maintain its divergent understanding of law:
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pends on the bar's nomos for vindication.
The court thus implied that the bar's law is somehow stronger and
more binding on group members than state law.342 The power of the
bar's law did not trouble the court because in the court's vision the para-
mount precept for lawyers must be (and therefore for the court is) the
obligation to comply with state law. This understanding of the hierarchy
of norms contained in the ethics rules is, however, a state understanding.
In the bar's nomos the duty to comply with other law does not, as we
have seen, trump all other norms. That the court ignored the bar's com-
peting vision of law is not odd; to acknowledge it overtly would be too
threatening, given how dependent courts and state law are on the bar.
What is odd is that this court and others343 continue to nurture a vision
(the bar's vision) that is so threatening by demonstrating so little com-
mitment to state law or the courts' own role.
The evidence of weak commitment found in National Student Mar-
keting is common in cases involving the law governing lawyers. Another
striking example is provided by the opinion in the Pennsylvania case
Commonwealth v. Stenhach.34 In Stenhach the conviction of two law-
yers for concealing evidence and hindering prosecution was before an
intermediate appellate court in Pennsylvania.345 In the course of repre-
senting a client charged with murder, the lawyers had withheld from the
state physical evidence that incriminated their client in the crime. The
According to the allegations contained in two lawsuits that Lord, Bissell [& Brook,
the firm involved in National Student Marketing,] recently settled for twenty-four
million dollars, shortly after the decision in National Student Marketing, the firm
began aggressively representing National Mortgage Equity Corporation (NMEC), a
controversial venture designed to capitalize on the newly emerging market in second
mortgages.... [A]ccording to the deposition testimony of the firm's managing part-
ner, the firm changed virtually none of its practices as a result of the SEC's prosecu-
tions in National Student Marketing.
David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARv. L. RaV. 801, 870-71 (1992)
(citing Tim O'Brien, Some Firms Never Learn: Lord, Bissell's Second Escape from Fraud
Charges Cost $24 Million-And It Could Happen Again, AM. LAW., Oct. 1989, at 63, 64).
Professor Wilkins uses this example to counter bar arguments that lawyers will be unduly
chilled by agency and other state regulations. I agree that National Student Marketing is un-
likely to "chill" many lawyers, but I disagree that this shows that state regulation is unlikely to
"chill" many lawyers. It shows, instead, that state regulation lacking significant commitment
is unlikely to "chill" many lawyers.
342. The court not only cedes to the ethics rules the power to guarantee compliance with
the securities law, but also assures the bar that the courts will accord great deference to the
bar's interpretation of the securities laws: "Courts will not lightly overrule [the] attorney's
determination" that state law has been fulfilled. National Student Mktg., 457 F. Supp. at 713.
343. See infra notes 369-72.
344. 356 Pa. Super. 5, 514 A.2d 114 (1986), appeal denied, 517 Pa. 589, 534 A.2d 769
(1987).
345. Id. at 5, 514 A.2d at 114.
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court said that under state law-the state's ethics rules-the lawyers had
done wrong,346 and in theory could be punished by the state supreme
court for such conduct.347 On the other hand, the court held that the
state could not prohibit the same conduct under its criminal laws because
those laws were both vague and overbroad as applied to lawyers.3 48 In
other words, the court said the state must not use too much force against
lawyers to back its norms.
Like the advisory opinion rule in National Student Marketing, the
boundary rules used in Stenhach were stretched and laden with irony. In
Stenhach the boundary rules that the court used to avoid applying state
criminal laws to lawyers were the rules against vague and overbroad
criminal laws.349 The court stated that vague and overbroad statutes
346. "We ... reject appellants' contention that their conduct was proper and that they had
no duty to deliver the rifle stock to the prosecution until they were ordered to do so." Id at 24,
514 A.2d at 123.
347. "We note.., that the courts have the power, outside the context of criminal sanc-
tions, to regulate the conduct of attorneys practicing before them, and that the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court [sitting in review of a bar Disciplinary Board decision, may deal] . . . with
apparent attorney misconduct." Id at 31, 514 A.2d at 127. I say "in theory" because in a
later proceeding the Pennsylvania Bar's Disciplinary Board unanimously recommended that
the lawyers not be disciplined. Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Stenhach, No. 479, slip op. at
28 (Pa. Super. Ct. Disciplinary Bd. Aug. 8, 1989) (on file with author). Parts of the Discipli-
nary Board's opinion strongly suggest that the appellate court's interpretation of the ethics
rules is wrong and that the lawyers acted in accordance with those rules. "'By retaining the
evidence, Respondents protected their client's constitutional rights and by not tampering or
destroying the evidence and keeping the evidence where it could be readily recovered upon
lawful request, Respondents served their duty to the court.'" HAZARD & KONIAK, supra note
144, at 52 (quoting Stenhach, slip op. at 25).
Other parts suggest that the interpretation might be right but that the facts of this particu-
lar case make a penalty inappropriate. The Disciplinary Board emphasized that in trying the
Stenhach brothers' client, the prosecution chose, after the Stenhachs turned over the evidence,
not to introduce it against their client. "'Mhe integrity of the legal system was maintained [in
this case, and discipline is inappropriate] because there was no reason to believe the evidence
was of importance to the resolution of a disputed fact or the successful prosecution of Respon-
dent's client.'" Id (quoting Stenhach, slip op. at 27). This last bit of reasoning seems particu-
larly stretched when one considers that the Pennsylvania statutes on concealing evidence and
hindering prosecution make the admissibility of the evidence irrelevant. See 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. §§ 4910(1), 5105(a)(3) (1991).
Even though, according to the intermediate appellate court, these statutes do not apply to
lawyers, they express the state's general position that the legal system may be threatened by
inadmissible evidence, not to mention evidence that is admissible but not admitted. The Disci-
plinary Board's suggestion that the intermediate appellate court was wrong on the meaning of
the ethics rules is further evidence of my point that the bar's understanding of law is different
from the state's. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania did not have an opportunity to review
the Disciplinary Board's determination because no appeal was taken from the Disciplinary
Board's decision. Telephone Interview with John M. Dinguss and Kenneth M. Argentieri,
attorneys for the Stenhach brothers (Feb. 27, 1992).
348. Stenhach, 356 Pa. Super. at 26, 514 A.2d 124-25.
349. These boundary rules are grounded in state and federal constitutional precepts. The
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"deny due process in two ways:" by failing to "give fair notice to people
of ordinary intelligence that their contemplated activity may be unlaw-
ful" and by "inviting arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." ' The
rule against overbroad laws, however, is generally considered to be
grounded not in due process concerns, as the Stenhach court asserted,
but in the special need to protect free speech.
351
The overbreadth rule runs counter to rules on standing and the rule
against advisory opinions.3 2 Traditional state doctrine explains that
these normal rules of procedure give way to the overbreadth rule in cases
involving speech because speech is an especially important and peculiarly
vulnerable right. 3 In Stenhach the court used the overbreadth rule to
suspend normal procedural constraints apparently because the defend-
ants were criminal defense lawyers, who are "charged with the protec-
tion of [their clients'] fourth, fifth and sixth amendment rights."35 4 The
court thus freed the rule from its traditional First Amendment moorings.
rule against vague laws is grounded in the twin due process concerns that fair notice of what is
unlawful be given and that arbitrary enforcement of the laws be avoided. Constitutional rules
prohibiting ex post facto laws also reflect those two concerns. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 3.
The rule against overbroad laws prevents state law from "chilling" the exercise of constitu-
tional rights by striking down laws that arguably reach constitutionally protected activity. It is
almost exclusively used to protect First Amendment rights, see, e.g., Note, The First Amend-
ment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844, 860 (1970), although in theory it could be
used to protect other constitutional rights.
350. Stenhach, 356 Pa. Super. at 26, 514 A.2d at 124-25.
351. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J.
853, 859-63 (1990) (explaining that overbreadth is an exception to normal procedural rules
generally reserved to First Amendment cases).
352. The overbreadth doctrine allows a party to challenge a law by arguing that the law as
applied to someone else in some other context would be unconstitutional. Under the over-
breadth doctrine it is irrelevant whether the law as applied in the case before the court is
constitutional or not. The law is invalid if the court can imagine a situation in which it might
infringe constitutional rights. By definition, then, the overbreadth doctrine runs counter to the
rules on standing and the rules against advisory opinions. See generally Broadrick v.
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973) (explaining the exceptional nature of the overbreadth
doctrine). But cf Henry P. Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 Sup. CT. RE v. I (arguing that the
overbreadth doctrine, properly understood, involves first- and not third-party standing); Henry
P. Monaghan, Third Party Standing, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 277 (1984) (same).
353. See, e.g., Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615 (explaining that the overbreadth rule is limited to
laws that potentially infringe on constitutionally protected speech; moreover, when the law
regulates conduct along with speech, "the overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but
substantial as well"); see also Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 379-81 (1977) (refusing to use
the overbreadth rule in a case involving commercial speech-in fact, the commercial speech of
lawyers).
354. Stenhach, 356 Pa. Super. at 27, 514 A.2d at 125. I say "apparently" because the court
did not clearly separate the overbreadth concerns from the vagueness concerns. Id. Although
the claims of vagueness and overbreadth are often raised together, in theory they are different:
"[A] statute can be quite specific, i.e., not vague-and yet be overbroad." GERALD GUNTHER,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1202 (12th ed. 1991).
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This stretch might signify a strong commitment to the nomic autonomy
of the bar, amounting to an assertion that criminal law must tread ex-
tremely lightly in trying to punish lawyers (at least criminal defense law-
yers) for acts committed in the course of representing a client.355 But the
move here was ambiguous, and therefore weak, because the court never
acknowledged the special power of the overbreadth rule and avoided ex-
plaining with any particularity what triggered it here. 356 We are thus left
355. The argument that criminal laws not otherwise overbroad are overbroad when applied
to lawyers has been put forth by bar organizations. See Amicus Brief for the Massachusetts
Assoc. of Criminal Defense Lawyers and the National Network for the Right to Counsel at 21-
22, United States v. Cintolo, 818 F.2d 980 (lst Cir. 1987) (No. 85-1615). Cintolo is discussed
infra text accompanying notes 374-78.
356. The court gave only one concrete example of conduct that possibly comes within the
terms of the statute and which the Constitution arguably protects, i.e., conduct that would
render the statute overbroad. It is a lawyer's withholding of "a handwritten account of in-
volvement in the crime." Stenhach, 356 Pa. Super. at 26, 514 A.2d at 125. The court, how-
ever, did not explain why withholding such material would be protected conduct. The lawyer
might be privileged to withhold the handwritten account of the crime because the Supreme
Court has held that the attorney-client privilege protects material given to the lawyer by a
client when it would have been privileged under the Fifth Amendment had the client kept the
material herself. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 404-05 (1976). The catch is that
hardly any physical material in the hands of the client would be protected under the Court's
current approach to the Fifth Amendment. See HAZARD & KONIAX, supra note 144, at 215-
16. Thus, once one moves away from the "handwritten account of the crime" example, it is
difficult to find examples of physical material protected by the attorney-client privilege.
The Stenhach court did not explain any of this or even assert any of it. It merely states
that "no one would suggest the attorney should give [such evidence] to the prosecutor," assert-
ing without explanation that "to do so would be an egregious violation of the attorney's duties
to his client." Stenhach, 356 Pa. Super. at 27, 514 A.2d at 125. By failing to mention the
privilege, the court avoided explaining why the laws at issue in Stenhach could not have been
cured of any constitutional defect by limiting them to physical evidence not covered by the
privilege. Is the privilege itself too vague? Too limited to protect constitutional rights? All
this shows how ambiguous the court's cursory treatment of overbreadth was, how little legal
meaning it created.
Contrast Stenhach to Amusement Devices Ass'n v. Ohio, 443 F. Supp. 1040 (S.D. Ohio
1977), in which a three-judge panel held that an Ohio criminal statute that prohibited furnish-
ing legal services to a "criminal syndicate" for the purposes of maintaining it was unconstitu-
tionally overbroad and vague. Id at 1054. The court grounded its overbreadth analysis in the
First Amendment's protection of the associational rights of "syndicate" members and its par-
ticular protection of the right of individuals and groups to be protected from government
interference in the exercise of associational rights through access to counsel. Id By connect-
ing the overbreadth rule to the material world in this manner, the court demonstrated a
stronger commitment to the nomic autonomy of the bar than the Stenhach court did, and
rendered the rule a stronger boundary to state interference with the bar. Further, by explain-
ing what triggers the overbreadth analysis, it provided some shape to the boundary rule-a
shape that is a function of state law.
The Ohio court's discussion of vagueness also demonstrated a stronger commitment than
the court in Stenhach. As it did with the overbreadth rule, the court in Amusement Devices
turned the vagueness rule into a stronger boundary rule than it normally is by explaining why
the due process concerns that underlie the rule are especially implicated in this case:
Limiting the availability of pre-accusatory legal services to persons engaged in such a
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uncertain about the nature and shape of the boundary between lawyers
and the criminal laws.357
While in theory overbreadth decisions might demonstrate a strong
commitment, in practice they usually do not:
[The] attractiveness [of the overbreadth rule for the Court] may
be ... its relatively technical, tentative appearance. It strikes
down the law at the behest of challenger A without saying
much about the First Amendment dimensions of A's behavior;
it strikes down the law because of a possible application to third
party B not before the Court, an application that is often only
briefly discussed, rather than fully explored.358
Moreover, the rule against advisory opinions makes every decision that
regulated field can have a substantial and direct impact upon the accusatory and
post-accusatory stages of a criminal investigation.
... We are convinced that it is fundamentally unfair for a state on the one hand
to regulate with criminal sanctions certain modes of conduct, and on the other hand
to enact a penal statute which, because of its breadth and its lack ofdefinition, dis-
courages the rendering of legal services to persons in the regulated field.
Iai at 1052-53 (emphasis added). The court thus connected the vagueness rule to the material
world of the past and future; in doing so, it created legal meaning.
357. At the end of the decision in Stenhach the court noted "that other jurisdictions have
enacted criminal statutes which.., do not subject [criminal defense attorneys] to rules identi-
cal with those applicable to the public." Stenhach, 356 Pa. Super. at 31, 514 A.2d at 127. This
remark suggests a preference by the court, but certainly does not demand one. It is interesting
that the only jurisdiction the court cited as exempting lawyers in this way is Texas, which to
my knowledge is the only jurisdiction to have such a rule. See id. (citing Clark v. State, 159
Tex. Crim. 187, 261 S.W.2d 339, cert denied, 346 U.S. 855 (1953)).
Again, contrast Amusement Devices with Stenhach: "We do not decide whether the Gen-
eral Assembly of Ohio can regulate the practice of law with penal enactments. Nor do we hold
that all purely legal services are constitutionally protected; it may be that legislation drafted
with more precision could reach such activities without exceeding constitutional bounds."
Amusement Devices, 443 F. Supp. at 1054. This also leaves uncertain the barrier between
criminal law and the bar, but its language, consistent with the rest of that decision, suggests a
stronger commitment to the bar's nomic autonomy than that demonstrated in Stenhach.
Moreover, its language suggests a stronger commitment to the court's role in defining the
boundary between the state and the group.
358. GUNTHER, supra note 354, at 1193. See generally Fallon, supra note 351, at 853 (ar-
guing that the "overbreadth doctrine is frequently a far weaker potion than either its champi-
ons or its critics have appreciated").
Amusement Devices is a good example of the potential for, and limits of, demonstrating
commitment in an overbreadth decision. The court demonstrates strong commitment not only
in the ways discussed above, see supra note 356, but also in its refusal, relying on Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), to abstain from deciding the case. Amusement Devices, 443 F.
Supp. at 1053; cf Zalman v. Armstrong, 802 F.2d 199 (6th Cir. 1986) (using Younger to refuse
to decide a challenge to a similar Kentucky statute). Nonetheless, at the end of Amusement
Devices, one is still uncertain what conduct is constitutionally protected and what may be
reached by the state through its criminal laws. See supra note 357 (quoting from Amusement
Devices).
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rests on overbreadth grounds ironic, i.e., subject to the charge that it is
overbroad.
The second of the boundary rules in Stenhach, the vagueness rule,
may also signify a weak commitment to the creation of legal meaning. It
is "most frequently employed as an implement for curbing legislative in-
vasion of constitutional rights other than that of fair notice."3 59 By rest-
ing on general due process concerns about fair notice, the courts can
avoid elaborating on the substantive dimensions of the rights involved.3"
They do not commit themselves to any particular connection between the
normative and material worlds. They create little law.
In Stenhach the use of the vagueness rule is particularly ironic.361
The first half of the decision is devoted to explaining what the second
half of the decision contends is too vague to be explained-i.e., what a
lawyer should do with incriminating physical evidence.362 It is also
ironic that the court cited the "distressing paucity of dispositive prece-
dent ' 363 as one reason for holding that the law was vague, given that the
court relies (in the first half of the case) on that precedent to state what a
lawyer should do and given the ambiguous precedent it created in this
decision.
Most interesting, the court found the law vague in part because
"[v]olumes are filled with.., potential sources of guidance [other than
court decisions], such as ethical codes and comments thereto ... and
359. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme
Court, 109 U. PA. L. Rnv. 67, 87-88 (1960).
360. But see Amusement Devices, 443 F. Supp. at 1052 (connecting the vagueness rule to
the normative and material issues in the case).
361. In general, decisions resting on the vagueness rule are ironic. As Amsterdam put it,
"[There is] an actual vagueness component in the vagueness decisions." Amsterdam, supra
note 359, at 88.
362. In the first half of the decision the court reviewed case law from other jurisdictions
and found that the lawyers did wrong. It explained what they should have done differently:
[A] criminal defense attorney in possession of physical evidence incriminating his
client may, after a reasonable time for examination, return it to its source if he can do
so without hindering the apprehension, prosecution, conviction or punishment of an-
other and without altering, destroying or concealing it or impairing its verity or
availability in any pending or imminent investigation or proceeding. Otherwise, he
must deliver it to the prosecution ....
Stenhach, 356 Pa. Super. at 23-24, 514 A.2d at 123. In the second half of the opinion, the
court asserted that one reason the law here is void for vagueness is that no one can actually tell
what a lawyer should do in such situations: "Beyond the obvious example stated above [con-
cerning a client's handwritten account of involvement in the crime, see supra note 356], there is
little or no guidance for an attorney to know when he has crossed the invisible line into an area
of criminal behavior." Stenhach, 356 Pa. Super. at 27, 514 A.2d at 125.
363. Stenhach, 356 Pa. Super. at 27, 514 A.2d at 125.
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myriad articles in legal periodicals. ' '314 This sentence suggests that it is
in fact the plethora of law, not the paucity of it, that makes the lawyer's
obligation vague. And what the court refused to say explicitly is that
those "other sources" are for the most part inconsistent with the law the
court found in the court cases365 and on which it relied in the first half of
the opinion. The real vagueness is thus not a function of "too little law"
but of "too much law."13" Faced with legal interpretations that line up-
other sources (read: bar law) on one side and court cases (read: state
law) on the other-the court refused to commit itself to either side.
Thus, it affirmed neither state law nor the bar's nomic autonomy.
The Stenhach opinion is also important because in discussing other
court decisions it provides evidence of how common weak court commit-
ment is. The court in Stenhach noticed that while virtually all of the
court opinions agreed that incriminating physical evidence should be de-
livered to the prosecution, all "express a great deal of doubt.., as to the
grayer areas of ethical usage of evidence of all sorts. ' 367 Moreover, the
court's summary of the case law shows that court doubt is always great-
est when the court must decide whether to use force against lawyers to
back its law.368
There are numerous other examples of the courts' weak commit-
ment in cases involving the law governing lawyers: cases in which the
court refuses to use force to back its interpretation; 369 cases in which the
364. Id.
365. For example, the court described three articles as "helpful and noteworthy." Id. at 30
& n.3, 514 A.2d at 127 & n.3 (citing Stephanie J. Frye, Comment, Disclosure of Incriminating
Physical Evidence Received from a Client: The Defense Attorney's Dilemma, 52 U. COLO, L.
REV. 419 (1981); Jane M. Graffeo, Note, Ethics, Law and Loyalty: The Attorney's Duty to
Turn over Incriminating Physical Evidence, 32 STAN. L. REv. 977 (1980); Comment, The
Right of a Criminal Defense Attorney to Withhold Physical Evidence Received from His Client,
38 U. CHI. L. REv. 211 (1970)). The first two of these articles disagree with the law the court
explicates in the first half of the opinion and with the law that the court finds is accepted by
virtually all courts to have considered the question. See id. at 23-24, 514 A.2d at 123.
366. See supra note 2.
367. Stenhach, 356 Pa. Super. at 27, 514 A.2d at 125.
368. 1d, at 28-29, 514 A.2d at 125-26 (quoting People v. Belge, 83 Misc. 2d 186, 189, 372
N.Y.S.2d 798, 801 (Onondaga County Ct.) (threatening lawyers with criminal prosecution),
aff'd, 50 A.D.2d 1088, 376 N.Y.S.2d 771 (App. Div. 1975), aff'd, 41 N.Y.2d 60, 359 N.E.2d
377 (1976); In re Gartley, 341 Pa. Super. 350, 365-67, 491 A.2d 851, 859-60 (1985) (state
wanting to search lawyer's office for evidence)).
369. See, e.g., In re Thompson, 416 F. Supp. 991, 996 (S.D. Tex. 1976) (refusing to hold
lawyer in contempt of court's order of discharge in bankruptcy, although his threats against
discharged bankrupt on behalf of unsecured creditor were "inexcusable and in obvious disre-
gard of the purposes" of the Bankruptcy Act); Mozzochi v. Beck, 204 Conn. 490, 497, 529
A.2d 171, 174 (1987) (holding that lawyers who breach their duty "to their clients and to the
judicial system" by filing suit after learning that the allegations are wholly without merit are
not liable for abuse of process because "[a]ny other rule would ineluctably interfere with the
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court refuses to create legal meaning;370 cases using temporary or inher-
ently weak boundary rules; 371 and cases in which the court suggests that
the bar's understanding of law controls the court's interpretation.372
attorney's primary duty of robust representation"); In re Corboy, 124 Ill. 2d 29, 45, 528
N.E.2d 694, 701 (1988) (imposing no sanction because the lawyers "acted without guidance of
precedent or settled opinion, and there was, apparently, considerable belief among members of
the bar that they had acted properly"); Herbster v. North Am. Co. for Life & Health Ins., 150
Ill. App. 3d 21, 30, 501 N.E.2d 343, 348 (1986) (holding that in-house counsel cannot sue
client for wrongful discharge when fired for refusing to break state law), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
860 (1987).
In In re Carter, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 82,847 (SEC Feb. 28,
1981), the SEC reversed an administrative law judge's decision to suspend two lawyers from
practicing before the SEC, holding that while it was "a close judgment" whether the lawyers
had aided and abetted securities fraud, id at 84,167, and while they had acted improperly
under the interpretation of rule 2(e) set forth by the SEC in this opinion, id. at 84,169-72,
discipline was not appropriate because "generally accepted norms of professional conduct...
did not... unambiguously cover the situation in which [the lawyers] found themselves," id at
84,173. Notice that the conduct, which the SEC says was not clearly understood by the bar to
be improper, is conduct that the SEC finds to be almost enough to constitute criminal activity
under the securities laws. In a forceful dissent from the SEC's refusal to discipline the lawyers,
Commissioner Evans criticized the incoherence of the SEC's position and the weak commit-
ment it demonstrates to state law. Id at 84,173-78 (Evans, Comm'r, concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
370. One striking example of this phenomenon is provided by In re Grand Jury Subpoena
(Reyes-Requena), 926 F.2d 1423 (5th Cir. 1991). In that case the Fifth Circuit refused to say
whether and when a trial court should grant a hearing to determine whether a lawyer refusing
to answer questions before a grand jury has a valid claim of attorney-client privilege. Id. at
1433. The court said the issue was moot because the trial court had ultimately granted a
hearing and upheld the lawyer's claim of privilege. Id at 1425.
The use of the "mootness" doctrine to avoid making law in Reyes-Requena is striking,
given what the lawyer had to endure at the hands of the trial court before the court sustained
the claim of privilege. The trial court first denied the claim of privilege on several occasions.
Id. at 1427. It refused the lawyer's request for a hearing on three occasions. Id at 1427-28. It
granted several of the government's motions to compel the lawyer to answer the questions. Id
Faced with the lawyer's continued resistance, the trial court finally gave in, held a hearing, and
reversed its initial determination on the question of privilege. Id at 1425-29. In light of this
history, to hold that the question of when a lawyer is entitled to a hearing is moot shows an
extreme reluctance to create legal meaning. See also United States v. Feaster, No. 87-1340,
1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 4953, at *6 (6th Cir. Apr. 15, 1988) (holding that a lawyer was prop-
erly charged with a crime for advising an undercover agent, posing as a client, on how to avoid
paying taxes), cert denied, 488 U.S. 898 (1988); Barker v. Henderson, 797 F.2d 490, 497 (7th
Cir. 1986) (refusing to discuss "[t]he extent to which lawyers ... should reveal their clients'
wrongdoing-and to whom they should reveal," noting that "[t]he professions and the regula-
tory agencies will debate questions raised by cases such as this one for years to come").
371. See, e.g., Reyes-Requena, 926 F.2d at 1426-27 (mootness); Financial Gen. Bankshares,
Inc. v. Metzger, 680 F.2d 768, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ("[Ihe unsettled nature of District of
Columbia law regarding the fiduciary duties of an attorney to a client" rendered it an abuse of
discretion by the district court to decide that pendent-jurisdiction claim.").
372. See, e.g., United States v. Klubock, 832 F.2d 649, 654 (1st Cir. 1987) (en banc) (four
judges stating that local court rule adopting bar's understanding of when and how lawyers are
to be called before grand juries is valid, despite lack of support in case law or federal proce-
dural rules for such limits on the grand jury, because the "fundamental underlying problem
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There are, of course, counter-examples. 73 For example, in United
States v. Cintolo374 bar organizations arguing as amici asked the court to
overturn a lawyer's conviction for obstruction of justice because, unlike
other people, lawyers should not be liable for obstructing justice when
the means used to do so are themselves lawful. To allow an intent to
obstruct justice to turn lawful activity into unlawful activity, they ar-
gued, would be overbroad as applied to "criminal defense attorneys-
indeed [as applied to] all lawyers-[who would then] be 'chilled' from
undertaking legal maneuvers and tactics the success of which is in
doubt., 375
In Cintolo the lawyer's "lawful" act was advising his client to refuse
to testify before the grand jury when the client had a valid grant of im-
... is an ethical one"). Citing bar reports and recommendations, the four judges in Klubock
concluded that "[t]he subpoenaing of attorney/witnesses ... appears to present ethical con-
cerns of a widespread nature." Id. at 657; see also Barker, 797 F.2d at 497 ("fAin award of
damages under the securities laws is not the way to blaze the trail toward improved ethical
standards in the legal and accounting professions.... The securities law.., must lag behind
changes in ethical and fiduciary standards."); Florida Bar v. Rubin, 549 So. 2d 1000, 1003
(Fla. 1989) ("If [the lawyer] had been cited for violation of the Code [of Professional Responsi-
bility] for following the [court's order], his good faith reliance on the trial court's order and the
mandate of the district court would have been a good, and most likely a complete, defense."
(emphasis added)).
373. See, eg., In re Grand Jury Subpoenas ex rel. United States v. Anderson, 906 F.2d
1485, 1499 (10th Cir. 1990) (upholding district court order jailing lawyers for contempt for
refusing to reveal the source of their fees to the grand jury, and rejecting lawyers' argument
that their refusal was justified by their ethical obligations); Parker v. M & T Chems., Inc., 236
N.J. Super. 451, 463, 566 A.2d 215, 222 (1989) (allowing in-house counsel to sue for damages
when fired for refusing to help client break the law); Tennessee v. Jones, 726 S.W.2d 515, 521
(Tenn. 1987) (holding that lawyer could be held in contempt of court for refusing to obey a
court order that correctly rejected the rule and reasoning of an ethics opinion upon which the
lawyer relied, notwithstanding the lawyer's "lofty motivation and respectful and impeccable
conduct").
For an example of strong court commitment that also reveals the active clash between the
bar's normative vision and the court's, see In re Solerwitz, 848 F.2d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 1004 (1989). In Solerwitz, despite testimony by three "experts in the field of
legal ethics" that the lawyer's conduct was proper, the court held that "clear and convincing
evidence [showed] that [the lawyer's] continued course of conduct in filing and maintaining
multiple frivolous appeals in the face of this court's orders, notices, instructions, rules, prece-
dents and previous sanctions" was improper and justified a one-year suspension. Id. at 1576,
1578. As for the ethics experts' testimony to the contrary, the court quoted with approval the
trial judge's assessment: " '[W]hile based in part on established tenets of the legal profession,
[their views] do not fully outline the duties of a lawyer ....."" Id. at 1577 (quoting trial judge).
Specifically, the experts ignored case law upon which the court relied. Id. (citing In re
Bithoney, 486 F.2d 319 (1st Cir. 1973)).
374. 818 F.2d 980 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 913 (1987).
375. Brief for the Massachusetts Assoc. of Criminal Defense Lawyers and the National
Network for the Right to Counsel as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant at 3, Cintolo (No. 85-
1615).
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munity.3 76 The corrupt intent was proved by introducing tape record-
ings that showed that the lawyer had reported regularly to third parties
(allegedly organized crime figures whom the lawyer also represented) on
whether the primary client would keep quiet to protect those people from
indictment and that the lawyer was present when those people discussed
plans to kill the client should he decide to talk.37
In a demonstration of strong commitment, the court soundly re-
jected the view of the amici bar groups:
The appellant and amici pay lip service to th[e] principle
[that a corrupt motive can transform lawful acts into unlawful
ones], but maintain that different considerations come into play
where criminal defense lawyers are concerned. In those [situa-
tions], they assert a corrupt motive may not be found in con-
duct which is, itself, not independently illegal . . . . [T]he
conversion of innocent acts to guilty ones by the addition of
improper intent-is what this case is all about....
Nothing in the caselaw ... suggests that lawyers should be
plucked gently from the madding crowd and sheltered from the
rigors of 18 U.S.C. § 1503 [obstruction-of-justice statute]. 78
Although detecting trends in something as complex as the degree of
state commitment is a difficult business, there are many indications that
the commitment is increasing.371 On the other hand, given how perva-
376. Cintolo, 818 F.2d at 984.
377. Id. at 984-89.
378. Id. at 992-93 (emphasis added); see also United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854, 863
(2d Cir. 1964) (affirming the criminal convictions of a lawyer and an accountant for mail fraud
and conspiring with their client to commit securities fraud). In Benjamin the court wrote:
In our complex society the accountant's certificate and the lawyer's opinion can be
instruments for inflicting pecuniary loss more potent than the chisel or the crowbar.
Of course, Congress did not mean that any mistake of law or misstatement of fact
should subject an attorney or an accountant to criminal liability simply because more
skillful practitioners would not have made them. But Congress equally could not
have intended that men holding themselves out as members of these ancient profes-
sions should be able to escape criminal liability on a plea of ignorance when they
have shut their eyes to what was plainly to be seen or have represented a knowledge
they knew they did not possess.
Id.
379. The Supreme Court's decision in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 793
(1975), holding that activities of a mandatory bar association are not exempt from the antitrust
laws, may be one of the first and most significant signs of an increased commitment to the role
of state law vis-a-vis the profession. Another important sign is the significant erosion in the
traditional rule that a lack of privity prevents third parties from suing lawyers for negligence.
See Greycas v. Proud, 826 F.2d 1560 (7th Cir.), cerL denied, 484 U.S. 1043 (1987); Lucas v.
Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685 (1961) (en banc), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962).
The 1983 amendment of rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the adoption
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sive and longstanding the practice of low commitment has been and how
sympathetic to the bar's vision many judges are, I would not predict a
complete about-face in the immediate future.380
B. The Bar's Commitment. Texts of Resistance
Whenever a community resists ... some.., law of the
state, it necessarily enters into a secondary hermeneutic-the
interpretation of the texts of resistance.381
As we have seen, the bar's sacred stories predict a crisis between a
lawyer's obligations to her client and the demands of state law put forth
by prosecutors, judges and other state actors. The stories glorify resist-
ance to such demands, but at the same time they emphasize the extreme
risks of resistance-risks, that is, to the hero-lawyers, not risks to the
state. Indeed, in the bar's stories the state is not threatened by the law-
yer's resistance but saved by it. On the other hand, the lawyer, in the
name of redeeming the state (and its law) and/or in the name of protect-
ing the individual's freedom and dignity, is threatened with loss of life or
liberty.
382
Thus, the central theme in the bar's narratives is a theme of resist-
of similar rules in the states may be another sign of the courts' increased commitment to its
vision of lawyering. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (holding lawyers to a greater level of candor in plead-
ings and other court papers); see generally 1 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 255, at 544-46
(discussing the changes in the rule).
The commitment of state actors, outside of the judicial branch, appears to be increasing in
a more dramatic fashion. In March 1992 the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) sought $275
million in restitution from a New York law firm that had represented Charles Keating's now-
defunct Lincoln Savings and Loan, claiming that the firm had unlawfully concealed informa-
tion about its client from bank examiners. Edward A. Adams, Agency Sues Kaye Scholerfor
$275 Million, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 3, 1992, at 1. More significant, the OTS invoked its power to
freeze most of the law'firm's assets. Id. The firm settled with the OTS, agreeing to pay $41
million, but refused to admit wrongdoing. See Jolie Solomon, U.S. Did In S&L Adviser by the
Book, BosToN GLOBE, Mar. 10, 1992, at 35; see also George C. Kern, Jr., Exchange Act
Release No. 29,356, 1991 SEC LEXIS 1222, 1991 WL 284795 (S.E.C.) (June 21, 1991) (an-
nouncing the SEC's intention to renew efforts to discipline securities lawyers who "cause" or
help their clients in the violation of securities laws). If the courts' commitment to their role as
official and final arbiters of such clashes between state actors and the profession does not in-
crease apace, we may find ourselves in the worst of all possible worlds. See supra text accom-
panying note 331.
380. See the more recent cases cited supra notes 369-72.
381. Cover, Nomos, supra note 1, at 49.
382. Recently, attorney William Kunstler invoked this theme when the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that he should be sanctioned under rule 11 for his
conduct in suing state prosecutors for harassing Native American activists. In re Kunstler
(Robeson Def. Comm. v. Britt), 914 F.2d 505, 525 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1007
(1991). As reported in the ABA Journal, Kunstler, who asked the Supreme Court to hear the
case said: "'I'll tell you this: I'm not going to pay any fine. I'm going to rot in jail if that's
what I have to do to dramatize this thing. I think I could do no better thing for my country.'"
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ance, but one which, by emphasizing the extreme risks attendant upon
disobedience, suggests caution and invites further interpretation by the
community-interpretation that elaborates the circumstances in which
resistance is the appropriate response, the degrees of resistance de-
manded, and the degrees of resistance authorized in this nomos.38 3 Texts
of resistance normally include both an interpretation of the community's
law that explains whether (and, if so, why) a norm demands protection
from the acts of the state or other communities (I will call this interpreta-
tion primary), and an interpretation of how much resistance is required
and how much is authorized in the name of the norm (a secondary inter-
pretation).38 4 In the bar's texts of resistance, the primary interpretation
usually centers on the norm of confidentiality, which, as we have seen is
the norm that most often triggers a call for resistance. The content of the
primary interpretation has already been suggested above 85 and will not
be reviewed here, but it is important to keep in mind that the bar's texts
of resistance generally devote much time and attention to recounting the
importance of the norm of confidentiality and the reasons for resisting
the state's infringement of it.
Having recounted these reasons for resistance, the bar texts shift to
discussing and justifying the moves of resistance. It is in this secondary
interpretation that we find the bar's understanding of its obligation to the
state and its law. The texts do not deny the obligation; they interpret it.
The questions at the heart of these texts are what counts as state law and
what counts as an authoritative interpretation of that law. In other
words, they provide the bar's understanding of what is and what is not
legitimate state law for purposes of the obligation to obey. In the bar's
nomos, the obligation to obey state law is significantly qualified by the
Don J. DeBenedictis, Rule 11 Snags Lawyers, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1991, at 16, 17 (quoting
Kunstler).
383. As Professor Cover wrote:
Bentham could criticize natural rights phraseology as "nonsense on stilts;" he could
assert its tendency to "impel a man, by that force of conscience to rise up in arms
against any law whatever that he happens not to like," because, in characteristic
fashion, Bentham failed to recognize that texts of resistance, like all texts, are always
subject to an interpretative process that limits the situations in which resistance is a
legitimate response.
Cover, Nomos, supra note 1, at 50 (quoting Jeremy Bentham, A Critical Examination of the
Declaration of Rights, in BENTHAM'S POLITICAL THOUGHT 257, 269 (Bhikhu Parekh ed.,
1973)).
384. By using the term "secondary" I mean to recall Professor Cover's reference to a "sec-
ondary hermeneutic." See supra text accompanying note 381. I do not mean to suggest by the
use of the word "secondary" that this interpretation is less important in establishing the con-
tours of a nomos.
385. See, eg., supra notes 119-27 and accompanying text.
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bar's interpretation of what counts as state law for purposes of this norm.
Implicit through much of this Article, this point must be made explicit
here because it is critical to understanding the divergence between the
bar's and the state's understanding of law: if the bar counted as state law
everything the state counts as state law for purposes of interpreting the
duty to obey state law, bar law would incorporate state law and the ten-
sion between the two normative worlds would be alleviated. The courts
understand the ethics precept containing the duty to obey law this way
and they thereby reconcile bar and state law.386 In the bar's nomos, on
the other hand, the duty to obey state law functions more as a boundary
rule than a rule of reconciliation, and the shape of this boundary is deter-
mined for the bar by its interpretation of what counts as legitimate state
law and legitimate interpretation of that law.
Before describing the bar's interpretation of what counts as state law
and the various moves of resistance in the bar's repertoire, two common
characteristics in the texts of resistance of groups that claim nomic au-
tonomy warrant our attention. First is the plea to be spared the crisis of
choosing between group law and state law.387 This plea expresses the
understanding of all such groups that their existence within the state is
contingent on the state's toleration. Insular nomic communities may
choose to exit from the state should the state's accommodation to their
vision prove insufficient on the group's terms, but the bar, dependent as it
is on the state for definition and purpose, cannot exit. 388 Like other com-
munities that seek to redeem the state by transforming state law to fit the
group's vision, the bar must win or see its nomos (and itself) forever
transformed or destroyed. The crisis for redemptive groups is, if any-
thing, more critical because, for the group, everything turns on its resolu-
tion.389 Bar texts often appeal to the state not to place members "in the
untenable position of either violating their professional and ethical re-
sponsibilities, or incurring the risk of civil or criminal sanctions." '90
386. See, eg., supra text accompanying note 343.
387. See, eg., Brief of Amicus Curiae in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari on
Behalf of Church of God in Christ, Mennonite at 3-4, Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461
U.S. 574 (1983) (No. 81-3), quoted in Cover, Nomos, supra note 1, at 27. "When [our reli-
gious] beliefs collide with the demands of society, our highest allegiance must be toward God,
and we must say with men of God of the past, 'We must obey God rather than men', and these
are the crisis (sic] from which we would be spared." Id. at 4 (quoting Acts 5:29).
388. For a discussion of the differences between insular nomic communities and redemp-
tive ones, see Cover, Nomos, supra note 1, at 35-40.
389. For a brilliant examination of how one such redemptive group, the American labor
movement, had its vision and itself transformed after continued confrontation with the state,
see William E. Forbath, The Shaping of the American Labor Movement, 102 HARV. L. REV.
1109 (1989).
390. Florida Bar, Resolution on Section 60501 of the Internal Revenue Code (1989). Such
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This plea asks the state to exercise caution and engage in further inter-
pretation to avoid the crisis. In effect it says to the state, "You act to
redeem yourself and your law so that we do not have to risk being de-
stroyed for your sake."
Second, texts of resistance typically stop short of requiring resist-
ance. Instead of speaking of what one "must" do, they speak of what one
"ought" to do. This move to the "ought" is not, however, necessarily
indicative of weak commitment. When the state refuses to use force in
the name of its law-when it refuses to speak of "must" and resorts to
"ought"-we may infer a weak commitment because the state is licensed
to use force and thus the presumption is that when it "means it" it will
use that force. Of course, even the state runs some risk when it chooses
to use force in the name of its interpretations because its monopoly on
violence is imperfect; revolution is always a possibility, however re-
mote,3 91 and massive disobedience, which raises an important challenge
to the state's legitimacy, is another considerably less remote possibil-
ity.392 For the state the greater risk is posed, however, by not demon-
strating commitment to its law because it thus concedes a critical
attribute of sovereignty. Conversely, for the group, particularly a re-
demptive group, the greater risk is posed by demonstrating (or insisting
that its members demonstrate) too strong a commitment to its law: if the
group's commitment is strong enough, the state may effectively, if not
literally, kill off those who dare to live the group's vision of law and the
vision of law with them. The power of the state "put[s] a high price on
[the group's] interpretations. But an 'economic' approach here is mis-
leading. For the understanding of law is the projection not only of what
we would in fact do... , but also of what we ought to do."3 93 Communi-
ties, unlike the state, thus typically express their commitment in terms of
what "ought" to be done, not what must be done. To do otherwise
would be to risk weakening the commitment of individual members of
pleas are nearly incomprehensible according to the state's understanding of the hierarchy of
norms, which includes an understanding that the duty to obey state law trumps other ethics
rules. See, eg., Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 633 n.10 (1989)
(responding to the bar's pleas that a federal statute conflicted with lawyers' ethical obligations
by stating that even if the forfeiture of attorney fees "is at odds with model disciplinary rules or
state disciplinary codes," that "hardly renders the federal statute invalid"). In a nomos in
which the general hierarchy of norms is different and the obligation to obey state law con-
tained in the ethics rules has a different and lower status, however, the plea has meaning.
391. Some of the antebellum decisions of the Supreme Court on slavery show a concern
with avoiding revolution. See, eg., Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539, 609, 611-12 (1842).
392. See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 678-747 (1975) (discussing the concern of
the justices of the Supreme Court that an order to desegregate the schools would be met with
massive disobedience).
393. Cover, Nomos, supra note 1, at 50.
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the group to the nomos by imposing on them obligations of extreme hero-
ism. We must then judge the group's commitment by how willing it is to
say one "ought" to resist, not how willing it is to demand resistance.
In the bar's texts of resistance, after deciding that something the
state calls "law" conflicts with bar law (a question that is resolved in the
primary interpretation in the text), the question becomes: is that trouble-
some thing, which the state calls law, law for purposes of the lawyer's
obligation to obey? The first interpretive move is that legislation and
regulation conflicting with bar law are not "law" for purposes of this
norm. The comment to rule 1.6 itself suggests this move by omitting
reference to legislation and regulation. It reads: "The lawyer must com-
ply with the final orders of a court or other tribunal of competent juris-
diction requiring the lawyer to give information about the client."3 94 It
may be that the bar treats judicial decisions as a higher form of law, in
part because it regards judges as semi-brothers and hence mediators be-
tween the state and the bar. The point here is that what counts as law is
limited by this first interpretive move.
While neither legislation nor regulation is law that requires obedi-
ence, bar texts emphasize that their nonlaw status is strictly limited to
the extent that they conflict with bar law and no further. For example,
while client confidentiality, according to the bar, precludes a lawyer from
complying with tax law and regulations that require the lawyer to pro-
vide the client's name and other identifying information, "confidentiality
... do[es] not relieve the lawyer of the statutory duty to file [the required
form] .... ,,395 It "must still be filed, but the lawyer should insert. . . in
place of the client's name... a statement that the lawyer and the client
are asserting client confidentiality, the attorney-client privilege and, if ap-
plicable, the Fifth and Sixth Amendment privileges."3 96 Resistance is to
be tailored to contest the "invalid" portion of the legislation or regulation
and should not otherwise show disrespect to the state's legislation or
regulation.
3 97
Moreover, while for the bar neither legislation nor regulation is
"law" for purposes of the duty to obey (when they conflict with bar law),
394. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuCT Rule 1.6 cmt. (1991).
395. Ethics Advisory Comm. of the Natl Ass'n of Crim. Def. Lawyers, Formal Op. 89-1
(1989); see also State Bar of Wis., Formal Op. E-90-3 (1990) (approving and incorporating
NACDL Op. 89-1).
396. Ethics Advisory Comm. of the Natl Ass'n of Crim. Def. Lawyers, Formal Op. 89-1
(1989).
397. Id. The opinion explains what the lawyer should do if she receives a letter from the
IRS asking her to supply the information omitted from the form: "[T]he lawyer should re-
spond to the letter and state in clear and respectful terms the nature of the objection to provid-
ing the information and the legal bases for it." Id.
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bar texts typically distinguish between the two; the obligation to resist
regulation is generally greater than the obligation to resist legislation.
For example, the Statement of Policy adopted by the ABA House of
Delegates on the duties of lawyers to comply with the securities laws
states:
[A]ny principle of law which, except as permitted or required
by the [Code of Professional Responsibility], permits or obliges
a lawyer to disclose to the S.E.C. otherwise confidential infor-
mation should be established only by statute after full and care-
ful consideration of the public interests involved and should be
resisted unless clearly mandated by law.39
Implicitly, this suggests that greater resistance is owed to SEC regula-
tions inconsistent with bar law than to legislation, which must be resisted
too, but not if "clearly mandated by law." How one decides whether
legislation is "clearly mandated by law" is not fully described by this
ABA Statement, although a suggestion of the bar's answer is provided in
the last paragraph of the opinion, which bemoans the possibility that
lawyers would be deterred in the exercise of their responsibilities to their
clients by either an "erroneous position of the S.E.C. or a questionable
lower court decision." '3 99 Thus, we may infer that an interpretation of
legislation that conflicts with the bar's law and that is supported by only
a lower court decision is not "clearly mandated by law."
This brings us to the bar's next interpretive problem, whether court
orders and decisions are law that must be obeyed. It is at this point that
we may gauge the true nature of the bar's commitment, for at this point
the state's use of force may be imminent.' The comment to rule 1.6
states that lawyers "must comply with the final orders of a court or other
tribunal of competent jurisdiction."''" The qualifications in this sen-
tence---"fnal orders" and "competent jurisdiction"-are important in-
dicators of the bar's understanding. Generally, bar texts of resistance
allow a lawyer to comply with court orders, but do not require that she
do so.4 2 For example, the ABA has explained its understanding of the
398. ABA Policy on Advising on Securities Matters, supra note 150, at 1086 (emphasis
added).
399. Id. (emphasis added).
400. I say "may be" because although standard state doctrine provides that one may be
jailed for violating even an unconstitutional court order. Walker v. Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307,
319-21 (1967). When it comes to lawyers who assert "ethical" grounds (or, in our terms, "bar
law") to justify noncompliance, the courts are quite reluctant to use force or to authorize its
use to affirm the trial court's authority.
401. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 cmt. (1991).
402. E.g., Alabama State Bar, Op. 88-76, summarized in [Ethics Opinions 1986-1990]
Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 901:1046 (Sept. 1, 1988) ("If ordered to testify by
the court, the lawyer may either do so or may seek appellate relief."); Virginia State Bar, Op.
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ethics rules as follows:
If the motion to quash is denied, the lawyer must either
testify or run the risk of being held in contempt....
The lawyer has an ethical duty to preserve client confi-
dences and to test any interference with that duty in court....
If a contempt citation is upheld on appeal, however, the
lawyer has little choice but to testify or go to jail. Both the
Model Rules and the Model Code recognize that a lawyer's eth-
ical duty to preserve client confidences gives way to final court
orders. 4 3
Notice that while this quote carefully avoids explicitly requiring
resistance, the message is clear that a lawyer should resist-at least, she
should resist a lower court order: ethical duty "gives way" according to
the text only after a final court order, and "final court orders" are, ac-
cording to the quote, orders of an appellate court. Even more telling of
the bar's commitment to its law than the strong encouragement to resist
lower court orders is the suggestion that bar law "gives way" to appellate
orders not because they are legitimate and authoritative interpretations
but because the state at this point is extremely likely to use force: "the
lawyer may have little choice but to testify or go to jail."'  It is accom-
modation pure and simple that is being expressed, not concession to the
appellate court's role as authoritative interpreter of its law.
The view that it is the state's force and not its interpretation or its
right to interpret that relieves a lawyer of the obligation to resist appel-
late orders is also expressed by the bar's understanding of the reach of
such orders. Bar texts do not contain any suggestion of an obligation to
check controlling precedent in the relevant jurisdiction before deciding
whether to comply." Moreover, given the weight of authority on such
787 (1986) (stating that a lawyer subpoenaed to testify about a client confidence must present a
motion to quash the subpoena and may testify only if the motion is denied); see the ethics
opinions cited supra notes 133-134.
403. Disclosure: Lawyer Subpoenas, [Manual] Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA)
55:1301, 55:1307 (Oct. 25, 1989) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). While I have omitted
the citations to court cases in this quotation, I want to point out that the text is scrupulous in
its citation of court cases that justify the position of the text. This attention to court cases that
justify resistance is typical in the bar's texts of resistance. When, after all, could it be more
important to demonstrate loyalty and attention to state law than at the moment that one is
claiming to be resisting state law in the name of redeeming state law?
404. Id.
405. Some bar opinions, although not all, emphasize that the lawyer's right to disobey a
trial court order exists only so long as a "good faith argument" may be made that the order is
wrong. See, eg., Kentucky Bar Ass'n, Op. 315 (1987). But these opinions do not define "good
faith argument." For a glimpse of how broad this term might be in the bar's nomos, see the
bar's position cited in Golden Eagle Distributing Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531,
1540 & n.4 (9th Cir. 1986). I have found no bar opinion explicitly stating that a lawyer should
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issues as whether a client's identity or the fees she paid her attorney are
privileged,4 "6 it is clearly the message of these bar texts that court deci-
sions contrary to bar law are to be understood as having decided the
question before them and no more. As the NACDL put it in testifying
before Congress: "Our members will litigate these issues at every turn
"407
This posture "is an attempt to separate completely the projection of
understanding from the decree that is the direct exercise of court power.
Such separation allows one to 'acquiesce' by refraining from resistance
while simultaneously refusing to extend the social range of the Court's
hermeneutic." 4 8 The efficacy of this move is dependent on the level of
the courts' commitment. Courts, after all, have the means to insist that
their interpretations are projected into the future: injunctions. But the
likelihood of the courts using such a tool against lawyers is remote, given
how weakly committed they are to their role when they find themselves
at odds with the bar.' The bar's commitment, on the other hand, is, as
we have just seen, strong. It is the interaction of these two levels of com-
mitment that allows the divergence in normative understanding to
continue.
VIII. CONCLUSION
If I have demonstrated a lack of sympathy for the bar's normative
understanding, it is neither from a desire to curtail divergent understand-
ings of law nor from a belief that in all or even most respects the state's
vision is morally superior to the bar's or more in line with my political
consider the relevant authority in the jurisdiction in deciding what is a good-faith argument
upon which one can rely to resist state law.
406. See supra note 64.
407. Hearings, supra note 48, at 204 (statement of Alan Ellis, President-Elect of the Na-
tional Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers).
408. Cover, Nomos, supra note 1, at 54 n.146. Professor Cover was discussing Lincoln's
famous remarks on the Dred Scott decision. See Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393
(1857). Professor Cover quoted the President:
"I do not resist [Dred Scott]. If I wanted to take Dred Scott from his master, I
would be interfering with property... But I am doing no such thing as that, but all
that I am doing is refusing to obey it as a political rule. If I were in Congress, and a
vote should come up on a question whether slavery should be prohibited in a new
territory, in spite of that Dred Scott decision, I would vote that it should."
Cover, Nomos, supra note 1, at 54 n.146 (quoting speech by Abraham Lincoln in Chicago,
Illinois (July 10, 1858), reprinted in 2 ABRAHAM LINCOLN, THE COLLECTED WORKS OF
ABRAHAM LINCOLN 484,495 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953)). Professor Cover explained that what
Lincoln was saying is that "[o]ur future actions are to be governed by our own understanding,
not the Court's." Id
409. Contrast the court's use of the injunction against the labor movement and the power
of that tool to kill that group's existing vision of law. See Forbath, supra note 389, at 1148-78.
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views. As to normative understandings that diverge from the state's, I
believe we should welcome them because, as my teacher put it, "Il]egal
meaning is a challenging enrichment of social life, a potential restraint on
arbitrary power and violence."41 0 I believe, therefore, that "[w]e ought
to stop circumscribing the nomos; we ought to invite new worlds." '411
Moreover, the "we" in Professor Cover's sentences and in mine in-
cludes not just those of us in private life, but those in the courts as well.
Thus, my implicit criticism of the courts' weak commitment in this area
of law should not be read as an invitation for courts to expand dramati-
cally the normative space accorded state law. The courts' commitment
could just as easily be demonstrated by more clearly articulating where
the boundaries of state law lie; those boundaries could leave considerable
space for the bar's nomic autonomy. In fact, this is what the bar itself is
asking when it asks the courts to explicate more fully how much protec-
tion for the attorney-client relationship is accorded by the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments to the Constitution.
As for the moral superiority of one view over another, I believe that
state control over lawyers poses a serious threat to freedom, as the bar's
sacred stories imply. These are, to that extent, my stories too, and they
lead me to support strong barriers that preserve a significant sphere of
nomic autonomy for the bar. But these stories do not lead me to support
the nomos I have described in these pages-the nomos the bar has created
and which it seeks to preserve. Celebrating the proliferation of divergent
normative understandings and even celebrating the particular impor-
tance of nomic autonomy for the bar are not the same as celebrating the
particular normative understanding I have described here. As Professor
Cover states:
It is not the romance of rebellion that should lead us to look to
the law evolved by social movements and communities. Quite
the opposite. Just as it is our distrust for and recognition of the
state as reality that leads us to be constitutionalists with regard
to the state, so it ought to be our recognition of and distrust for
the reality of the power of social movements that leads us to
examine the nomian worlds they create.412
In assessing whether and, if so, how the bar's nomos should be re-
formed, it is important to consider not just the bar's sacred stories but
the acts of lawyers in our real and present world that those stories justify;
one must look not just at the hierarchy of norms and the substantive





understanding of norms in the nomos, but also at the situations in which
the nomos is actually used to justify departures from state norms. To the
extent the current hierarchy of norms and the current understanding of
the scope of client confidentiality and the demands of client loyalty are
used primarily to justify lives dedicated to the powerful and their right to
remain powerful-lives dedicated to circumventing the normative space
left for the rest of society-I find the bar's nomos in need of repair.
By elaborating the content of the bar's nomos and by revealing (and
affirming) its power in these pages, I hope to contribute to a reexamina-
tion of our nomos and to the construction of a nomos that yields lives
closer to the lives I see celebrated in our sacred stories-lives dedicated
to resisting not just the state but any center of arbitrary power and vio-
lence, not just the state but any sector that threatens to dominate the
normative space of our society and to kill off emerging and competing
visions. In action, as our stories suggest, the bar has the power to
weaken the state and its norms-and implicitly to weaken other commu-
nities. We owe ourselves and the rest of society a nomos that suggests
some limits (other than the ability to pay our fee) on the exercise of such
power. It is time we re-formed and repaired our world.
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